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THE NATURALIZATION OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE FAR EAST

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It is sometimes said that Christianity has been so long identified with the West, it has so thoroughly become a Western religion, that it is not adapted to take a great place in the mind and life of the Eastern nations. It is not intended in this remark to overlook the fact that Christianity is itself by origin an Oriental faith, an outgrowth of Judaism. Nor is it denied that, in considerable numbers, men of Oriental race, mainly within the borders of the present Turkish Empire, have from of old confessed Christianity in forms familiar to us in the Greek churches. But these Oriental Christians sustain rather than disprove the judgment which was above expressed. Not only have they shown since before the rise of Mohammedanism no perceptible zeal for the propagation of the Christian faith among other Orientals, but they have reacted powerfully against the propaganda on behalf of Western forms of the Christian faith in their own midst.

What is here meant to be asserted is rather that Christianity, at least as current among those who have been deeply interested in missions, is so largely indebted to Hellenic and Roman and Teutonic culture, so long associated with the civilization of Europe, as to be antipathetic even to the Semitic peoples out of the midst of whom Jesus of Nazareth arose, and totally alien to the remoter Asiatics like the Chinese and Japanese, or even to those who, like the Hindus, share with Europeans at least a common Aryan origin. The Christianity which in fact is offered, whether by Roman Catholic or Protestant emissaries, to these

children of the East in all the pride of their intellectual and spiritual inheritance, is, in the form of its doctrinal statement, the direct result of a history of thought whose field has been mainly the basin of the Mediterranean and, more recently, Western and Northern Europe. It is, in the form of its organization, so palpably the reflection of conditions which for ages prevailed in Europe that that form cannot be understood among us without reference to these facts, and ought not to be offered to others without acknowledgment of these facts. The phase of Christianity which is likely now to be carried to the East by zealous adherents is, in its form of worship, the direct deposit of the feeling and experience of a more or less defined group of races which have a common aesthetic as well as intellectual tradition. And finally, the ethical assumptions, or at all events the moral emphases, the whole type of life both public and private, in which this Christianity has expressed itself, the conduct it has fostered, not to say the institutions which it has produced, are those which have been evolved mainly within the area of the history of European morals.

Yet, whether from the side of the Roman Catholics or of the Protestants, those who have been eager for the propagation among Eastern peoples of the faith dear to themselves have not been, for the most part, of those who were prepared to make these sweeping admissions. Or, to put it differently, those who have been prepared to make these admissions have not been, until recently, in numbers among those who have been moved by an enthusiasm for their own faith and belief in its saving efficacy for others which launches men upon a propaganda involving isolation and reproach. The appeal of the missionary career, in the early stages of the work, is primarily not so much to the reflective as to the active, not to say the heroic, qualities in men. Its demand is for those qualities which pioneers, explorers, and adventurers show, for the men whom Stevenson describes as "mighty men of their hands, the smiters and builders, the judges who have lived long and done sternly," who have not always indeed hesitated when they might, but who at all events reveal that the world was not made in hesitation. The career has gathered to itself men who have loved their cause and their fellows and have created

problems which very possibly require for their solution other gifts than those which the pioneers themselves possessed.

A work thus inaugurated comes to a point where it needs pondering, solemn review, and sympathetic questioning. It has need of much that a man may do in his study. It has need of that which a man much in his study may see with his eyes when he transports himself to the field. It has need of the man of much study who will spend his whole life in the field. It has need of continual readjustment of its measures, not to say even transformation of its ideals, as in its maturer stages it meets the maturer and more complex problems of the mind and life of the nations to which it has gone. It has need of perennial reconsideration of its own principles and of its own nature in the light of that which its experience reveals. And not the least of the services of the endeavor to propagate Christianity among alien races is that which this effort renders to the understanding of Christianity itself. If certain assumptions concerning Christianity which have obtained largely unquestioned within areas where Christianity has been long in the ascendant are found to be baseless, inadequate, or perverse, surely we have cause to be grateful to those whose wider contacts tend to rid us of our provincialisms, to rebuke us for our pharisaisms, and to bring home to us some sense of the simplicity, the vital quality, the self-transforming capacity, of that which in our Christianity we really do possess.

It is beyond question that the most of those who have, at any time thus far, been ardent for the propagation of Christianity among alien races have done so under one form or another of the assumption that Christianity is an absolute religion—the absolute religion—destined to be universal because absolute. For some of those this assumption has gone even farther. It has amounted practically to the conviction that the form in which they themselves had experienced the blessings of Christianity was identical with the whole revelation of God for the religious life of man. By this assumption they have stayed their souls on the Eternal in all the vicissitudes of their endeavor. By this they have without doubt moved multitudes and do now move them. When ever has not the conviction of the absolute been a source of peace and again of might to those whom it possessed? When ever is

not that conviction, put forth by some, profoundly impressive to others? This ring of certainty has had much to do with the success of any propaganda. When ever did a doubter win men to the overcoming of their doubts or lead them to the abandonment of that which they had deemed assured?

The conception of the absoluteness of Christianity and the place of Christianity in the history of religion has been much discussed of recent years. It is to most men so obvious, once their attention has been called to it, that a religion cannot be in the same sense both absolute and historic, that the time seems opportune for the illumination of this theme from current experience as well. It seems fitting to set that proposition in the light of facts such as may be witnessed in the Orient at the present moment, and to test it by observations of the living contact of Christianity with the living faiths of the East. If it has conduced to clearness that men should debate in what sense it is possible to allege that Christianity is absolute and in what sense not, no less do we free ourselves from embarrassment and gather power from the perception of the relativity of Christianity. Prolonged administrative experience, observation on the field, the compulsion to formulate one's reflections and if possible to shape a policy—these should contribute something toward the bringing to a fruitful conclusion a discussion which only too easily may become abstract and remote. Exactly through these the theoretical propositions issuing from the comparative study of religions should be made more helpful to the cause of Christian missions and more useful to the understanding of our own Christianity, with which we must ever be afresh and without fear concerned.

We were saying that without doubt, with many of those who have been engaged in the missionary endeavor in the East, that certainty of Christian experience out of which they speak has been unconsciously expanded into a conviction of the absoluteness of the form of faith and practice in which they themselves have been born and bred. What could be more natural with these than the assumption that other men would have the great experience of conversion and of progress in the Christian life under the same forms with themselves? We all have a feeling somewhat akin

to this concerning the atmosphere of the home in which we were born, the tradition of the family stock and neighborhood, the nation to which we belong, the maxims of the early discipline which we received. It is only by experience and reflection that we are made aware how many other homes there are, how many other traditions and inheritances, other environments and stimuli. We realize that through these others have had experiences which were for them of absolute worth. And, coming to religion, did not the earliest disciples of Jesus, having received still as Jews from him, a Jew, the precious experience of truth and grace and of redeeming power, assume that all others must receive that experience with the same appendages and in the same way? Was not that the gist of the great struggle between them and Paul? Was not that the crisis and parting of the ways of the earliest Christianity, typical of all other crises and partings of the ways which have been ever since? Indeed it is not half so wonderful that ten men, and those the personal disciples of the Master, stuck fast in this notion of the absoluteness of their Judaism, as that there was found even one, and he a man who had not seen the Master, who had the insight and courage to rebuke them to their faces, and to have his whole life made at once miserable and glorious because of his unfaltering adherence to his vision of the greater meaning of the Master's gospel which possessed him. And are we not, as we said in our initial sentence, Western Christians, or—to put it more correctly—being Western, are we not Christians, in the sense of our own real experience, only because Paul and men like him insisted that the Gospel in going to the West should leave what was Eastern and Semitic behind it? They urged that it should become Greek to the Greek, Roman in Rome, African to the Carthaginians, Gallic to Gauls, Teutonic at the last to our own ancestors. It was not merely clothed with the garments of new times and places but fed with the food, vitalized with the rich blood, of the new races, domesticated, naturalized, nationalized, transmitted from father to son, as all part and parcel of the mystery of the transmission of life. All futile, impertinent, and unpardonable obstacles were to be left behind. The inward spirit of it was to be so merged with new traits as to be no longer identical with its old self in any sense save this, that

what had blessed some men in Galilee under the terms inviolable, human, and therefore divine, of real religious experience which Galileans naturally had, now blessed peoples then unheard of, and still blesses us. That is the old, the perennial story.

We in turn must have so great a faith as to realize that though we cannot set ourselves outside of our own skins one whit more than could Paul outside his Rabbinism, though we cannot personally shed our Occidentalisms when we cross the Hellespont trending eastward, any more than could Paul divest himself of his Orientalisms when he crossed it passing west, yet we anticipate that the faith we bear will leave wholly behind it many of the forms, dear to us, in which we bear it. It will not perpetuate itself as a mere imitation, but as the life of men who live. It will transform them indeed, but, exactly in that measure, be itself transformed into a likeness past all our forecasting. It will be the life in God as revealed through Christ to the soul of the Chinese man. It will be this or it will be nothing to the Chinese man. Paul's own inheritance was too much for him. The Judaism of his teaching is often as pronounced as is the anti-Judaism of his practice. He cannot forget the things which he breathed since his earliest breath and drank with his mother's milk. But had the ordinary destiny of literature befallen the letters which he left, or had the Church come earlier to a truer sense wherein the inspiration of those rare letters lay, nothing could have prevented the complete decomposition of Paul's cherished forms of argumentation, like the corn of wheat which falls into the ground and dies. Nothing but that strange fate which ultimately gave to Paul's lightest letter the same kind of value as a verbal oracle which Paul himself assigned to Law and Prophets could have committed men removed from him by fifty generations and by half the circumference of the earth to the endeavor to find in those incidental elements of synagogue dialectic the forms in which we still must believe in our own Christ. Meantime the whole logic of Paul's life-contention and the whole history of the Occidental churches which he gave his life to found proved just the contrary. They expressed the deep meaning of the Gospel and the spirit of Paul's adored Master in forms Paul never would have dreamed.

In the same manner, we cannot go to the Orient as other than

the Western men we are. And when we put on Chinese coats and have a thin blond queue projecting from the fringe a British bald spot makes, we do but make the matter worse, not better, it would seem. We cannot expect to be taken seriously when we are always playing a part. We understand the Gospel in the way we do in the wake of an immemorial inheritance. It is ours to speak it as we understand. Not in one lifetime nor in nine, could these be given us, should we surely see things as the Chinese man sees, who not only has not our inheritance, but who has one, vivid and immemorial, of his own. We do not need to torture ourselves to see Christianity otherwise than as we do or as we imagine that the Chinese man may see it. The problem of the transmission of faith is easier than that. The level of the transfusion of the blood of religion is different from that. Least of all need we join the ranks of those who deem that nothing can be done until we arrive at a statement of the essence of Christianity. The pursuit of the philosopher's stone is not more futile than that notion, and this for the simplest of reasons: so soon as you have stated this essence, it ceases to be essence and becomes a concrete, a local, temporal, personally conditioned, partial, and passing embodiment of that essence. We might as well say that we will transmit nothing but the pure spirit of learning to our pupils. We cannot do that. We can only with joy impart to them such scraps of learning as we have, with all their imperfections on their heads, and hope that in the process students may catch something of the spirit of learning which will make them living and life-giving in the field of scholarship, and cause their achievements to be greater and better than our own have been. There is, therefore, something sublime in this faith of the Christian man as he goes among men and takes in simple courage and good cheer the faith which he has, the character which he is, the spirit which Christ has enabled him to be, and, without blinking his own imperfections or being deterred from work by those who insistently remind him of them, yet trusts that God will make all but the true life of his religion to rot as the mere body of it, but will also make that true life of religion to prevail among the men over whom he yearns, and in them and in their world to have what body God shall please.

But, as we were saying, quite the opposite of these ideas has prevailed in the large in both the Roman Catholic and the Protestant communions. In the one the forms of sound doctrine, organization, and practice, stand identified with Christianity, and Christianity with these. Their truth and permanence has been guaranteed by the authoritative tradition of the Church—a tradition which in the last analysis is regarded as infallible. The greatest wonder of the long history of this Church is the flexibility which it has shown, its power of adaptation to most varied circumstances. In its missionary practice it has shown a disposition to accommodate itself to the ideas and customs of the peoples whom it set out to win for which it has indeed been often bitterly reproached. It is curious, therefore, that this Church should appear to be unconscious of the principle which these concessions illustrate. It has been most confident in its assertion that it has never changed and will remain unchangeable, all the while that it is in itself the greatest witness of the transformation which we have suggested through the influence of the environment in the midst of which it has worked.

On the other hand, the Protestant churches deemed that they went back to the New Testament. They believed that they reached a statement of faith, a form of government and practice, guaranteed by that Testament, and having something of the same inviolability which appertained to that New Testament. The tradition was declared to be human and errant, but the document which lay at the source of the tradition to be divine, infallible. It was not perceived that even if men could perform the miracle of transporting themselves thus from the sixteenth century to the first, not even thus could they escape that contingency and relativity which belongs to everything that is historical. On the whole, it is but fair to say that the Protestant missions have been far more shy of "accommodation," as it has been called, to the principles and practices of the non-Christian peoples among whom they worked than have the Roman Catholics, and that for a creditable reason. They have had less confidence, or rather no confidence, in mere external relation to the Church and in the saving efficacy of its sacraments. They have been less tempted to work for numbers and imposing visible results. They have

cared less that their converts should be influential in state and society. They have worked more for inward and spiritual transformation as antecedent to all others. But it cannot be said that the sensitiveness about accommodation, however well grounded, has tended to make the Protestant missions appear to be more liberal than the Roman Catholic, but rather less so. It has made their emissaries to appear to be more insistent on a certain, necessarily Occidental, form of statement of faith and practice of devotion and outward shaping of the life, as the essential prerequisite of their converts being allowed to bear the Christian name at all. We are confronted with the singular anomaly that those missions which have said with perfect truth that they desired only to teach men in their inward spirit, that they cared nothing for form, have yet achieved, in those whom they have profoundly influenced, such a reproduction of the typical religious experience as we are familiar with it here at home, such an acceptance even of our forms of statement of the mysteries of faith, and such a conformity to traditional Protestant, not to say denominational, practices, as the Roman Catholic, working in his less intensive way, never achieves, and possibly never designs or desires. One going into a Hindu or Chinese Christian church is positively astounded to see how completely some of the converts represent, seemingly to the minutest detail, the type with which we are familiar in the devout life of our churches here at home.

But these converts, much as we may rejoice in that which is undoubtedly genuine in them, give us food for reflection. They surely represent the intense influence of devoted missionaries upon some. But they surely are witnesses of the fact that this Christianity, real as it is, is still exotic. They are too much like ourselves for us to have the deeper joy of them we seek. They are the proof of the still ascendant influence of the foreigner. They are the evidence that among them Christianity is not yet naturalized. They explain how their compatriots may come to look upon the Christian as denationalized, and on conversion as equivalent to alienation; upon adherence to the Westerners' faith as proof that one has gone over absolutely to the stranger. Such phenomena may indeed be an evidence of the intensity and power of conviction with which Christianity has been taught in foreign

lands and of the revolutionary effect which it has without doubt had upon individuals. They show the complete displacement of previous convictions in such individuals, the transformation, not to say transfiguration, in feeling and life which these have undergone. They may be the indices upon the part of certain peoples or of certain strata of these peoples of almost complete receptivity toward the thoughts and the example and impulse given by the stranger from the West. Of the people of India the remark has often been made that, probably as the result of the age-long domination of one conqueror after another, they are in considerable degree pliant to foreign influence, and, despite the proverbial conservatism of the East, are liable in individual cases to go over to the standard of the stranger with an unreserve which seems amazing. The emissary of the foreign religion has already reaped in some measure the unhappy consequences of his identification with the military, civil, social, and commercial conquests of his race. He is certain to reap those injurious consequences in yet larger measure still. But momentarily he did reap an advantage. So soon as he advanced to the point where he made any impression at all, he impressed his constituency with the almost absolute contrast of that type of thought, feeling, life, which he offered to that which he found. He was able to win over some almost without reservation or resistance to this contrasting type. Perhaps he felt, and perhaps they felt, that only by this breach with the convert's past, this practical denial of his antecedents, this separation from his environment, this projection along a new path, could the integrity of his faith, the purity of his life, the characteristic element of his experience, be preserved. In many cases this may have been so. But the question is a far larger one than of the individual case. The question would not be answered by the accumulation of such cases. The question is, Is this multiplication of the foreign type what the Christianization of these lands would mean? Is this a practicable aim, upon the largest possible scale and for an indefinite time? Is it a goal which ever can be attained? Is it a goal which, when we calmly consider, we even wish to attain?

Meantime portentous changes are taking place, with which we must bear reckoning if we are to achieve anything further.

These changes affect both the missionary himself and those to whom he bears his message. It is sometimes cavalierly assumed that those alterations in the apprehension of Christianity which have taken place in the intellectual centres of Christendom within the nineteenth century, and which are beginning profoundly to affect the Christian body at home, have been as yet largely unfelt by the Christian representatives and their following abroad. Observation does not confirm that view. That all missionaries are thus affected is not asserted. That all ministers, or even laymen, here at home are thus visibly affected, probably would not be claimed. But that some veterans in the field, and some others, younger in years, who have escaped an obsolete style of training, are as much touched by the modern movement of thought as are any among ourselves may be affirmed. It would seem that the thoughtful among these persons stand over against the non-Christian world in a relation very similar to that in which the early Church stood in the face of the Graeco-Roman world. They are able to judge of principles and practices, not merely theoretically, as we may do from our studies, but in the actual contact with the persons to whom these faiths are a living reality, with institutions which they have created, and with a public and private life which they have inspired. Other things being equal, these men are in a better position to judge the faiths with which their own is brought into comparison, and to judge them by their influence and actual achievement. In like manner they are in a better position to judge their own faith, not by that which has been traditionally claimed for it, or even solely by that for which it may have stood in their own personal experience, but by the power which it shows in actual competition for the allegiances of men, the power to work a real redemption of men in the world and of the world through men. They are in a position to form a just and generous estimate of the great historic faiths which dominate the Orient, of the strength of these and of their weaknesses, of their points of contrast with Christianity and of resemblance to the same, of the virtues which they breed and of the vices which they cause or tolerate, as well as of the vices rampant in Christendom and still more on the fringe of Christendom in the isolation of the East.

It is certain, moreover, that the spread of Western education in the East, the increasing number of youths of standing and ability who from the East are being educated in the West, are exerting a levelling influence the full effect of which has been yet by no means felt. In the vast population of India, despite the long fidelity of the British government and of the missions and in spite of the zeal of some classes of the Indians, it is yet only a small portion of the people which is moved. In the still vaster population of China the agitation and upheaval is but just beginning. In Japan, with its small population, its compact area, its excellent means of communication, with the instincts of leadership by an enlightened minority inherited from the feudal age, and with a political situation which pushed Japan forward for self-preservation as no nation in the world was ever pushed, the movement has been successful almost beyond belief. Japan stands already among the great educated and educating nations in the world. The view which these countries have had and are now having through the residence of their youth in our universities; the impression they derive of the standing of Christianity within Christendom, of the shortcomings and delinquencies of our civilization at home as well as abroad, of the contrast between the ideal and the actual, of the friction of the sects among themselves and the alienation of a large part of the public from them all—these observations, with the testimony of travellers and the witness of the press, are not likely to make just the Christian propaganda to stand out from all the mass of things, European and American, which in the Orient have lost prestige, as the one which has not thus suffered loss. Quite the contrary, the nemesis of the connection between the mission work and national ambitions, international complications and race agitations, commercial exploitations, and what not, is upon us. In a far higher degree than we really have been responsible for these, we shall be complicated in the issues. For having once, even only in a left-handed way, profited by these, or only not sufficiently rebuked them, we shall have with our own right hand to help to pay the bill. If the native was once too pliant to the foreigner, too easily influenced, he may turn out to be not pliant enough, and not easily influenced even when the reasons for being influenced might be very good.

If he was once too ready to abandon his own faith for that of another, there may come a time when he will be altogether adverse to the religion of the foreigner, and that not because he is more faithful to his own, but because he has lost all serious interest in any. He will have become secularized in the wake of this vast secular movement in the midst of which he is, materialized, paganized, with the real paganism, of which there is plenty in America, having lost his interest in anything except dollars and pleasures, and in this also adopted the attitude of many here at home.

Many things have made for great change in the aspect of the self-consciousness of the peoples of the Far East within a generation. Pride of race, fidelity to the tradition of a great past, these races have always had. But its directest working was to make them ardently desire to perpetuate their isolation and to shut out the Occidental with all his ways and works. This spirit animated the dealings of Japan with the West until well within the lifetime of men now living. It animated the official course of China until the year 1900. But there came a change in Japan all the motives of which we do not fully know. The central element in that change was the perception on the part of the Japanese leaders that the old policy of isolation, the effort to maintain the hermit position, was a mistaken method. With the resources then at the command of Japan, every outbreak of popular feeling—often natural and just—against the encroachment of the foreigner led only to yet more damaging encroachment, to fresh concessions wrung from a helpless people. It was clear that the end sought would have to be gained by a path precisely the opposite of that which had thus far been pursued. Whereas heretofore nothing was to be learned from the foreigner, now everything was to be learned from him, or at all events everything was to be learned about him, in order that the people of the Island Empire might meet the foreigner on his own ground. Japan was to become other than her traditional self in order that she might remain herself. There was at one time even too great an avidity for things foreign, merely as foreign, and not necessarily as true. There was some too light-hearted parting with things beautiful and germane to the real character of the race.

One saw far too much of the impress of what is mistaken and unworthy, of what is stupid and vulgar and utterly disheartening, in our own civilization. In so great a metamorphosis it is likely that such a state of things was for a time inevitable. But whatever hallucination men may once have indulged, no one now imagines that this great transformation—one of the most wonderful episodes in human history—took place because the Japanese had lost their national sense. Rather, we see clearly that it was the strong race-sense, the passionate national consciousness, a patriotism which has thrilled the world, which was the deep underlying motive and true explanation of the transformation. No one who reflects upon the use made by the Japanese three years ago of the sciences and art of war by land and sea, of the hygiene of camps and transportation, of remedial measures of the hospital or the battlefield; no one who compares their commissariat with our own in 1898 or that of Great Britain in South Africa in 1900; no one who studies the Japanese constitution, the procedure of the courts, the methods of taxation, the organization of railways, telegraphs, express service, and the post; no one who has sailed in their ships and watched their commercial navy eating up the trade of the Pacific; no one who has listened in their universities, been conducted through their schools, can any longer dream that Japan is playing with some one else's weapons, imitating other people's methods, and walking in the foreigners' way. These things they have absolutely made their own. Through them they express themselves. Each year will see less and less of the incongruous and superficial and more of true assimilation, vital reproduction, more of the resurgence of the mighty spirit of the race.

And what has happened for Japan may be predicted, with the modifications which belong to it, for China too; all the more because Japan has given to China ocular demonstration that this is the path to tread if China also is ever to be rid of a foreign aggression which has already cost her much, and has seemed at times certain to cost her more. The differences between the two peoples with which we must needs reckon are many and striking. The vast numbers of the Chinese, their lack of homogeneousness as compared with the Japanese, the greatness of their territory,

and the scant means of communication as yet, the weakness of the central government and the lack of any veneration of the Chinese for it, the want of anything resembling the leadership which the old nobility gave to Japan, the militant democratic trait of the Chinese—these considerations and others like them may make the movement slower. The episode of 1900 was the end of an era. It was sufficiently dramatic to be ever remembered as such. There are possibilities of revolution which no man can reckon with. But, though a revolution of national proportions might jeopardize incidentally the foreigner in life and property, no such attempt in principle to rid the nation of the foreigner is any longer probable. Slow as are the peasants in the interior provinces to understand what the viceroys on the coast are trying to do, the sense surely has penetrated China that there are far shrewder things to do with the foreigner than to kill him. From the stranger much is to be learned. All that he brings is to be used. The exploiter is to be exploited. That the Chinese man loves the foreigner better than he used to do there is no reason to believe. But “China for the Chinese,” the cry ever on men’s lips, means a different thing from that which it meant only ten years ago. It means an aim the legitimacy of which we cannot for a moment question. In an antagonism some phases of which we may deplore, we do well to remember that there are causes of that antagonism of which we men of the West cannot be proud. Of the issue of this movement in the long run it would seem that no one can be in doubt. It will be a China open to the world, not merely in the sense of travel or even only of commerce. It will be a China open to the world, not merely diplomatically or socially but also intellectually and morally. It will be a China profoundly influenced by the world, but profoundly influencing the world in turn, in a way that we have never looked to China for influence. It will leave us the superiority precisely in those things in which we are superior and in no others. It will be a China not passively recipient of education and religion from the West. It will be a China intelligently receptive, in the end, only of those aspects of the intellectual or Christian life of the West which are really profitable for China, and rejecting all the rest. It will be a China so vividly transforming that which it does

receive as to become an interpreter in its own fresh way of the inner meaning and the further consequences of Christianity to those from whom the Chinese have received that faith.

Of one thing we may speak with confidence. The enlarging of the so-called spheres of influence to which the Powers in 1901 so ardently looked forward, and from which they were perhaps only by their own dissensions held back, the virtual partitioning of China which was to be the prelude to the overt and formal partition that once seemed to the over-confident Europeans so easy—that occupation would surely not have retarded, it could but have accelerated, the awakening of China. It would have increased the embitterment which everybody now is trying to allay. It would have given the foreigner more territory to defend, whereas he is just now sufficiently doubtful about being able to defend what he already has. The issue of the war with Russia shows that the task would have involved in the maintaining of these armies of occupation an expenditure of men and money of which no one in those days dreamed. It might easily have involved the Powers in conflict with one another. If persisted in, it might easily have precipitated a conflict of China with no small portion of the Western world. Such a conflict men would then have jeered to hear suggested. But when one thinks of the numbers of the Chinese, of the potential wealth of China, and of the strides of her recent military development, no one is jeering now. The moral, intellectual, and even commercial influence of the West upon China may in the end be far greater because certain things which were then supposed to make for the might of Europe in the East were not done, and because it is absolutely certain now that they never will be done.

No one can maintain that those portions of China in which the foreigner, of whatever nationality, has had least disputed sway have been the regions in which the best fruit of Christian teaching has been shown. They have been the regions in which, for missionary and merchant alike, not merely a theoretical extra-territoriality under treaty could be claimed, but in which, through the volunteer militia company within the Concession or through the gunboat off the Bund, that extra-territoriality could on a moment's notice be enforced. It cannot be said, however, that

these were conditions ideally adapted for the making of the true impression of the Gospel of the Prince of Peace. These have been the regions in which, indeed, foreign virtues of the highest order have been shown, but, as well, foreign vices of the most scandalous sort have cried to Heaven. If under the benign régime of governments sufficiently far away, and not certain to be in accord, although their subjects in emergency were sure through thick and thin to stand together, an occasional pharisee made broad his phylacteries, at all events it must be conceded that there were many publicans and sinners too. Even now it might occasionally go hard with a foreigner in a Chinese court. It goes hard also with a Chinaman at times in a Chinese court. But the time cannot be far away when to the Chinese also, as to the Japanese in the years after the adoption of their Constitution, this extra-territoriality of the foreigner will come to seem to be an insufferable indignity, a violence to the nation's honor which must be done away. We should hail every advance in China which tends to make possible its doing away.

And as if it were not enough that the foreigner, both good and bad, should be beyond the jurisdiction of the government upon whose soil he lives, some one in a moment of enthusiasm wrung from the Chinese government the concession that even a Chinese convert to the foreigners' religion might enjoy a partial extra-territoriality. At least the dealings of his government with its own citizen might be reviewed officially or unofficially by a subject of a foreign power, to see if that citizen were not being persecuted for his faith. One can never be sufficiently amazed that at the time of the adoption of this clause in the treaties there seems to have been no forecast among those who had the cause of truth and goodness at heart of the immeasurable evil which this would work. But you do wonder that it was not foreseen that never, so long as such ruling obtained, could Christianity make any progress toward naturalization in the land. Never by any possibility could it get beyond being the religion of foreigners and of those who found it profitable to cast in their lot with the foreigner to the possible detriment of the institutions, and in violence to the just sentiment, of their native land. We must suppose that at the time when Christian men made this provision and rejoiced in it

they did not clearly look forward to that kind and degree of naturalization of Christianity in China which seems to us the ideal. They did not realize overwhelmingly, as we have come to do, that Christianity in China must become native or nothing. Only in becoming native has Christianity ever meant anything to any people. The very reason why the forms in which we know and love Christianity are potent to us is that they are the forms in which the spiritual impulse which Christianity is took shape all naturally among our own ancestors. And the very fact that they are natural to us makes them unnatural, and in the end impossible, to other men. The function of the living and loving emissary of Christianity and of the doctrines and practices which he knows about is only a temporary one. The very purpose of them is that they shall function just so long as to bring the life of a new race into contact with the truth, and then they shall cease to be. The new race untrammelled and, as well, uncoddled is to have its own way with Christianity, or Christianity will never have its way with that race.

We have dwelt long upon these external parallels because they seem to bring home with tremendous force the thing we wish to say. The time will come when the Gospel will be preached in China and the Christian Church built up—or else will fail to be built up—for the same reasons and under the same conditions in which the Gospel is preached and the Church built up in England or the United States. We may rejoice in that prospect. The period of tutelage has been long enough. At all events it has been long enough to develop, with the virtues, also the weaknesses which are developed under tutelage. And, whether we will or no, we are being forced to the period in which we must take all the risks, suffer the evils, bear the trials, and reap also the excellent consequences in character—our own and that of those whom we instructed—of a period whose ideals are far different from those of tutelage. To say that the days of missionary usefulness are over is absurd. It would be more true to say that they are just fairly begun. But the days are over of the kind of influence and the method of exerting it which have perhaps on the whole in the past preponderated, and that often with very good effect. The difficulties of the older situation were great. In face of such resistance

as China offered to Morrison and those who followed him any success was admirable, and the success achieved amazing. But the difficulties of the propaganda for Christianity in a China open to us as it is today are not less great. They are certainly of a different sort. The thing which grows upon us as we think of these nations whose problem is ever more and more like our own is that there is no barbarism among them which is not also here at our own doors. There is no real heathenism among them the like of which is not illustrated in our own community. There is no dark shadow of immorality and superstition among them which has not its parallel in our own midst. There is no faith of men sincerely held which has not done for them something of that which our own faith has done for us. And a faith, even if it be our own, insincerely held, can hardly be expected to accomplish on the other side of the world what it cannot do on this. In face of some things which we might mention in our own recent history, we hesitate to call other nations uncivilized. It needs explanation to our own soberer selves and to others when we make bold to call this a Christian nation. And there are some of us who have almost laid away the appellation "heathen," or when we bring it out for service are quite as likely to apply it to inhabitants of avenues in our own country as to the denizens of the heart of Africa or of the islands of the sea.

We may deplore the fact that the problem of all the other nations, even of those old Oriental ones, is so fast becoming so much like our own. We may deplore this devastating advance through the East of the Western type. We may even waste time in recrimination as to whether the merchant opened the country for the missionary, or the missionary for the man of trade. That makes little difference now. The one thing which stands out in the religious relation is this: that if Christianity in the East remains an exotic—English, German, or American; Roman Catholic or Protestant; Anglican, Puritan, conservative, or radical, as we count these differences—it will be among the things which, as meaningless for the future of China, will be swept away. If in its moral and spiritual force, its idealism and optimism, in its law of service and of sacrifice, in its comfort and inspiration, as the stay of private goodness and of public virtue, it holds the hearts

of the Chinese, and the Chinese hold it in their hearts and express it freely in their own lives and institutions, its spreading in his land the Chinese man cannot permanently prevent. If it gives him more hold upon what is greatest in human life than does his Buddhism or his Confucianism, it will dominate him in the end in spite of these. If it does not give him such hold upon what is greatest in life, we should not wish it to dominate him. If we have any real faith in our own religion, we believe it will be so. If we have no such faith in our religion itself, then how can we have any faith in the paltry things which we may do in its name?

But indeed, if we have ever lacked this kind of confidence in the inward spirit of Christianity; if we have ever doubted its ability to adapt itself to new and strange conditions, its capacity to transform nations and incidentally itself to undergo the most radical of transformations, that must be because we have forgotten how great a transformation Christianity has already undergone in its march from one region to another people. We have not reflected how alien to its Jewish, Hellenic, Roman self it has in time become, in order that it might be to us Teutons and Saxons what it is. We forget how recent are many forms which we call ancient, and how much of what we deem essentially Christian is not Christian at all! No aspect of Church History is at the present moment claiming more attention from scholars than the survivals in Christianity of the forms of thought, feeling, and action of the earlier faiths, which Christianity would thus appear not wholly to have displaced. No study is more interesting or instructive than that of the deposit in the types of Christianity successively current from the media through which it had to work. That Christianity was itself primarily a religious revival within Judaism; that its first adherents, and even the Lord himself, were devout Jews—the evidence of all this is written broad and long both in the Synoptic Gospels and by Paul. That this strong Judaic element, these traits of the old upon which the new life of Christianity was grafted, were not eliminated for generations, nay more, that, owing to the peculiar standing given them as witnessed in the inspired Scripture, they are even now only beginning to be generally recognized as Jewish survivals and eliminated—this may be regarded as among the assured results of New

Testament study. No sooner did Christians pass beyond Palestine, even only to the Jews in Alexandria and Asia, than Christianity accommodated itself to the forms current in the centres of Hellenic influence upon Judaism. These things are evidenced in the thought and life implied in the Epistle to the Hebrews and in the Fourth Gospel. The same thing is yet more evident when we look at the witness of the writings of the Apologists and of the early Fathers, Greek, Roman, African, and of whatever racial and cultural affinity they were. Nothing is more impressive than to behold how those who most rejoiced in the conquest of the pure Gospel in the world, those to whom the pagan life about them was but the proof of an evil spirit, and pagan thought but the pathetic evidence of the powerlessness and error of the human mind, yet themselves never write or speak or act but they give evidence of being profoundly influenced by that life and mind. Conquer the Western world they did, these glowing advocates of a vital faith, these exponents of a new religious power. But into every institution which they framed, into every system of instruction in the faith which they put forth, into the methods of defence of that same faith which they devised, they took up all unknowingly, and in a profound sense all rightfully, elements fundamental to the life and thought which they deposed. In the long retrospect of centuries we perceive that it was exactly by these elements which they unwittingly wrought into composition with the characteristic impulse of their faith that they conquered as they did. In these elements lay their temptation and their weakness often, to be sure; but in these elements lay also one of the secrets of their strength and achievement as well. Books have been written to show how, in the seething caldron of the nations which the Roman Empire in the two centuries after Jesus had become, elements of religion the most incongruous were mingled, and composite types arose. Syncretism was the trait. Surely it is a most naïve assumption that in the midst of this religious syncretism the Christian religion alone stood, and through the generations, through the ebb and flow of races in the mobile population of the vast united Empire, Christianity alone remained unquickenened and unimpaired. The Christianity of the basin of the Mediterranean, the Christianity which we inherit,

is itself a syncretistic religion. If it had not been such, we never should have inherited it. The creeds the Church has cherished, the systems on which it has relied, are the children of the fruitful union of that Jewish revival of religion which the earliest Christianity was with the intellectual genius of the Greeks. The institutions which are to us traditional are the fruit of the reaction of Jewish, Hellenic, and Roman impulses to order and efficiency in the social combinations of mankind. Was the eremite, the monastic, the coenobitic ideal, which played such a part down to the Reformation, a Christian impulse? Was the priesthood as a class a Christian notion? Was the dual standard of life for spirituals and for other people within the implications of Christ's teaching? Was asceticism a thing native to Christianity? Was the contrast of the sacred and secular Jesus' notion? Was not the substitutionary thought of the atonement a reminiscence of Teutonic social order? Or, to come to things small, is not a Christmas tree a pagan symbol? Are not many of the customs of our religious festivals the result of the partial infusion of the Christian spirit into ancient popular customs too dear to be taken away from a converted people by the converting priests? Are not some of the saints in the calendar faint recollections of the heroes of folk-lore? Is not the whole worship of the saints, as it dominated the Middle Age, the metamorphosis of a polytheism which was never so far put away as to need to be brought back?

And are not some phases of faith now dead to us the living phases with men who stand at the same point in the religious experience at which our ancestors stood not so long ago? When the Hottentot reads in the Bible about witches, the missionary, with his modern sense about the Bible, is hard put to it to maintain for the Hottentot his belief in the Scripture and at the same time to rid him of his murderous superstition about witches. The poor man believed in witches before he ever saw a Bible. For the moment he believes in them the more, and not the less, because the Bible seems to sustain him in his belief. But so did the Bible prove the witches to our own Massachusetts forbears; and, fortified by the Bible, they too committed abominable crimes and lived in nameless fear. In China it will be pointed out to you that the Scripture of the New Testament gives color to the

belief in demoniacal possession. In confirmation of the Scripture the Chinese believe in demoniacal possession too. All China is, so to say, permeated with this belief. A book written by a missionary not many years ago cites possibly a hundred examples of unquestionably authentic experiences in China, to show that phenomena of demoniacal possession occur in China precisely similar to those recorded in the Scripture. The Chinese explanation of these phenomena is the same as that offered in the words of the Scripture. By these examples the Scripture is supposed to be defended against criticism, and it is made certain that men were and are possessed.

A missionary said that he thought it had been almost a generation since, in the field with which he was familiar, a Western emissary of Christianity had preached material hell fire and the physical torment of the lost. He doubted if the natives of the younger generation had ever heard from a foreigner an exposition of Scripture looking in that direction. And yet there were native preachers, when they went off on their preaching tours, making men tremble, as Edwards in Northampton made our fathers tremble too. Did not the Scriptures speak of a hell fire? Does not the Chinese man in his legal processes resort to torture? But is it so long since our own fathers also depicted their God as an Oriental Sovereign, ruling without a code, or even having a code which might conceivably reverse the maxims of what seems true and good to mortal men? These seem to be most interesting examples of the contact of the Gospel with the rudimentary notions and sad mistakes of men. They remind us, right from the face of our own Scriptures, how the spiritual impulse of the Gospel passed through a period of amalgamation with notions which are not true and do not make for the good. It may be almost in the same order and sequence that a new race, in contact with the Gospel, will pass through some of those same amalgamations too.

Quite apart from the idea of the saving efficacy of the Sacraments and other ideas belonging to its ecclesiastical theory, the Roman Catholic Church has, as is well known, always pursued in its missionary activities a policy which is in fundamental contrast with the prevailing Protestant practice, and which has had

some interesting consequences for that aspect of the history of missions of which we speak. The Roman Catholic communion has assumed, namely, that the true course in the training of a race to Christian conviction and practice is that which identifies the convert with the Church almost so soon as his consent can be gained. It cares for his education in Christian knowledge and his training in Christian character, so as to say, from the inside. It frankly sets Christian maturity as a goal to be best approached by those who have been perhaps for the greater portion of their lives enrolled among the baptized members, if not actually among the confirmed communicants, of the Church. The Protestant emphasis, on the other hand, has generally been upon an initial experience, more or less pronounced, of conversion. The Protestant has hesitated even to baptize, and still more to receive to his other Sacrament, those who have not already made some marked progress in the graces of the Christian character. He has feared lest immature Christians might bring reproach upon the cause, uncertain ones might lapse, the clear distinction between the old life and the new might be obscured; and thus both to converts and watchful outsiders harm be done and offence be given. We have indeed here only painted the same contrast with which these two types of Christians stand over against one another here also in the home land. But the contrast is even more pronounced in the missionary field. This is notoriously the reason why statistics of the one body are practically incommensurable with those of the other. It is often put as if by this method the Roman Catholic Church actually sought vast numbers of apparent converts, not much concerning itself that part of the conquest was thus only apparent. This may sometimes have been the case. Records of the work of St. Francis Xavier show what entire confidence he had in the Sacrament, and how little he cared that his priests often knew no language in which they could communicate with their adherents. But we should be ashamed not to state the Roman theory in the best light in which its advocates might put it. Just so we would put the Protestant theory in the light in which it expresses true care for the souls of men and for the honor of the Church.

It is clear, when they are thus stated, that each theory has some-

thing to say for itself. Each stands for a truth. But each entails its disadvantages. The Roman Catholic Church thus gets nearer to the people, both—be it said—for its own good and ill. It lays itself open more largely to the accusation, and even to the actual temptation, of taking the unworthy or, in any case, the very dubious; of lowering its standard, and accommodating its claims. It actually enfolds within its ample bosom those who have but in slight measure separated themselves from the maxims and practices of their old life and from the influence of their surroundings. It grows used to this state of things, and takes up within itself, consciously or even unconsciously, not inconsiderable elements upon which no regeneration through a new spirit was passed. It presents the singular contrast of being the faith which professes to differ most absolutely from all others, yet visibly differing very little from the old faiths of its converts, and giving them but a confused sense of anything beyond an external allegiance to a punctilious routine for which it stands. The Roman Church, therefore, represents the phenomenon of the naturalization of Christianity in the Orient in a form in which it is only too easy to say that, if this is what is meant by the naturalization of Christianity, then the less we have of it the better. The more we keep clear of it, the more faithful exponents of Christianity we shall be. It is hardly too much to say of the historic example of De Nobilis's approach to Brahmanism in India, that it attained its success by parting with the most of what is characteristic in Christianity. The so-called Malabar Customs seem only too justly to bear the worst possible name. Even the zeal which the potentates of the French Church in contemporary China have sometimes shown to figure as actual magnates of the Chinese Empire, the recognition they have demanded as if they were officials of the realm, may conduce to some other things, but hardly to the understanding of the Christian religion.

On the other hand, the Protestant theory has the defect of its own quality. It is weak for precisely the same reasons for which it is also strong. In anxiously making something like Christian maturity the *sine qua non* of entrance upon the Christian body, it is setting a standard higher, it would seem, than the Master used to set. It deprives itself of its function as nourisher of the

weak, and the weak of that nourishing within the Church which would seem to be a beautiful attribute of the Church. It makes the Church to appear to be only a voluntary society of more mature persons, who have for reasons decided to become members of it. But these are the shadows of the Evangelicals' own light, even as we see them here at home. If at home it is easy for the thought, emotion, and conduct of the new-comer to Christianity to be forced into the mould of the experience of those who came a generation ago, so abroad it is only too easy for the pattern shown in the mount for the Chinese man, if he will be a Christian at all, to be the pattern regnant in England or New England. The whole drift is to the accentuation of that by which the Christian differs from his old self and his fellows. The tendency is to make the Church appear as the voluntary society of those who have been willing to adopt what the foreigner taught, and to conform to a mode of life in which it might sometimes almost seem as if studied reproach were cast upon antecedent and environment, and nothing were left of that which a man once held dear, and which those whom he loved now hold dear. The divisive effect of this situation is often pitiable. The influence of it for that which is conventional and artificial is evident. If the Roman Catholic faith has accommodated itself too much, has in given instances been completely swamped, has been at times in all that was essential done away; if it has thus in spite of apparent triumphs remained nugatory, as to some extent it has, the Protestant faith, on the other hand, has accommodated itself too little. It has been far less potent than it might, because it has been far less assimilated and less assimilable than it should. It has never sufficiently studied how far, and in what particulars, it might be assimilated, and in what not. To make a phrase, it has never been sufficiently recognized that accommodation is death, but that assimilation is life. To be conformed is one thing: to be transformed is quite another. And except a corn of wheat fall in the ground and die, it abideth alone.

The most interesting illustration of this which we know is the attitude of Christian missionaries in the matter of the worship of ancestors in China. This matter, as is well known, was the root of an old contention in the Roman Catholic missions. It is a

living, not to say a burning, question in Protestant circles in China at this hour. It has often been said that, judged in the light of its own principles, a Buddhism which tolerates the worship of ancestors, as does Buddhism in China, is a most singular combination. It has also been said, and probably with much truth, that, had Buddhism, transplanted to China, not tolerated the worship of ancestors, it would never have made the conquests which it did.

Matteo Ricci, the first great Jesuit leader in China, at Canton after 1581 and at Peking after 1601, was a man who carried away the Chinese of governmental and literary circles by his display of learning in mathematics and exact science as taught in the West, and who certainly, in his riper years, was a scholar of no mean pretensions in the Mandarin language and in his knowledge of things Chinese. It is well known that he allowed converts to continue to practise the rites of ancestor-worship, on the ground that he considered these rites purely civil in their nature. So surprising was the success of his mission and that of his immediate followers that high officials of the Empire became alarmed, and steps were taken to limit an activity which was constantly increasing. Moreover, Dominicans and Franciscans, learning of the success of the Jesuits, flocked to China, and the dissensions of the rival orders did more to imperil the position of the nascent church in China than did the opposition of the Chinese themselves. The Dominicans declared that ancestral worship was idolatrous and sinful. The matter being referred to the Pope, Innocent X sustained the Dominican view. But the Jesuits despatched a special agent to Rome, and Alexander VII reversed the previous decision, approving the opinion that the ancestral rites possessed only civil significance. A French bishop in China continuing the agitation, the Jesuits carried the matter before the great Emperor Kang-hsi himself. The Emperor, in a most interesting document, declared the custom to be political. Not to the physical heavens, but to the great Spirit, is adoration rendered in the so-called worship of Heaven and Earth. The worship of ancestors is the mark only of filial piety and veneration. As such the rites may be participated in by men of many faiths. But exactly as such they are of primary interest to the State. As connected

with the family and the clan system and with the maintenance of the social order, when they are denounced as pernicious, when it is sought to alienate men from them, the State must be alarmed.

In 1704, however, Clement XI recurred to the elder papal decision that the rites are idolatrous, and a papal legate arriving in China ordered all converts to desist from practices interdicted by the Pope. Kang-hsi was not the man to take that tamely. He made it known that all those who wished to break with the Chinese social structure would be outlawed. Missionaries were ordered to leave China upon pain of death. Converts numbering hundreds of thousands were deprived of their spiritual guides, and themselves subjected to bitter persecution. Escorted to the frontier, many of the priests returned in disguise. For decades their converts protected them. New priests from the West came in time to their aid. Their resolution and fortitude became legendary in the East. The succession never failed until the opening of the mission work again, far along in the nineteenth century. Incidentally we may say that the external history was not different in Japan. Here also, under the Tokugawa Shoguns, the effort was made to drive out the Jesuits for what seemed to be the attempt to set up a realm within a realm; although here, it is needless to say, this particular matter of the ancestral worship played no part. And here the persecution of the native converts was more terrible than anything that we hear of in China. In Tokio one may see ivory and metal crucifixes worn almost smooth by being trodden on as they lay in the path along which suspected hordes are said to have been driven between ranks of armed soldiery, those who would tread on the crucifix being spared, while those who would not tread into the dust the symbol of their faith were hewn down on the spot.

But to return to the question of ancestral worship, the problem was thus bequeathed to the Protestant period of missions. Difference of opinion concerning it obtains both among foreign Christians and Chinese adherents to the faith. Despite the utterance of the great Emperor and the oft-repeated opinion of many of the most enlightened men, the common man in China presumably makes no such fine distinction in filial veneration between the propitiation of a possibly aggrieved progenitor and

the homage which is natural to loving hearts and closely connected with that patriarchal social order which sometimes seems to be stronger than even the imperial government itself. A Sicilian gentleman would almost assuredly assert, that it is not worship which is offered to the image of the Saint. But the Sicilian peasant does not make that distinction. The great mass of the Protestant missionaries assuredly would side with the Dominicans and not with the Jesuits in this matter of ancestral worship. It is not difficult, from the evidence of other matters, to accuse the Jesuits of accommodation, of the willingness to leave the convert in most respects as they find him, provided only the obedience at which these propagandists aim is secured. It is not so easy to explain away the Chinese Emperor's luminous utterance. Surely he knew whereof he affirmed. Still, the opinion which he uttered might well be true for men of cultivation like himself, and not true for the vast mass of the Chinese. Despite the inflexible position which most missions have taken, that ancestral worship must be abandoned entirely if a man is to become a Christian, there are not wanting distinguished men in the Protestant missions today who feel that here jealous and uncompromising Protestantism is mistaken; that it has made a mountain out of a mole-hill, a religious issue out of one which is social and secular; that it has made the way of the convert unnecessarily hard, the progress of Christianity needlessly slow; and courted the misjudgment of itself as socially subversive, in a way that it need never have done. In the end, the missionary will generally refer you to the native convert himself, and bid you ask him how he feels about it. The great majority of those questioned answered that they felt the worship of ancestors to be idolatrous. Yet even by this testimony interrogation was not allayed. The men were so essentially of the type above described as foreign Christians that one could not be sure that they were not sincerely echoing the opinions of their revered foreign missionary teachers and, incidentally, what they supposed to be the opinion of their interlocutor as well. Furthermore, it may well have seemed to these men, as to their teachers, that the safer course is to make a clean breach with many aspects of the popular religiosity, ancestor-worship included, in order to be safe from temptation and com-

plex situations. This may be practically true. But such practical reasoning does not settle the theoretical question as to what we really ought to think concerning the meaning of ancestor-worship. With the lapse of time, the sure tact, the racial feeling of the native Christians who are truly such, when the influence of foreign Christians is diminished or removed, will lead the Chinese Christian Church to a satisfactory conclusion of a question which no man can answer with entire confidence at this time. If the ancestor really is only one more among the many possible malevolent spirits whom the Chinese man must exorcise; if this worship is only part of the general nature superstition which has been such an incubus, and which now, with the advance of knowledge of nature, is being rolled away, then the ancestral worship, too, will go. If, however, it is something different, of nobler origin, and connected with the best and not with the worst traits of men, it will survive, no matter what the missionaries may say or do against it. It will be sublimated and ennobled as it comes to stand in clear relations to a higher thought of God and man. It will still express the fact that the Chinese man reveres the authors of his life and the traditions of his past in a way in which he feels that we wildly energetic, irreverent worshippers of the future do not revere our fathers and our past.

Ricci directly asserted that the worship of Confucius stood upon the same level with that of the ancestors—that it was a social and civil act, not a religious one. The implications of Kang-hsi's statement are the same. The judgment of most students of comparative religion agrees that Confucianism is not a religion, but merely an ethical system. Thus the veneration accorded to Confucius would be but the grateful recognition of one of the greatest benefactors of the human race, the father of the intellectual and moral life of thousands of millions of men through twenty-five hundred years. It is one of the curious episodes, therefore, of the year 1907, that by imperial decree it has been ordered that the same divine honors shall be paid to Confucius which are paid to Heaven and Earth. All sorts of questions arise in one's mind as he asks himself what this decree may mean. Is it the attempt to meet Christianity, so to say, on its own ground? Is it the attempt to galvanize the honor which China has always

done to its great teacher into divine homage, parallel to that which Christians so many generations ago accorded to their great teacher, the Galilean Jesus? Is it thus an attempt by decree to make Confucius to be more to the Chinese man than he has thus far been, and more like what the Christ of theology has been to the Christian Church and world? In an age when the influx of modern learning is displacing ominously the old study of Confucian literature, is this the effort to win the ears and hearts of men for the meaning of Confucius again? These are questions which the outsider asks. Among the Chinese themselves, there are not wanting those who assert that such an elevation of Confucius to divinity is absolutely out of harmony with the teaching and spirit of Confucianism; that it is absurd in the face of what Confucius indubitably said and did, and of the light in which he plainly wished himself and his influence to be viewed. But in state schools and elsewhere provisions have been made to enforce the worship thus enjoined. Participation in it is to be obligatory at least once a month; and, theoretically, no man can be in state employment who does not conform. Still, the enforcement has not yet anywhere been undertaken with great seriousness. In scores of cases Christian converts are refusing it. The whole situation gives much food for thought. Is this the retort of the Chinese to the absolutist view of Christianity which has generally prevailed among those who have brought Christianity into their midst? Can Confucianism be resuscitated in this way? Must it not go over into a syncretism in which a religious factor larger and more vital than Confucianism has ever shown itself to be will find place, but in which also the ethical and social philosophy of Confucius will be accorded an influence far larger than any Christian propaganda has yet assigned to them?

Every one knows the difficulties which missions in India have had in dealing with the question of caste. Almost with unanimity the emissaries of Christianity have declared the caste system to be absolutely opposed to the Christian ideal, and the Christian ideal to it. On the other hand, Indian society has almost uniformly driven the convert to Christianity out from his caste. In many cases it would be practically impossible for the convert to maintain the customs of his caste. For a long time the ad-

herents of Christianity were drawn very largely from the outcasts, whose social condition could not be worse, and might possibly be better, by any change which they might make. Needless to say, a great many other causes are at work in India today besides the spread of Christianity to weaken the hold of the caste system. But Christian converts are still obliged in a measure to create for themselves a social order outside the framework of the one with which they are familiar. It has been much easier to assail the caste system as iniquitous than to provide something which will in the long run take its place, or even to deal justly with the immediate situation which the abolition of the immemorial social order creates for these converts. Nothing is easier than abstraction and negation. One is reminded of the parallel in the case of slavery. It was comparatively easy to be an abolitionist, especially if you did not live in the slave-holding states. Comparatively few would now dispute the principle which was involved in the emancipation, though they may regret the immediate and wholesale enfranchisement. But there was in many quarters a pathetic waning of enthusiasm for the freedmen when the stage of abstraction and negation was once past. Gifts of a different order are asked for when it comes to the struggle of generations—and possibly it will be of centuries—to build up an economic, civil, and social order for the emancipated, or, as is always the true problem, to make the emancipated able to build up such an order for themselves. The parallel seems instructive. It is easy to say caste must go. The democratic trend of modern society makes itself felt even in India, now that India is in mid-stream of modern movements. But what to do with the men and, still more, with the women and children who, as the result of our teaching of Christian idealism, have become outcasts? That is the question. Or at least it is *a* question. How to sustain them now in love without making them feel that they are always going to be sustained in love. Nothing is easier than to get five thousand orphans on your hands and to utilize the occasion to instil into them the principles of the Gospel. But Christian sentiments are not going to be all of the Gospel which these orphans will need before their life is through. There is much that not missions only but also government must do; much which

the government is making splendid effort to do. There is much which only a new industrial order can gradually achieve. At the present, weak, helpless, many of them, the converts cast themselves upon the foreigner. The foreigner takes up his load, as he ought to do—this load which he has had such a part in creating. But these groups of large-eyed, docile Hindus, become semi-English or American, are not going to solve India's problem. The more completely they are in accord with the foreigner's ideas, the less they will solve India's problem. The bigger the groups, the farther is the solution away. Commerce, politics, and, most of all, education, are working this tremendous upheaval—not Christianity alone. And the immediate effect even of education is problematical. The people who think that if the missionary should withdraw all would be well again show little knowledge of the situation. The movement will go on. But it will go on best with the stripe of missionary who can address himself to the complex, subtle, overwhelming problem which we have endeavored to outline. The day of statesmen, builders of industries, educators and, above all, moulders of the character of men in a struggle which will last for generations, has come. The day of men who dreamed that the function of the emissary of the Christian religion was to stand and proclaim a doctrine, and that by sufficient multiplication of such emissaries we might give the Gospel to the world in the lifetime of men now living, is over. Such a result could be imagined only by one who had a sufficiently small notion of what giving the Gospel means. But though the foreigner may gird himself for this task with a light heart—or possibly with a heavy heart—he realizes in his best moments how much there is of it all which no foreigner can ever do. For East is East and West is West. Impalpable distinctions are insuperable. The greatest and best part of all that we mean, the Hindu must do for himself, the Chinese man must do for himself, or it will never be done. The Oriental world, even when it shall have become thoroughly permeated with the spirit of Christianity, will be still the Oriental world. The Orient will never become Christian in the sense of the transfer of what we think and feel, just as we think and feel it, to the Orientals. It has been mercifully provided that the trees shall

not grow into the sky. And though we sometimes feel depressed that the type of civilization which we know in the West, with all of its good qualities and all of its evil ones, will become dominant over the wide world—everywhere only this one monotonous type, so defective in itself, so unsuited to many peoples in the world, so vulgar and dreadful often we cannot deny—that, too, is a sort of a nightmare. Excesses may be at the moment rife. But we may have profound faith that the quality of races which God has for ages been making for himself will reassert itself, and that what of the Western influence is superficial will be thrown off. What is really made their own by these races will be made their own so truly in their own terms that our civilization and our faith will one day confront us in a different—and why should we not say in a better—light. If by the domination of Christianity in the world we mean the foisting upon the world of those notions concerning Christianity which we have, our zeal for missions would be far other than it is.

It is comparatively easy to say that polygamy and concubinage, as these exist and are recognized in China, do not comport with the Christian ideal. But it is a very difficult question to say what a convert should do who has stood in these relations, and has in the past in good faith assumed responsibility for others, both women and children, and given them a status which was not only in no way illegal but to which no stigma, and hardly even reproach, attached. Shall he signalize his new views of morality by repudiating these obligations and compromising the position of those who, under the old system, were not only not to blame but hardly even unfortunate? It is difficult here not to do evil that good may come; or, at all events, not to do good in a manner which entails much obvious evil to innocent and helpless ones. It might not be difficult to win assent for the proposition that, all things considered, monogamy is the ideal of society, apart from specific Christian or even religious considerations. But as the merest matter of fact it has not been the ideal of Chinese society. The home has existed for a large part of Chinese society upon the contrary assumption. There are few countries in the world in which the home has played a larger part than in China. There are few—possibly there are

no—countries in the world in which the family may be said to be more really the basis of the social order. There are few social systems in the world in which women have, within limitations, a more defined position, and have immemorially—particularly the older women, mothers and grandmothers—exerted a greater influence. Despite dreadful things which one hears concerning the mortality among children, there are few countries in the world in which the having and rearing of children is looked upon more generally from the point of view of duty and privilege, and few in which the love of little children is more in evidence.

One realizes that in touching this general subject he has touched the plague spot of the human race. But at all events, one who has lived to maturity with his eyes open in Europe or America can but have his moments of doubt whether a society like our own, which is theoretically monogamous and supposedly under the influence of Christian ideas, has much to boast of. In any case, if he is candid, it will not be easy to reply when the Oriental tells him that the same things which exist in his land, measurably acknowledged and provided for, exist in ours with the additional horror that they are not acknowledged and not provided for. No question whatever of the ideals. But how to deal with the sad facts? How to get from one system to the other without temporarily, at least, making matters worse rather than better? Or, to put it more pungently still, how to make the great idea prevail among these peoples not merely as well as it prevails among us but much better? Time and economic changes are bound to have the greatest effect upon the patriarchal system and upon the customs concerning marriage. But these are changes in which the foreigner can hardly more than point the way. They are changes which only the man of the race instinct and sympathy can work out.

It will be interesting to see whether the Chinese government and society will be more successful in enforcing a theoretically absolute prohibition of opium than the American government and social sentiment has ever been in the execution of the statutory prohibition of alcoholic drink. The English-speaking missionaries' protest against opium has been heretofore somewhat impaired in efficiency by the fact that, as the Chinese cannot forget,

the English had too much to do with the bringing of opium into the land. But the matter has gone now far beyond a mere protest, however sincere, of the religiously minded. The vice is so obviously ruinous, the havoc which it works so dreadful, that the Chinese people may be said to have risen against it in their might. The fact that, theoretically at least, the State will employ no man in any capacity who is addicted to the opium habit must have weight. The fact that families, villages, and guilds, inflict punishment, and even death, in a way of which the government takes no cognizance, upon members who become obnoxious, makes the way of the transgressor hard if his family come to think that he is wasting family property, or his guild to deem that he is impairing its good name. The democratic assertion of the right to get drunk or to smoke opium, if one pleases, does not go quite so far in China as it does in Massachusetts or even in Maine. The result of this is that the drastic prohibitory measures which have been adopted are on the whole more likely to be enforced in China than similar measures would be with us. Meantime the instinctive and just Chinese view of the Concessions and the extra-territorial governments supposed to prevail therein is not likely to be improved if opium dens, driven out from the Chinese quarters of a city like Shanghai, have only to cross the street to flourish again within the area which is under the foreigners' control. That this control has only too often nothing to do with Christianity is true. But that in a vague way the Celestial holds Christianity responsible, and in a very definite way holds Christendom responsible, is also true. The Christian religion does not gain by such facts as these. There can be no doubt whatever of the longing of China to be rid of the curse of opium. The sufferings of the struggle are acute. The missionary physician in his work of sympathy and mercy may possibly be able to exert, just now, an even larger influence and helpfulness than the preacher with his exhortation and denunciation—which latter are now hardly so necessary as of yore.

The problem of rendering the Scriptures into Chinese has not been an easy one. Indeed, despite the vast amount of learned labor which, ever since Morrison, has been expended upon the task, not even yet have satisfactory results been achieved. Mor-

rison worked with two native teachers almost his whole lifetime in this endeavor. So great are the difficulties of the language that one, at least, of the greater Boards has always pursued the policy of giving to each missionary a native teacher, not always a convert, throughout the lifetime of service. These Chinese teachers act as secretaries and interpreters, and often in touring and school work as companions and general assistants. They have had their share in translation work and authorship, either supervised by the missionaries or at least instigated by them. For it is obvious that the Christian influence through literature would but make a beginning with the translation of the Scriptures. It would advance to the rendering into Chinese of works, both popular and scientific, pertaining to the interpretation of Scripture, and also of works of more general bearing upon the moral and social and intellectual life. Particularly the growth of schools has necessitated the production of text-books of all grades. The attempt to train native physicians has involved the translation of standard medical works of reference. Devotional books, and classics of the world literature, have found place in this ever enlarging catalogue of books rendered into Chinese. Any one who supposes that the missionaries of the last hundred years have done nothing but touring and evangelizing has a new impression in store for himself when he reads a publisher's catalogue of works of the kinds we have named, which have gone from the missionary presses in the old days, or are now going from the presses of the great publishing houses everywhere springing up.

It must not be forgotten that one of the things which have enhanced the difficulty of this work has been the number of dialects, or, almost you might say, of independent languages, which have obtained in different parts of China. Only one of these, the Mandarin, could in any way be regarded as a sort of a *lingua franca* for any large part of the Empire. And one of the most prominent centres for the intellectual life of the country, the Foo-chow province, is one in which the Mandarin is of no avail. In this respect India has presented a somewhat similar problem, while that of Japan is relatively simple. Furthermore, it will be understood that while the terminology of ethical discussion was in large part ready to hand for the Chinese of almost any

dialect, because of the immemorial interest of the people in these things, yet even here large advances had to be made in order to convey the meaning of the characteristic concepts of Western thought. In many of the other departments to which we have alluded, as for example in that of the natural sciences or medicine, the nomenclature had actually to be created. The state of things in which these subjects were taught in English had not arrived. A generation ago this situation would hardly have been prophesied, and a generation hence this condition may hardly obtain. All this means that a vast change is taking place in the language—or, perhaps we should rather say, languages. It means that work once fondly thought to have been done for all time will now clearly have to be done over. In all this change, both in the new development of the language itself and in the production of new books in the changed and changing speech, the educated and Christian Chinese will bear a far larger part than they have done in the past. They will bear a far larger part than the foreigners, teachers or missionaries, themselves in the production of an original Chinese literature of the sciences, of modern philosophy, of religion, and the rest; just as we have already an original and free Japanese literature of the sciences, of religion, and of Christianity. When one sees the crushing weight of practical cares, the exacting routine of practical activities, in which most missionaries have been involved, it is a wonder that the quantity and quality of literary work has been what it has. But it will be at once apparent that a great sphere is here opened for a missionary of a somewhat different type from that which has often, at least, in the past obtained.

We may take a leaf from the history of the Christian movement in Japan, or again in India, to convince ourselves how futile it is to render any books for these nascent Christian communities save the best which are current among ourselves. Large numbers of devout persons buy books here at home because the books say what these excellent persons have already long since thought. They might be interested to have these books translated into Chinese because they would describe the books as safe. But there is no large stable community of Christians in the Orient which buys books or listens to teaching because these latter say

what the Christians have already thought. They have not long thought about these matters. And they cannot be taught to think seriously about them in terms not germane to those in which they are rapidly being taught to think about everything else. It is painfully suggestive that in a country like Japan, where the Christian movement is so new and commitment to certain traditional views scarcely exists at all, a part of the public should speak scornfully of some current teaching of Christianity, whether in the pulpit or through the press, because this teaching seems to rest upon assumptions in science, philosophy, or history, which neither among the cultivated Japanese nor among ourselves any longer obtain. The foundations of the Gospel have indeed been laid in those lands in strata of the population in which such questions are not rife, and perhaps their Christianity is no worse for that. But we need to realize that, with the whole world of Western thought coming in on these people like a flood, the best and most earnest thing which we have to give is hardly good enough. What here merely grows out of our own past will not grow there at all where they have not that past.

Large use has already been made within Christian circles in China and Japan of periodicals and newspapers, the ephemeral publications which in any modern country have so much to do with the formation of public opinion. In respect of the number and quality of its newspapers Japan is the most modern of countries, and China is fast becoming such. It is a marvel how the newspaper press puts the news of the world at the disposal of large parts even of the Chinese public, and affords material by which, through cable transmission or through translation into the columns of the Anglo-Chinese papers, the facts concerning China from day to day might be used for the information of Europe and America far more largely than they are used, if the West were only more alert than it is to the importance of knowing from day to day what is happening in the Far East. One of the things which strikes most forcibly the quick observer as he travels in the Far East is the respectful tone of the Japanese, as also of the Chinese and the Anglo-Chinese, newspapers toward the Christian movement in these countries and the missionary cause. The native and foreign resident in these countries, in the large, appre-

ciates the bearing and influence of this movement, understands the facts, recognizes the achievements of the past through missionary labor. If he is keen in criticism of belated aspects and non-national tendencies of the movement, that is just what he ought to be. If he points out mistaken courses and assails injurious phases of the movement, he thereby renders the cause a service for which open and courageous minds are grateful. Such minds desire for their movement no privilege of not being spoken against. And those timid minds who do desire such a privilege are not likely to get it. The assault of the native press, often purely secular in tone, upon many aspects of the national worship, upon many injurious customs connected with the ancient rites, upon the expensiveness of idol processions, and upon the immoralities of priests, when these are in evidence, are often in a tone which the missionary and the specifically Christian press would not dare to use, and ought not to use, lest it should seem guilty of fanaticism. But ought we to accept the good results of the liberal and liberating work thus done by the press, and then expect immunity for the vices and foibles of the cause which we represent? But we repeat that the attitude of blind and unreasoning prejudice, of stupid abusiveness and vituperative speech at the very mention of a missionary, which so often betrays the gross ignorance of certain people in the West, even though they may have travelled, is practically never met with in those who are conversant in a large way with what is taking place in the East.

Already, in the paragraph concerning literature and the press, we have forecast much that it seems proper to say concerning the general educational movement, and particularly that part of it which may still be in Christian and foreign hands. We are not yet very far removed from the time when there was in China little demand for the foreign education offered in the mission schools except on behalf of the children of those who had already become converts to the Christian faith. These converts were so largely from the poorer classes that the education had mainly to be given away in order that the schools might have pupils at all. Despite the excellence of some work done, the schools made but little impression upon the Chinese people at large. Of the pupils thus

trained a great majority ultimately professed the Christian faith, and even found their way into the work of the Christian teacher or preacher. The educational aspect of the work was really subordinate to the evangelistic. It was felt to be so by the non-Christian community surrounding the schools. It was frankly declared so to be by some of the missionaries themselves. By some supporters of the missionary cause at home it was gravely questioned whether, even in the proportions which this aspect of the work had gradually assumed, it was to be fostered or suppressed.

How has the attitude of the Chinese toward all this changed within the last few years! How has the prevision of some missionaries been verified! How has the opportunity of the mission school been increased! And what an instrumentality for moulding the life of the nation through its youth has the mission school become, if only it is conducted in such a manner as to command unqualified respect as a school! The abandonment throughout the Empire of the civil service examinations in the Confucian classics and in the prose and poetry of the golden age, the turning of the popular mind for the moment almost in a feeling of resentment against the old system of education, is so complete as to seem deplorable. Temporarily, what is everywhere in demand in China is the Western education of the type which the mission schools have long sought to offer, and which they long offered in vain. What the schools founded by the viceroys in their provinces and by individuals of rank and wealth and public spirit throughout the realm are seeking to teach are the topics which the mission schools so long aimed to set forth with their limited means and in their smaller way. It may at some future day become a question whether the mission schools can keep the pace with these new institutions, with vast resources and the national consciousness behind them. But in the chaotic state of many of these new foundations, with the paucity of teachers which yet besets the whole educational scheme in China, with the vagueness of aim and the uncertainty of method which must yet for a little time prevail, that is not a very serious question yet. The graduates of mission schools are in such demand as teachers in the public and endowed schools, the compensation

offered them is so far in excess of anything which the little Christian communities can afford, that already the cry is heard that the ranks of the Christian ministry and of missionary helpers are depleted. Something like that wail we hear in our own country. But if our own country needs true Christian men in every walk of life, how much more must that be true of the land which is going through such changes as we see in the China of today! One thing is clear: it is a great chance for the mission school to have in their youth under training some of the men who in high station are going to be useful in every walk of life. It is a great chance to be allowed to train the teachers who are to go out to raise up another generation of teachers. It is even a greater chance to have been allowed to present the claims of the Christian ministry to a far larger body of men than before, and to train those whom you do train for the Christian ministry, not in isolation, but in contact with men who are being trained for other professions.

If we really look forward to the naturalization and nationalization of Christianity in China, then certainly the question of the Christian schools, and the attitude of the Christian advocates to all the schools, is of an importance which cannot be overestimated. If what we really look forward to is the raising up in the course of a generation or two of a sufficient number of men and women of intelligence and Christian conviction, who shall take upon themselves the whole responsibility of the Christian movement in China; if what we really look forward to is not the propagation of a foreign sect, the perpetuation of a foreign influence, but the permeation of the Chinese Empire with something of that same spirit of Christianity concerning which we have only to deplore that it permeates our own nation's life so little as it does—then the chance which the Chinese today are giving us to have part in the education of their youth is one which a few years ago would hardly have been dreamed, and a few years hence may, if neglected, be closed against us, or in any case much modified and impaired. It would be difficult to conceive a greater blunder than now to draw back from the educational policy upon which we have embarked. Foreign support of these schools and colleges in generous measure will for a time be necessary.

But Chinese control in growing measure, even of the institutions which have been endowed by foreigners, is the path along which their truest development is to be expected. Ultimately it must be upon the Chinese public that the responsibility for their perpetuation and increase must rest. If the history of such institutions in Japan, and notably the well-known case of the Doshisha, proves anything, it is this: that trust in the Christian community in these lands wins trust in return. Though there may be and must be misunderstandings as to the method by which the goal is to be reached, and pain may be caused to those who have given their lives for the institution, and again offence may be given to those for whose sake all has been done, yet, if only there be mutual understanding as to the goal to be attained, the issue is secure. The Christian movement in Japan has long since assumed proportions that make the attitude which a particular institution or individual foreign leaders may take toward the national movement a question of significance only for that institution or those leaders, and not of great consequence for the Christian and national movement itself. One might make the same remark as to the drift of the national churches of Japan toward independence and union. For the foreign ecclesiastical bodies with which they may have been denominationally connected to resist the desire of the Japanese Christians for freedom and their decision to ignore differences which they regard as for them meaningless is merely to make a sorrow out of the maturing of that for which we have striven, while that very maturing should be to us the cause of a deep and solemn joy.

But, before we leave this matter of education and go on to speak of the fortunes of the Church, let us make one more allusion, this time to medical education and its relation to the naturalization of Christianity in the Far East. That medical practice has been the right arm of the Christian movement, both in Japan in remoter times and in China until now, few would deny. If there is one application of a scientific education concerning which the Chinese are all eagerness at the present moment, it is this. The time is not yet far in the past when the superstitions of the masses and the interest of the practitioners of magic in the name of medicine made the foreign physician's lot a hard one. The

responsibility of all cases which he ever touched was laid upon him, even if these had been in fatal shape before they came to him. On the other hand, reasonable belief in his processes was refused him, even when he succeeded beyond hope. The belief in spirits makes, for the lowest of the people, the whole area of disease and suffering one in which cruel fear has sway. Yet in amazing degree the example and precept of foreign practitioners—most of them missionaries, of course—has had effect. The superstition about the evil spirits is vanishing. The people have become aware of the ignorance and helplessness of those who pretended to skill. They are in almost feverish anxiety to put themselves in possession of a few foreign medicines and of the maxims of their use. Cranks and charlatans are abroad without number. The foreign drug store, and the man behind the counter who deals out nostrums in the plenitude of ignorance to a population only more ignorant than himself, is much in evidence. The foreign physicians with their hospitals and dispensaries are too few and too widely scattered. Natives trained in these dispensaries by the missionary physicians under the old régime are too few. And though some of them are well trained others are not. The Chinese students who have studied medicine in Japan or Europe or America and returned to practise in their own country are fewer still. Away from the great open ports the conditions of practice are crude. Yet the need of the people, and the chance both to alleviate their distresses and, along with that alleviation, to impress them with the spirit of the Gospel of love and helpfulness is the same. The few medical colleges are overflowing. The whole aim must be to raise up hundreds and thousands of native doctors and nurses, whose knowledge shall be equal to their Christian devotion, and whose Christian devotion shall be equal to the sound scientific training which they shall have secured. For, while there is much medical practice in China which will be highly remunerative, there is no land where for a long time to come there will be so large scope for men who will do the healing works of Christ for no other guerdon than the love of God and man. Probably no one would think today of sending a missionary physician to Japan. Such a state of things is as yet far distant in China; but it must come. And the medical teachers whom

we now send, the medical colleges we establish, the hospitals and dispensaries now founded and endowed, where all these youth of the new China are to get their training—these are the instrumentalities which will bring on that day. The college is more important than the practitioner, and the native more effective than the foreigner can be.

But if what we have been saying is true of education, medicine, and the rest, it is the more true of the Church as institution, and of the organization of the specifically Christian life among these peoples of the East. The things which we have been discussing may be said to have been only some of the points of application of the Christian spirit in this invasion of the Orient by the civilization which has thus far been characteristic of the West—an invasion which is taking place upon an unprecedentedly large scale, and, more recently at least, with the consent and ardent wish of the Orientals themselves. And though it is true that in these lands the medical work, for example, has often been the means of overcoming prejudice and breaking down opposition which had proved otherwise invincible, yet we must flinch when it is put as if we fostered medical work because we expected by it to gain, furtively as it were, an influence over men's souls which else we might not gain. When it is so put as if a missionary society might not sustain a hospital or school as such, but only if it intended through that hospital as a means to further its propaganda for the faith, then we leave it open to right-minded men to hope that we may fail, and incidentally we open the way to ourselves to the sustaining of very poor hospitals. Is not the hospital itself an expression of the Christian doctrine of mercy and loving kindness and solicitude for the distresses of men? Is not the school an expression, in and of itself, of the Christian longing to know the truth and to be set free by it, and to give to others the freedom of the life which is by the truth? And does not the frank and fearless, but at the same time scrupulously honorable and gentlemanly, exerting of the influence of the Christian character on the part of physicians and teachers present exactly the same problem in China or Japan that it presents here in our own midst? And is not this the real contagion of the spirit of the Gospel?

The one thing which is certain is that all these things, Western education, medicine, business methods, governmental theories and practices, are going into the East in a resistless stream. The question is whether they shall be brought in only by those who are at variance with Christianity or indifferent to it, or whether the representatives of Christianity shall have their share in such works and their influence upon them just as they have done here at home. To that question, whatever may be the attitude of the zealots here at home, the history of missionaries in the field is a sufficient answer. As a matter of fact it has been the missionaries themselves who, for the most part, have been the inaugurators of the educational, medical, charitable, and philanthropic, of the social and humanitarian and ameliorating movements, which often win the approval of foreign residents and as well of native patriots in the East in a way that the direct religious work and ministry do not.

It is possible to lay hold of these, which are so to say the by-products of the Christian movement of these countries, and so to exploit them as to obtain for the general movement related to missions a support among non-Christian merchants and openly anti-Christian nationals which otherwise might not be obtained. It is possible to take these facts as showing conquests in higher classes than have heretofore been in sympathy with Christian missions, or at least approaches to those classes. It is possible in this way to collect on the spot a local budget which seems very large to the missionaries of regular Boards, since they would not be allowed to collect money for current expenses in this fashion, just as they are not allowed in any way whatsoever to enter into business or participate in the profits of any business. It is possible to spend money collected on such a budget from generous residents in the settlement and natives doing business there in such a manner as to make the missionary receiving his little salary from home appear but a poor man, and his affairs but picayune affairs as compared with those which take their place in the general lavish way of doing what the foreigner resident in the East decides to do.

It is impossible for an impartial observer to escape the feeling that that will be truly a rare class of men among whom not one

will sooner or later be demoralized, or at least gravely impaired in his judgment, by such freedom in the raising and spending of money. The maxim that it makes no difference what a good thing costs is true only for people of very good judgment. The habituation to such a maxim is likely to impair one's judgment. And perhaps the maxim is more true when one is spending his own money than when expending money raised for a cause. The lavish spending of money, especially if it can be possibly construed as spent in any way for personal ease or aggrandizement, is one of the most constant reproaches brought against missionaries and one of the most groundless. Those conversant with the facts realize that it can be only a vanishingly small minority of regularly accredited missionaries who ever have any money which they can spend in this way. But too great care can never be taken to avoid the reproach.

It is possible now to live for a few years in the East and do not a little missionary work of a kind, without knowing any language except English, since the most of those of higher castes and classes know less or more English. And all expansions of work and influence which are really such are to be welcomed and rejoiced in. But no one who knows the history of missions in the East in the last three hundred years can fail to be aware that work which has not been built up from the bottom is very precarious. The greater Boards have been right in appointing none but those who will commit themselves to the missionary career for life; in commissioning no men who have not had some form of actual professional training in addition to mere graduation from college; and in compelling all missionaries to learn the language before permitting them to take any large responsibility. The organization under Christian auspices of students for co-operation in moral and religious work is in foreign lands perhaps naturally upon the same basis upon which it stands here at home. Its function is perhaps largely that of organization and sympathy and inspiration. These have their value. But when one thinks of the subtlety and significance of the whole problem, one longs that in those lands, as also here at home, some way may be found to make and to keep the tie between the student movement and those who study. When one realizes what certain missionaries

who might easily be named have accomplished in study of the nations with whom they have cast in their lot; when one recalls the labor they have done in two languages, or in twenty—tasks of an intellectual industry which is nothing less than colossal—one feels like beseeching for the good of the common cause that these men who study be not forgotten in the leadership of the Christian student movements of those lands.

It is certain that neither in the West nor in the East does mere social or philanthropic work, mere ameliorative effort, show that power over the deep places of the personal life, that recreative influence upon character, which the specific religious propaganda has always set for itself. It will be possible in the East to demonstrate as truly as here in the West it has already been demonstrated that mere relief of the distresses of men may leave them only more selfish and vicious, more demanding and less dutiful, more rebellious and less responsible than they were before. So that the missionary who, in all the welter which faced him when he first came to these strange lands, kept close to the problem of the soul was, at all events, in the excellent company of his own Lord and Master, who also must have seen a thousand things about him which needed reforming and ameliorating. But despite that fact, or rather because of his profounder insight into these relations, he kept close to the problem of men's souls. There is, therefore, something very great and beautiful about the work and influence of men and women who for generations, in face of opposition from the men to whom they came, and despite obloquy and misunderstanding on the part of some at least of their own countrymen, have kept on their way, in poverty always, in loneliness often, and stuck to the task, subtle and disheartening in the last degree—the task of endeavoring, through the possession in the secret places of their own life by the spirit which is of Christ, to bring to others something of that same mind and inward life. They have sought to cheer, uplift, and fortify men and women by the touch of Christ for the life they had to lead. They have sought ever to create little groups, communities of men and women of a spirit like their own, which would make for the uplifting and glorifying of the lives of their countrymen. This is the phase of mission work which has preponder-

ated in the past. This is the phase for which alone, perhaps, there was room in the beginning in those countries and with the scant support from home. This is the phase which is just now in risk of being turned away from. It is the phase which is often spoken of slightly, relegated to a period of unsophistication, and generally regarded as a stage good to have outgrown. There is a general cheerfulness abroad, as if in the new stadium that is being entered upon missions were going to win credit and support where these had not been heretofore in large measure bestowed.

We can well believe that that age of relatively simple problems will some day be looked back upon as the golden age of missions, just as one looks back upon the boyhood of his son as somehow the golden age of the relations between him and his father; and just as the Christian Church looks back upon the period of apostolic fervor and simplicity, before the great amalgamation with the Graeco-Roman world took place, as the golden age of the Christian Church. We are very far from being pessimistic enough to believe that these are the golden ages. We mean only that the simplicity and more spiritual nature of their problems, as compared with the complexities and perplexities of later periods, may easily make them to appear such. In any of these cases what is meant is merely that the beauty of childhood is past. That is only another way of saying that the glory of manhood has come. If out of these earliest stages of missions, with all the limitations which may easily be pointed out, there have come—as there have—Chinese, Japanese, and Indian men who have within themselves the life which is by the spirit of Christ, that is enough. That life will take care of the changes which must come. But no changes which must come will necessarily produce that life.

For, the moment it is admitted that the naturalization and nationalization of Christianity is the thing to be aimed at and ardently desired, then it is evident that the nation is the real agent of that naturalization. If once it be recognized that the foreign form of statement or rite in which the foreigner, albeit necessarily, brings Christianity to this new land is not essential, but only incidental; that it is actually a hindrance and not a help to the appropriation of the real Gospel itself; that these forms are not

expected to perpetuate themselves, but only to do their work and be transcended—then it is clear that those who can, in the long run, do this transcending, and create the new and natural and necessary forms of statement, or organization, or rite, are the Chinese, the Japanese, the Indians themselves. The problem is not the building up of Christian institutions after the pattern which it would be natural for the foreigner to create, but the raising up of men who will create institutions after the pattern which will be natural to the Chinese when they have been created. Confucianism has never influenced the Christianity of the West in the least. But it is difficult to imagine a Chinese Christianity which will not have been profoundly influenced by Confucianism; precisely as the early Christian community in the West was, in its formative stage, profoundly influenced by Plato, who was as much the teacher of the whole Western world as Confucius has been of the Chinese. Of what use is it to teach Plato to the rising generation of the Chinese youth, except as a part of general culture, and as helping to explain how the Christianity current among us came to be what it is? But it is of every use that what is great and beautiful in Confucianism should be taught to these youth, who are to be the ministers and Christian leaders of China; who will surely think in Confucius' terms, as will also those whom they teach. The Buddhist literature has exerted as good as no influence upon Christianity. But it is difficult to conceive a Japanese interpretation of Christianity in which much that is in Buddhist literature will not have place. Because these things are true, these faiths are worthy of the most devoted study on the part of the foreign teachers of Christianity to the peoples named. But the most fruitful study will be that of the Christian Chinese and Japanese themselves, which may be likened to the delving of the Christian Apologists and of the early Fathers in that classical antiquity which was the background of the life of their races before Christianity had come to them.

And if we may thus speak with confidence of some elements which certainly will be represented in the naturalized Chinese Christianity to which we look, surely we may speak with equal confidence concerning some elements prominent in the Christianity current among us which will not be there. Of what inter-

est to the Japanese Christianity of the future will be the differences which divide the Protestant sects and make each of these to be what it is? By what possibility can the Chinese man make real to himself certain contentions which have long embroiled Christendom and brought reproach upon the name of Christ? There are quite obvious reasons for anticipating that these unhappy dissensions will never take root in the East, no matter how sectarians may try to have them. They will be buried in the East long before we cease to reckon with them in the West.

If one may put it paradoxically, he may say that the great task of evangelism in China or in the less accessible regions in Japan is not evangelism at all, but the education of Chinese and Japanese evangelists. Certainly it is already obvious that the great problem of the ministry and the churches in these countries is not the indefinite increase of the number of preaching missionaries from England and America to correspond to the wide open door which is set before the church today, but it is the indefinite multiplication of the native ministry and of natives as clerical and lay helpers of every sort. When one hears of a campaign to increase within a certain number of years the commissioned foreign missionary staff two or three hundred per cent.; when one has set before him statistics to show that even then the parishes of these ministering missionaries will be of such magnitude as to make thoroughness of administration impossible, one asks, "But how did we ever come to suppose that this was the way in which the work was to be done?" Such numbers of the foreign missionary staff seem not only impossible to send, but they would work to the suppression of the native church if they could be sent. They would hinder and not help its autonomous development. They would dwarf it by keeping for the foreigner the responsibility by which the native church should be made great. They would perpetuate the foreigners' standard for everything, and prevent the native mind and life from having its way. It will not be considered censorious to say that the fact that we have pursued this mischievous ideal of numbers for our foreign missionary staff even so much as we have is the reason why some part of every missionary staff is composed of such mediocre material as it is.

That we must send men without due regard to their quality and fitness is an obsession. Quite the reverse is true. At present, at all events, it would be far better to send no men than poor men; especially into these ancient and cultivated nations, with all the complex questions which arise in the transition through which they are passing or have but recently passed. In large areas of these countries and in large aspects of our work the function of leadership alone is left to the foreign missionary. It is only by fulfilling this function that the foreigner justifies his presence there. There are large parts of the work which the peoples of these countries can do for themselves far better than the foreigner can ever do it for them. With the situation at which we have now arrived, if we cannot within an appreciable time raise up a body of Christians who will develop their own ministry, support entirely their own churches, and overflow in their Christian activity for the good of their own land, and even begin to take interest in other lands, then our work is a failure, and Christianity as represented by such a mission has no reason to hope for a future in these lands. It is naturalization or nothing. An American who has spent his whole lifetime with Sir Robert Hart in the service of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs recently said: "If we cannot through this service raise up Chinese who, in point of intelligence, integrity, and responsibility, can within an appreciable interval take this service off our hands, then we have labored in vain." Surely this is true also, and in even greater degree, of the Christian Church in that land. If a generation hence the cause of Christianity shall be so essentially exotic as it was much less than a generation ago, these peoples may well rise and exclude it as among the exotic things desirable to be excluded.

But it will not be exotic. It will not be excluded. The principles of which we have been speaking are so well understood, they are so sincerely acted upon by the spirits of light and leading on the field, that one must apologize to them for dwelling upon these principles here. It is surprising, however, how little these principles are understood and reckoned with among friends of missions at home. The hundreds of independent Christian churches in Japan, with their own ministers, educated in their own land, or even abroad, and in a manner bearing comparison with any

ministry in any land; with their own methods of administration, wrought out in their own experience; with their own organization for charity, philanthropy, reform, and for the extension and perpetuation of Christian interests in their country, are a demonstration of the thing of which we speak. And it must be remembered that there are in Japan about forty-five thousand such communicant members of Protestant churches alone, and in China about one hundred and eighty thousand. If the Japanese are sensitive, as many of them are, about the sending of any more missionaries to their shores, that can hardly be surprising. It is not that the foreigners now among them, to whom the debt of their cause is immeasurable, are not held in grateful honor and love, for they are. It is not that any foreigner coming among them with anything to say or do would not be esteemed according to the value of what he said or did. It is only that they feel that for a certain kind of missionary, sustained among them by a foreign organization over which they can exert no influence, they have no need. It is only that they feel that a considerable part of the Christendom of the West which is still zealous to send missionaries among them is so precisely because it has no idea of what the Japanese themselves have done for the Christian cause in their own land, and are now doing, and may be relied upon to do. They feel keenly the vast work which yet remains to be done, and would welcome any one who would join hands with them in doing it in those ways which seem to the Japanese, with their intimate knowledge of their own people, to be the right ways. But it is obvious in such a case that, notwithstanding the vast work to be done, it is not necessary to send any men but the very best. It might be wise if we should permit the Japanese to ask before any should be sent. One of the wisest of men, who has spent a long life in the service of the Christian movement in Japan, said not long since to a missionary in China: "You know the joy of doing for the Chinese. You are going in the near future to know the pang of seeing those whom you have raised up take things out of your hands somewhat, and do things, possibly not so well, but in their own way. And still beyond that you are to have the joy of seeing those men whom you have raised up walking by your side, and doing things so well that you feel that your own task and that

of your kind is mainly over, and that the future is secure." These things are not yet for China, but they are surely coming.

It would seem as if, in the line of what has been said, the policy of concentration of the foreign leaders of the Christian movement in the great centres was unquestionably the true policy for the time to come. It is no comment upon the vast amount of touring evangelism which the foreign missionary in these countries has done in time past to say that that will not be the predominant work in the time to come. Concentration, centralization, organization, unification—these must be the watch-words of the foreign leadership, or else it will not be leadership. And if the foreigners' work is not leadership, then it will not be long before the foreigner will have no work or place in this movement at all. In a wise and tactful, a spiritual and affectionate leadership, he may have a great place for a long time to come, and may render an inestimable service to the cause.

If one ever has his moments of misgiving about the working out in the hands of the peoples of these national churches of a problem so complex, and into the solution of which already so much that is precious has been poured, it may be well to recall an observation which every thoughtful man must have made many times concerning the propagation of religion in his own land, which is profoundly true also in the missionary world. There must have been times in your experience when, if you had listened only to the form of statement of faith inculcated and the type of doctrine advanced, if you saw only how the minds of zealous persons fix upon some rite or ceremony and insist upon some small detail as necessary to the faith, you might have been profoundly discouraged. But you realize that these are not the only sources of influence of the man who is in the pulpit or of the institution which we call the Church. Indeed, they are not the main sources. They may not be the sources of his influence at all, but even distinct deductions from that influence. You perceive that the fortitude, patience, and peace which average men and women show; the fidelity and courage, cheer and hope, purity and unselfishness, devotion to ideals, solicitude for others, which their life reveals—these are not only themselves the true fruit of the Gospel but they are the real working power of the

Gospel. It is these which do a large part of the work which is done. It is these which exert an influence which all the narrownesses and inadequacies alluded to are not able to destroy. These things are true at home, as every one of us must have discovered. They are even more true abroad, because these are the qualities which are universally understood. They are felt, and do not need to be understood. Language and race difference may make theoretical propositions which the missionary of the new faith brings, or which the newly trained native preacher sets forth, most difficult and his rites remote. But the character commands respect and reverence. It leaves an impression which never can be effaced. Far more than we realize, it is at this level of character, and by this possession of character, that the Christian propaganda has taken place and is now taking place. When we wonder at the apparent adoption of forms of thought and speech so different from those of the Chinese or the Japanese, it is not that this adoption of foreign forms of thought and speech explains the assimilation of the Christian ideal of character. Precisely the reverse is true. It is that the zeal and desire to be conformed to that type of character which the native sees in the Christian man carries along with it for a time the customs and forms of speech which he has heard associated with that character and spiritual influence. But those customs and forms of speech will be dropped off as easily as they were taken on, in the working out of the Christian character of the Chinese, of the Japanese, or of the Indians themselves. By this absolutely natural and spiritual process, at the level of the Christian character, an Oriental Christianity will arise, and the specific Occidental form of Christianity by which this great transmission of life was mediated will disappear.

MEDIAEVALISM AND MODERNISM

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"Modernism" has already become as vague and ambiguous a term as Socialism. The latter stands for anything between common Christian charity—a recognition of social duties acknowledged by all and neglected by most—and a systematic reconstruction of the whole framework of society. Similarly, Modernism, thanks largely to the Encyclical *Pascendi*, has come to stand for the mildest as well as for the extremist concessions of Roman Catholicism to the exigencies of modern life and thought and sentiment. Owing to this comprehensiveness, it is possible to group together in one unholy fraternity, and under the same anathema, those who are sincere Catholics by conviction and those who, having lost all faith in the Church, continue Catholics in name and profession, whether through indifference, or self-interest, or consideration for the feelings of others. Men whose modernity is little more than an educated Ultramontanism are thus brought under suspicion of a secret sympathy with deists, atheists, and agnostics, and held up to the odium of the faithful at large.

It is impossible to discuss profitably or intelligently so wide a range of positions, which have nothing in common but dissent from the uncompromising intransigence of Pius X and his advisers and their refusal to pass an absolute and indiscriminate condemnation on the entire results of seven centuries of human progress. If we cannot define Modernism as a finished system or theory may be defined, we can at least describe it as a tendency, a spirit, a movement. In this respect again it is somewhat like Socialism, which is not the less a real and living force because it has so far failed to arrive at explicit self-consciousness or coherent self-expression. I think then that the term "Modernist" should be restricted to one who believes in the possibility of a synthesis between Catholic Christianity (I do not say Catholic

theology) and modern culture, however little he may see his way to that synthesis or be satisfied with existing attempts. And by a synthesis I do not mean a compromise involving the sacrifice of anything vital or essential on either side, but a unification resulting from a careful criticism of Catholicism on the one hand and of modern culture on the other; from a sifting out of their perishable from their permanent values; and from a recognition that their alleged incompatibilities are apparent and not real.

This provisional definition excludes from the category of Modernism those who consider that the said incompatibilities are real and not merely apparent; whether it be that they accept the results of modern progress as fatal to the claims of the Church, or accept the claims of the Church as fatal to the results of modern progress. Disbelief in the compatibility of Catholicism and Criticism unites these two extremes against the faith and hope of the Modernist; and indeed some of the most ardent allies of Pius X are to be found among the unbelievers inside as well as outside the Church, especially amongst those of the latter who consider that Modernism may give a new lease of life to a moribund and mischievous institution.

An uncritical acceptance of the ultramontane conception of the essentials of Catholicism on the one hand, or an equal credulity as to the values of modern enlightenment on the other, still more a combination of both, will almost inevitably make the hopes of Modernism appear paradoxical. They may be so; but at least it is in the interests of truth that the hope or hypothesis should be tried to the uttermost before it is abandoned. Far slenderer hopes have attained to fruition in spite of far greater discouragement.

"Modernism" was so named, with prejudicial intent, by its adversaries—by men whose hopes lie buried in the irrevocable past and whose attitude towards the present is one of ever increasing estrangement, distrust, and hostility. But the implied reproach falls somewhat flat on the modern ear. Since we must have a sect-name, we might well have a worse than one which expresses our catholic conviction that the Church must be always modern as well as ancient; of today as well as of yesterday; that since culture progresses, the synthesis of religion with cult-

ure is an abiding duty, an unending process. And then it indicates most aptly our specific difference from those Catholics who regard the synthesis of religion with the culture of the thirteenth century as final and valid for all times, and whom we may therefore most justly call Mediaevalists.

"Catholic" or "Roman Catholic" is the common genus of Modernist and Mediaevalist. As belief in Christ makes a Christian, so belief in the Roman Catholic Church makes a Roman Catholic. There are Christians for whom Christianity consists in one, or a very few, Gospel truths, and who regard the whole Catholic system, doctrinal and institutional, as an encrustation—now mischievous and meaningless, even if once necessary and protective. Against these, Modernists and Mediaevalists are agreed in regarding the Church as the work of the indwelling Spirit of Christ; as a divine and not merely as a human creation; as constituted by the legitimate and fruitful marriage of Gospel principles and forces with those of civilization and even of other religions; by the impregnation and leavening of the whole fullness of human life with the leaven of a new inspiration. Both have faith in the Church, in the concrete living community, as they have faith in Christ. As in Christ they see the Son of God where history and reason see but man, so in the Church they see the organ of Christ's spirit and not merely the inevitable resultant of historical conditions. And it is this common faith or interpretation of the divine meaning of phenomena which unites them as Catholics.

The specific difference that divides the Modernist from the Mediaevalist will be more keenly appreciated by contrast with its opposite.

Few readers of the Encyclical *Pascendi* will have paused to ask: "What then is this imperilled position of which Modernism is the negation? If all this is false, what is true?" If Modernism was there depicted so as to shock ordinary Christian susceptibilities to the utmost, Mediaevalism, for like reasons, was decently draped and kept in the background. Thus it was hoped to enlist Protestant sympathy in behalf of a system which in the day of its power could find no place for Protestantism but the stake, and which even in this document gives abundant proof that the

persecuting spirit is still willing though the flesh is weak; that milder manners are to be ascribed to lack of power, not to change of principle.

If Modernists and Mediaevalists agree in their faith in Catholicism, considered as a concrete living reality, they differ in their theoretical analysis and expression of the nature of that life and reality. For the Mediaevalist, Catholicism means a synthesis effected between Christian tradition and the fashionable philosophy of the thirteenth century. Upon that synthesis the Council of Trent set the seal of finality at a time when the new learning seemed to call for a theological revolution which the Church was then too feeble to face and which must have weakened those claims to absolute authority that she was maintaining against the reformers. Since then, the notion that the Church should "come to terms" with contemporary enlightenment has been regarded as a temerity. All subsequent developments, up to the Vatican Council and the Encyclical *Pascendi*, have been on the lines of the *Summa Theologica*, and have only widened the breach between lay and clerical culture. There has been no criticism of categories and methods, no theological revolution like that effected by S. Thomas. So innocent are the seminaries of history or of the historical sense that today the essential "modernism" of S. Thomas is unsuspected. The Catholicism of the *Summa* with all its theology and its institutions; with its seven sacraments (form and matter), its ritual, its dogmatic formulas, its priesthood, its papacy of the Isidorian decretals, its universal sovereignty—all is supposed to be the direct and immediate creation of Christ and his twelve Apostles. If the duty of synthesis between religion and culture, faith and knowledge, the Church and the age, is still admitted verbally, yet it is voided of all sense. "Faith must be at one with science"—yes, but with *true* science; and the test of true science is its agreement with Faith, which is thus judge and accuser at once. Such synthesis means, in practice, the submission of science, not to Faith, but to the elements of mediaeval science incorporated in the dogmatic expression of Faith—the subordination of modern to mediaeval knowledge and reason. To question or attack these consecrated survivals of old-world science and history is, in the

eyes of the Mediaevalist, the same as to attack the Faith itself. Conceiving himself to represent the most primitive and apostolic form of Christianity, he will no doubt repudiate the title of Mediaevalist; but it is none the less true that, in many respects, Modernism represents an older Catholicism than his, and notably in its recognition of this very principle of synthesis, by which New Testament theology gave way to patristic, and patristic to scholastic; and by which scholastic must now give way to historico-critical.

Those who would see a fair and open presentment of that mediaeval Church-theory which lurks between the lines of the Encyclical *Pascendi* cannot do better than consult an article, "The Catholic Church: What is it?" by Monsignor John Vaughan, in the *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1908. Mgr. Vaughan has been aptly described as the brain of the English Roman Catholic community. His books, *Faith or Folly?*, *Thoughts for all Times*, etc., have sold as only the best books or the worst novels can sell. This, together with his high ecclesiastical position and the careful censorship to which the utterances of even the highest are now subjected, guarantees the thoroughly representative character of his exposition, which, had it come from the pen of a "Modernist," might have seemed a travesty or caricature. Apart from certain puns and pleasantries which are all his own, and a certain clearness of style not entirely due to the shallowness of the position itself, Mgr. Vaughan says nothing that is not said in every seminary-manual of theology, nothing that is not held by Pius X and by the vast numerical majority of the present episcopate.

He proceeds therefore to explain (to the benighted Anglican bishop of Carlisle whom he is refuting) that, in order to secure to men the supreme advantage of theological uniformity of expression, "Christ has provided that in his Church all shall be ruled and directed by one. As the sap of an ordinary tree passes up through a single stem, then courses along the great outstretching arms and through each of the lesser branches until it enters into and gives life and vigor to every individual leaf, so the divine sap of revealed truth passes from the lips of the one supreme pastor and is communicated to the bishops, who in turn communicate it to the priests, who finally explain it and propose it to each individual

member of the entire flock." "What could be simpler; what could be more practical and efficacious?"

We have here the great mediaeval simplification by which the whole Church is concentrated into the person of the Roman pontiff, and the private will and judgment of a privileged individual is substituted for the collective voice and mind of the entire Christian community. Dictated by political expediency, inspired by papal arrogance, supported by fictions and forgeries, formulated by S. Thomas Aquinas, repudiated by the Reformers, contested by Jansenists and Gallicans, defended and promoted by the Jesuits, all but defined and imposed by the Vatican Council, it still lives on, in the teeth of history, in defiance of criticism, precisely on account of its alluring and fallacious simplicity—"What could be simpler; what could be more practical and efficacious?"

What will strike the educated non-Romanist reader as something peculiar to Mgr. Vaughan is really characteristic of the entire school of orthodox theology which he so faithfully represents. This naïve self-confidence, as of a rosy-cheeked school-boy who has just won the medal for catechism; this unaffected astonishment at the absurd perplexities of an Anglican bishop in face of the obvious and self-evident; this serene unconsciousness of the obsolete and worthless character of his premises, is inexplicable except for those who know the Roman seminary system from the inside—who know that the doctorate in theology is awarded to mere scholastic dialectic, and that the Sacred Scriptures and ecclesiastical history remain a *terra incognita* for all but a few restless and curious minds.

Here in the middle of the *Hibbert Journal*, like a mummy at a banquet, we have a writer who gives us four *a priori* reasons why Christ could not possibly have done otherwise than create the papacy; and then proves from two or three texts that he actually did so. He does not see that, *a priori* and *a fortiori*, a sinless papacy might have been expected; or that an infallible episcopate by its miraculous unanimity would have served better than an infallible pope, and would have been just as "possible" for the "omnipotence" of Christ. He is not aware that criticism has gravely undermined the authenticity of the texts on which he builds his logical house of cards. He does not know that the early Fathers

interpreted them far otherwise. He flouts the idea that unity of spirit and of charity is the mark by which men are to know the Church. What Christ prayed for was, in his view, that unity of theological formula which can only be secured by the infallible dictation of an absolute monarch. Of the history of the papacy he knows nothing; for, indeed, it sprang into existence on the day of Pentecost full-fledged! Why the papal infallibility, the very rule of faith and orthodoxy, should itself have been disputed for eighteen centuries, and only then defined, he does not say. He admits that "this machinery is of so simple and practical a character that if put into motion it must actually result in unity," *i.e.*, that this purely external uniformity is as little miraculous as that of a regiment of soldiers; and yet we are to see in it an obvious proof of the divinity of the Church of Rome, such as could only be afforded by a spontaneous and independent agreement of a multitude of witnesses. He appeals to the unanimity of the seven hundred bishops at the Vatican Council, as though there had been no recalcitrant minority; no packing of the Council with bishops *in partibus*; no contempt of the representative principle; no coercion, bullying, or intrigue; as though its shameful history never had been written and never could be written.

In all this we are listening not to Mgr. Vaughan but to the present official theology of the Roman Church and of the authors of the Encyclical *Pascendi*. Its place in relation to modern life and thought is that of Mgr. Vaughan's article in the middle of the *Hibbert Journal*—the dead in the midst of the living. "Friend," we feel inclined to say, "how camest thou in hither not having on a wedding garment?"

Neither historically, critically, nor exegetically has this mediæval Church-theory a leg to stand on. Its logic may be faultless, but its premises and assumptions are hopelessly discredited. It is in direct collision, not with some new philosophy, but with a mass of hard indigestible facts. It can only live in the dark; and the most skilfully organized obscurantism will not be able to exclude the light very much longer. Already the books are opened and judgment has begun.

This state of things has forced upon the Modernist a distinction between the Church and Church-theory, as between Christ and

Christology, or between God and Theology. His faith is in the living community, not in the community's self-analysis or self-expression at any given stage of its growth. He believes that within the unity and continuity of the Catholic community the leaven of the Gospel slowly permeates the fruits of man's natural endeavor towards every kind of progress, intellectual, moral, social, political, and religious; that, in alliance with all that is best and worthiest and strongest in the natural order, it struggles towards that highest expression of Christianity which lay hidden in the simplicity of the Gospel. He believes that this attainment can only be won—can only be fruitful and satisfying because it is won—experimentally, through many tribulations and costly experiences of failure and error and defeat and discouragement; that our grasp on the good and true is but infirm; that we do not possess them permanently or profitably till we have tasted every bitterness of evil, struggled in the brambles of every deceit. Thus it is, and not by a sudden creative fiat, but gradually, progressively, yet infallibly, that the Spirit of Christ leads his Church into truth after truth and out of error after error.

If he holds to the Roman Catholic rather than to any other Christian community, it is because he believes in the principles of unity and continuity as necessary conditions of the development in question. For it is only as compressed within the boundaries of one institution that the scattered and diversified elements of a wide collective experience, past and present, are forced to jostle together, to correct and criticize one another, to amalgamate sooner or later in a rich and fruitful unification. The schismatic principle, like other crude simplifications, is essentially impoverishing. It evades instead of overcoming difficulties, and solves the problem by dropping its awkward elements. This method can only result in just that external, regimental uniformity, spiritually thin and insignificant, which is the ideal of Mgr. Vaughan and the Mediaevalists generally. The "excommunication principle" insures that the soldiers shall all be of exactly the same height and as void of individuality as possible. Uniformity, or unity without variety, is the easiest thing in the world to secure, and does not require the aid of the Holy Ghost. Unity in variety is necessarily an ideal from which the Roman Church is as far as the Angli-

can. Here unity is lacking; and there variety. What we Roman Catholics need is the recognition of the value of diversities as something to be overcome, not by violent repression or elimination, but by good-tempered, persevering endeavor to save every real value in a higher synthesis. To further and guide this labor is just the function of sane ecclesiastical authority, could such be conceived.

The hindrances to this alone significant and fruitful unity are to be found either in the "externalism" which gives to the conceptual, verbal, and outward expression of the Christian spirit and aim the same value as to the spirit itself, and therefore is willing to kill or be killed for the integrity of that expression; or else it is to be found in the "internalism" which underrates or denies the spiritual value of such an outward embodiment of faith and the duty of continually shaping it into a more perfect instrument of the Church's inward life and action. Modernism in this respect stands in the mean between the externalism of the Mediaevalist and the internalism of the Protestant. Only that unity is fruitful which is the synthesis of variety; only that variety which is seeking for unity. With à Kempis, the Modernist does not believe that certainty about purely theological problems is as vital a necessity for the individual as Mgr. Vaughan and his school seem to suppose, or that in the day of judgment we shall be examined as to our views on hypostasis, *ousia*, substance, accidents, and the rest. He holds that there is always more than enough light to live by. Yet on the other hand he recognizes that the collective life of the community requires to express itself in a growing system of conceptions formulas and institutions, by which a fruitful unifying pressure is brought to bear on the luxuriance of individual variations. Only when this system ceases to grow, when some stage in its evolution is apotheosized and imposed as final, does it become, like the Mediaeval synthesis, a sterile uniformity.

Akin to, and as it were a dimension of, this anti-schismatic principle of unity is the principle of historical continuity. The more or less conscious memory and record of past experiences is a condition of fulness and fertility for the collective as for the individual life. All that tends to make a people explicitly conscious

of its solidarity with the past is of priceless value for its healthy development, as determining the direction of its path into the future and forbidding deviations inconsistent with its true character. A radical denial of its own past is impoverishing for the same reason that schism and excommunication are impoverishing. The Modernist is distinguished from the Mediaevalist by his sense of history. The latter denies that his religion has grown, that it has any internal history. It was what it is: it is what it was. Its memory can teach it nothing. The papacy, the three texts, the four *a priori* reasons, "simple, efficacious, practical," were always there—what can the past teach us? For the Modernist, Catholicism is a growth whose present stage can be understood and valued only in the light of every past stage. Hence he is essentially (though not inertly or blindly) conservative—a parsimonious minimizer in the matter of necessary changes and adaptations to current ideas. Forms, customs, and institutions that have outlived all other meaning and utility are still precious to him as so many strands and fibres that tie the present to its roots in the deep-buried past of religious history, and by which the ghosts of his remote ancestry are gathered round him in his worship. Even at a grave crisis of transition like the present, when the accumulated negligences and arrears of centuries of Mediaeval intransigence have to be made up for by the sacrifices of almost a single generation, the Modernist seeks precedents and anticipations of such a reform in the premature aspirations and efforts of men like Abbot Joachim or Savonarola—men who beheld Antichrist in the unrestrained, triumphant Mediaevalism of those days when it was freer than now to bear its deadly fruit unashamed. Nothing is further from his desires than to erect a smart up-to-date Church on the site of the old. The new must transcend, but it must also justify, explain, and include, all the values of the old.

Unlike the Mediaevalist, who identifies the ecclesiasticism and the theology of the thirteenth century with revelation itself, and who therefore may not criticize them without prejudice to conscience, the Modernist in his attitude towards this moribund synthesis is critical and discriminating. He applies the parables of the wheat and the tares, of the good fish and the bad, not merely

to the members of the Church but to the ever tentative and perfectible efforts of her rulers and theologians to build up an outward embodiment and organ of her inward life and character. He sees that wheat and tares have been sown contemporaneously from the very first and at every period of her history; that they have grown and developed side by side, each according to its inherent logic; that there has ever been need of continual vigilance and weeding, according as the true nature of evil and erroneous principles has betrayed itself; that there have been harvest epochs, when the call has gone forth to separate, to bind up, and to burn the tares that long negligence has allowed to accumulate in the Master's field. But, for all this, he knows that for man preliminary error is often the necessary condition of truth, and evil of good; that relatively to an immature mind what is objectively false may be nearer the truth. He knows that no doctrine, practice, or institution has lived and given life on a large scale and for a long time but in virtue of some vital element which must be saved at all costs. Thin, poor, childish, mechanical, as they now seem to any but to the seminarian mind, yet these mediævalist conceptions of dogma, revelation, faith, theology, inspiration, infallibility, papacy, priesthood, sacrifice, sacraments, saint-worship, hell, heaven, indulgences, purgatory—nay, even inquisition and persecution—all stood for the imperfect expression, or at least for the perversion, of some sound principle of religious life, individual or collective. Taking this external religion as an organic whole and not as a congeries of fragments, independently intelligible, the Modernist sees in it the work of the Holy Spirit immanent in the Christian community, striving to set forth, ever less inadequately, the Infinite and Transcendent in terms of the finite and human, according to the existing categories and beliefs of man's ever progressive mind and character. He realizes that if God is knowable, he is altogether incomprehensible in his transcendence; that of his inward essence, and consequently of man's relations to him, we can have none but symbolic conceptions. Our religion is therefore a mystery, an enigma, a dark glass. Faith is not knowledge; in their literal sense our creeds are not true. Faith is the conviction that whatever they tell us of the love, goodness, beauty, or

greatness of God is immeasurably less than the truth—is only an attempt to supply content to our barren idea of the Incomprehensible; is truer—or less untrue—in the measure that it more effectually raises our minds and hearts and stimulates our energies. According to S. Thomas Aquinas (not to speak of the Gospel), God himself is the central or formal object—in a sense the only object—of our faith. All other *credenda* are proposed to us merely as throwing light on his nature and his relations to man. But it is perfectly evident that the personal, individual spirit to whom we pray and in whom we trust is but a mental image or idol, in man's likeness, symbolic of the Incomprehensible and Infinite. We say rightly that God is at least equivalently spirit and at least equivalently personal; but of that which he actually is we have no comprehension. He is equivalently, but not "formally," all that we conceive. And if this holds of the central object of our creed, it plainly holds of the dependent objects. While treating the objects of faith as matters of miraculously communicated theological "knowledge," Mediaevalism, by speaking of them still as "mysteries," bears witness to the older view that was supplanted by impertinent scholastic rationalism and by concessions to popular materialism. For the Mediaevalist the Trinity is a difficulty rather than a mystery or enigma.

To charge the Modernist with Protestantism and private judgment is cheap but not intelligent. His faith is precisely in the Church; in a judgment which is objective because it is public and not private. It is the Mediaevalist who, by denying all inspiration and critical value to the collective experience reflection and judgment of the entire community, and by subjecting the whole Church, including the episcopate, to the personal will and judgment of a single bishop, has repudiated the fundamental idea of Catholicism and turned the constitution of the Church topsy-turvy. As Mgr. Vaughan puts it, the trunk, the branches, the leaves, all live by and from the root. So all truth and power and grace flow through the miraculously guided Pope down to the furthest members and branches of the purely passive and receptive Church: "What could be more simple?"—Yes; but what could be more false to history and to Catholic tradition?

What more childish, mischievous, and impracticable? What did the uncertainties, disputes, and councils of the Church during nineteen centuries mean, if the popes possessed, or claimed to possess, or were admitted to possess; this "simple, practical, and efficacious" means of producing uniformity?

The Modernist knows the crude modernity, the origin and history, the governmental and political motives, of this mechanical simplification. False as it is, it owes its life and persistence to certain truths which it perverts and caricatures. Like the whole mediaeval synthesis, it is one of those many hypotheses and plausibilities which were bound to be tried and experimentally disproved in the course of the Church's strugglings after truth, and by which her eventual apprehension of truth will be strengthened, deepened, and enriched. She will be all the better and none the worse for having passed through and beyond Mediaevalism, and for her costly experiments in absolutism. For the Modernist, she is a teaching Church just because she is a learning Church; because she can speak with all the authority of secular and worldwide experience; because she is unfailingly impelled to seek for an ever more perfect doctrinal and institutional embodiment of her unchanging faith and spirit. The Gospel is her conscience—a goad that will never suffer her to rest peacefully in any false or inadequate position, but infallibly drives her on in quest of the truer and better.

All this is, of course, as much an interpretation, a theology of Catholicism, as is the Mediaevalist synthesis. But, so far as it is more than a negation and destructive criticism of that synthesis, it is in large part a return to the principles of pre-Mediaeval and patristic Catholicism—to a deeper and more fruitful, because more experienced, appreciation of those principles. Moreover, unlike Mediaevalism, Modernism makes no pretence of being either a complete or a final synthesis. It is before all else a method and tendency rather than a system. Its inspiration or driving-force is history and not philosophy. The whole Mediaevalist fabric rests on a grotesque and monstrous ignorance of the history of the Bible and of the Church; that is, of the story of their genesis. For Mediaevalism they have no genesis, no history: they sprang into existence, full-formed, by a miracle.

Even the most meagre and reluctant estimate of the assured results of historical criticism is fatal to the Catholicism of Mgr. Vaughan and of the Encyclical *Pascendi*. For this reason the main argument of that Encyclical is devoted to an attempted demolition of the scientific method that leads to such disastrous results; while its practical measures are directed to the systematic inquisitorial repression of historical knowledge. The implied admission is surely significant: Rome is afraid of facts. Had Modernists cared only for the barren delights of destructive criticism, had they been the cold intellectualists described by the Encyclical, they would have abstained from all synthetic enterprise and contented themselves with stating facts and asking awkward questions. But being Catholics and believers, they were bound, for their own sakes and for the sake of others, to suggest some interpretation that would enable their Catholicism to survive the inevitable wreck of Mediaevalism; and to this end, most, though not all, of them have borrowed from modern philosophy those flexible categories of life and growth of which scholasticism knew little or nothing. Unassailable as long as they kept to facts and history, as soon as they trespassed on philosophical territory they gave the Mediaevalist (for whom scholasticism is of the very marrow of faith) the chance of crying, Heresy! and of sweeping away their facts along with their philosophy in the dust and confusion of one and the same anathema.

But when the dust settles the facts will still be there, as ugly and awkward as ever. Whatever other elements of the Modernist synthesis may perish—and many will—one point at least is secured for ever; namely, that however the interpretations of faith depend upon and presuppose the facts they interpret, faith has no jurisdiction in the realm of history. Faith may tell us that Christ was God and that he died for our sins; but only after history has told us that Christ existed and was crucified. Whether we know them through human witness, or angelic witness, or divine witness, historical facts remain historical facts, made credible by adequate testimony, and can by no possibility be matter of faith, or more than the natural text whose supernatural meaning faith interprets. On their phenomenal side, as links in the sequence of events, the

miracles of the Gospel belong to history and not to faith; and their factual truth must be as accessible to the veriest infidel as to the believer whose faith alone can divine their supernatural significance. Here is a conclusion to which we are simply forced by the pressure of historical evidence, and which of itself and alone is fatal to the Mediaevalist synthesis. One may excommunicate M. Loisy, but to excommunicate facts is very like excommunicating oneself.¹

Let us now turn for a moment from the speculative differences of these two systems which have lived side by side for some years in the Roman Church to consider the causes, the character, and the probable issues of the acute conflict which has arisen between them under the present pontificate.

While no doubt believing himself infallible, Leo XIII did not take his infallibility too seriously. "Now that We are infallible," he is reported to have said, "we must be very careful about our utterances." At all events his general action was not governed by that more extravagant interpretation of his powers which the intentional ambiguities of the dogmatic definition of 1870 left open. He fostered his authority cautiously, and took care not to risk it by too rude a conflict with the stubborn realities of a faithless world. Not till his powder was perfectly dry would he venture forth to battle in the name of the Lord.

The faith of Pius X, in strength, simplicity and sincerity, is that of a little child—the faith that in other times and circumstances has often changed the face of the world. Without any sophistical distinctions, he believes that to him has been given all power in heaven and on earth; that he is not only infallible in matters of faith but also in matters of history and science that

¹ For those who would inform themselves more accurately on the subject of Modernism and its history perhaps no book is more illuminating than M. Loisy's latest publication, *Quelques Lettres* (Paris, Nourry), in which, as nowhere else, we get an "all-together" view of his work, his ideas, his conflict. The *Programme of Modernism* (London, Fisher Unwin) is very valuable as bringing to a focus the various scriptural and historical problems which have, so to say, forced the movement into existence. *Lendemain de l'Encyclique* (Paris, Nourry) is also a very brilliant little synopsis of the situation by a group of French ecclesiastics. Finally, the volume on Modernism by the Rev. A. L. Lilley, Vicar of Paddington (London, Pitman), gives a most sympathetic and understanding outsider's view of the movement, and supplies an exhaustive bibliography.

bear upon faith; that the whole Church lives from him as a tree from its root; that it rests on him, the Rock, as an inverted pyramid on its apex; that the jurisdiction of the collective episcopate, of the ecumenical council, of the canon law, is all borrowed from him and can be overridden or taken back by him; that if he chooses he can take the election of bishops entirely into his own hands; that he can, if expedient, appoint his own successor; that, in a word, he alone in his own person is the *Ecclesia docens*—the teaching and ruling Church, while the episcopate, no less than the “lower” clergy and the laity, have no other duty or responsibility but to submit, to listen, to obey. Needless to say, it is no sort of self-sufficiency, no confidence in his own learning or wisdom, that allows a humble man thus to exalt himself, but a childlike faith in the promise of divine, miraculous guidance. Neither cardinals nor bishops were perhaps quite prepared for so extreme and logical a development of their concessions of 1870; but it is almost impossible to question the logic, nor can they now, by any constitutional method, recover their alienated birth-right.

Although anti-Modernism held a conspicuous place in his programme of general restoration, the first efforts of Pius X were directed to the much-needed work of the moral reform of the Roman clergy and prelacy—a reform prosecuted with a zeal and energy highly distasteful to the clerics in question. It was the interest of these latter to divert this zeal into other channels, and Modernism was an excellent lightning-conductor. Men whose preoccupations had been anything but theological became suddenly scandalized at the enormities of criticism; many a broken career was mended, many a spotted reputation restored, as the reward of diligence in the crusade against theological corruption. After all, it is an accepted axiom that orthodoxy is the root of morality. It is futile to cut down the evil tree and leave its root in the ground. Get the theology right, and all will go well. These were considerations to weigh with a naive, unhistorical mind. Moreover there was the class-ambition of the Roman theological schools enlisted in the cause. These had long felt the sceptre of intellectual leadership slipping from their grasp, and realized that the triumph of the historical and scientific method must be their ruin. Then

there was a whole host of frankly worldly interests—gain,² power, ambition, and the like—intimately bound up with the Mediaevalist simplification, and seriously threatened by a reading of history that would restore the laity, the “lower” clergy, and the episcopate to their primitive share in the doctrinal and governmental activity of the Church.

Then there is the considerable numerical majority of lay-folk, and even priests, who have been trained for two generations or so by catechisms and theological handbooks in which Mediaevalism is set forth with all that glaring self-evidence which it presents in the treatment of Mgr. Vaughan, undimmed by the mists of history, criticism, or exegesis. To these the system commends itself not only by its compendious intellectual simplicity, but as reducing their ecclesiastical duties to that of passive, blind, irresponsible obedience. Never having heard or read of any but the Ultramontane interpretation of Catholicism, to assail that is in their eyes to assail God himself; nor will they be patient of a view which would trouble their mental or moral inertia. Thus all the spiritual laziness, all the supine ignorance, of the Church are up in arms against Modernism.

² Finance as a factor of dogmatic evolution would be an interesting study. The considerations which shaped the Mediaeval doctrine of the papacy were financial as much as political. What is priceless cannot be sold for a price; yet it cannot be had without an “honorarium,” an alms, a fee. Hence to be the sole source of all spiritual liberties, privileges, and graces is not an unenviable position. If every bishop could dispense from marriage impediments; could do all that Rome does, Rome would be as poor as any other see. Again, the doctrine of the finite and therefore mechanically divisible value of the Mass has been determined by financial exigencies. Also the substitution of a purely vindictive Purgatory for the ancient medicinal Purgatory. A debt of spiritually profitless pains can be cancelled by the masses and alms of survivors. Modernism is not very indulgent to this *locus theologicus*, and not likely to be popular with those who “live by the Altar” in this fashion. In a hundred unsuspected ways it tends to spoil the market. For example, there is an enormous demand for and supply of text-books of correct Roman College theology, moral and dogmatic, which every prudent bishop desires to see in the hands of his seminarians, and which in the eyes of Modernism are considerably worse than waste-paper. For more than fifty years the Jesuit manuals of Perrone, Tongiorgi, Palmieri, Franzelin, Liberatore, Gury, Ballerini, Cornoldi, etc., have deluged the seminary world and been a source of no mean fortune to their common proprietor. Taking human nature as we know it from history, it must be confessed that the strongest and fiercest interest that truth has to contend against is the money interest—not less fierce because it is often subconscious in its influence.

Finally there is the all-permeating Society of Jesus, whose *raison d'être* has been the support of the absolutist interpretation of papal authority. Called into existence to oppose the counter-extravagances of the Reformation, it appropriated, systematized, and defended as of faith the crude absolutism of Gregory VII, Boniface VIII, Alexander VI. Hand in hand with the Roman Curia, strengthening and strengthened by it at the expense of the Church, it worked steadily for three centuries at the elimination of every vestige of the democratic and ancient Catholic conception of the Church's constitution; till in 1870 it achieved the practical abdication by the collective episcopate of all independent power and jurisdiction. Itself a military despotism, it has managed to impose its own constitution on the Church, and so far as Christ's Kingdom is of this world and not spiritual, so far as it has to fight political battles with political weapons, nothing could be more "simple, efficacious, and practical." The Pope now holds the same relation to the bishops, clergy, and faithful as the General of the Society does to the provincials, the rectors, and their subjects. They are nothing: he is everything. Here, unlimited rights; there, unlimited duties. Nor is it only its governmental form and principles that the Society has gradually imposed on the Church. The seminary system, the manual-theology, the enervating casuistry, the mechanical, anti-mystical asceticism, the trivial devotions, the liturgical decadence—these and many other features are not the Church's but the Society's. The seeming verdure does not belong to the ecclesiastical oak, but to the Jesuit ivy which holds it together at a good risk of squeezing the life out of it. Plainly the attitude of the Society towards Modernism with its all-intrusive historical search-light could only be one of unqualified hostility.

The weapons of attack as enumerated in the Encyclical *Pascendi* are such as Modernists have a right to expect from the character and motives of their opponents. An organized system of prying and secret delation; a campaign of systematic defamation and slander; the methods of the *Corrispondenza Romana* and of the "*bonne presse*" in general, compared with which those of the yellowest journalism are Christian and respectable; the boycotting of professors, of journals, of publishers; the suspen-

sion, often entailing the starvation, of suspected clerics; the repression of clerical, and as far as possible of episcopal, reunions and associations—these and the like are the weapons in which the Encyclical puts its trust. For the execution of such a programme none but the basest and unworthiest will offer their services; and thus it is into the hands of these that the destiny of their betters is committed.

Except for the futile attack on the historic method, there has not been in the Encyclical or since the Encyclical any sober and serious attempt to fight Modernism with the sword of history and reason—nothing but rhetorical tirades for the confirmation of the ignorant in their ignorance.

We need no longer, as a few months ago, speculate on the probable result of these methods. Already they are bearing their bitter fruit in abundance. Those outside (and alas! many inside) the Church who identify Catholicism with Mediaevalism and confound the two in one common hatred are witnessing with ill-disguised joy what seems to them the headlong rush of the Church's rulers down the steep that leads to the abyss. When Modernists who would stand between the Church and destruction are swept down by the stampede, they cheer and applaud—and Rome takes their applause with stolid seriousness. But to all the world it is evident that the practical methods of the Encyclical are those of a cause that has lost all faith in itself; that has nothing to hope from the inherent power of truth and justice; that subconsciously knows itself to be intellectually and morally bankrupt.

And of these two bankruptcies the latter is the more serious. The methods of Mgr. Montagnini³ are after all those of his patron and explicit approver, the Cardinal Secretary, and those of every nunciature throughout the world; and they are such as must subject any government, still more a would-be spiritual government, to the moral censure of Christian civilization. Mgr. Montagnini is in diplomatic disgrace for the crime of having been found out; but how little he is in moral disgrace is proved by his recent promotion to a canonry in the Lateran. And Rome imagines that these things can still be done, day after day, without apology or reparation as in the epochs of her greatest power and corrup-

³ See *Fiches Pontificales*. Paris, Nourry.

tion—that she can at once patronize the *Corrispondenza Romana* and claim the respect and obedience of upright and honorable men.

One might speak at length of the political and the financial bankruptcy of the Mediaeval system, but enough has been said to show that in the violence of the anti-Modernist crusade we witness not the symptoms of returning health and vigor, but the convulsions of a death-agony, the last flicker of an expiring flame.

This violent precipitation of a crisis for which the Church at large is by no means ready can afford but little satisfaction to the far-seeing Modernist. True, it has given the movement self-consciousness; it has immensely multiplied and united its adherents; it has evoked and justified a spirit of resistance; it has won for it the sympathy of the religious intelligence of the world. But such inevitable and radical revolutions should be slow and noiseless in the measure that the scandal and religious upset of the multitudes is to be avoided or minimized. The *Ignis Ardens* of the present pontificate must inevitably be followed (as is curiously prophesied) by the *Religio Depopulata* of the next.

Yet in spite of this, the true Modernist is, as we have said, one who believes in the vitality and recuperative power of that formless, underlying, pre-hierarchic Church which, as it preceded and produced, so also can criticize, reject, and survive the great experiment of Mediaevalism. He appeals, not with Pascal "Ad Jesu Christi tribunal," not to a future Pope or Council, but to the silent Church that thinks, feels, endures, and bides its time; from the Church Mediaeval to the Church Eternal.

This no doubt is faith and hope rather than reason; yet not without some basis in reason and history that diverse minds will estimate diversely. For, unlike many abortive anticipations of Modernism in the past, the present movement owes its rapidly accelerating force and impetus, not to uncertain theories and speculations, but to a whole cumulus of facts, each as awkward for Mediaevalism as was the single discovery of Galileo. None has more right than the Modernist to say, "Things are what they are, and their consequences will be what they will be." Such was practically the response of M. Loisy to Pius X, who, not content

with that critic's profession of the Catholic Faith and promise of respectful silence, demanded an inward renunciation and an outward refutation of his honest historical conclusions—as though there were no such thing in the world as intellectual necessity or scientific conscience! This system, which cannot bend to facts, must break against them. The whole atmosphere of the age is laden with the microbes of Modernism, and all the inquisitorial ingenuity in the world cannot prevent their fructifying in living and active minds. Were every known Modernist to be silenced and excommunicated tomorrow, it certainly would not check, it might for many reasons accelerate, the spread of the epidemic. Of this the perfectly independent appearance of the phenomenon in so many different and distant centres—a fact which only the recent action of Pius X has brought fully to light—is an evident proof. Modernism is independent of propagation by contact.

It needs then no faith to foresee the incoming of the tide, or to predict the inevitable retreat of King Canute to a position of safety. But it needs some faith to believe that this forced retreat may be accomplished without dishonor and irreparable disaster to the cause of temperate and rational authority. Such, however, is the faith of all true Modernists, and the hope, more or less faint, of many who at least wish them God-speed.

*THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO AS A MEDITATION
ON DEATH*

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It is of the philosophy of Plato that I would write, but I would keep in mind a definition of philosophy given by Plato himself when he spoke of it as "meditation on death." I would write, too, not of any inner details of what Plato thought, but of his teaching in its general character and value; and especially, on behalf of my readers, I would assume that, for their purposes as well as always for my own, no fair estimate and no vital appreciation of Plato or his meditation can ever be attained without some understanding of the place of Plato and his philosophy in the history of his very remarkable people, the ancient Greeks, and of their dead civilization.

As an ancient Greek Plato belonged to the fifth century before Christ. He was, furthermore, a great philosopher who possessed the genius of a poet and very unusual powers of intellect, being, what is certainly rare in human history, as clear and discriminating in his thinking as he was far and penetrating in his vision. In philosophical standpoint he was an idealist, whatever his sort of idealism may prove to be; and to his idealism he was in large measure inspired by the life and teaching and martyrdom of Socrates. As to this last matter, however, the very greatness and significance of Socrates lay in his embodiment and dramatic, prophetic enactment of the hurrying fate of his race and their civilization. The times being what they were, and rooted as they were in a glorious past, spoke deeply and grandly through the words, and even more eloquently through the final silence, of Socrates to the poet-thinker Plato.

What it means in human history for a civilization to have produced a great poet-thinker, a man who is at once a seer and a keenly discriminating critic, and into whose life, along with his thinker's genius and poetic vision, such a searching, harrowing,

personal experience as the condemnation and death of a master and leader has entered, must always tax as well as inspire the imagination. Yet when all is said, for the history of Greek civilization the meaning is to be found in the consciousness of the poet-thinker himself: it is well focussed in the peculiar idealism of Plato; and, accordingly, to just that, to its various sources, personal as well as historical, to its character as a reflection and a comment on the past and as a foreshadowing of the future, attention is now asked.

Idealism is very far from being a self-defining term, and at least to understand Plato's idealism, it is necessary to foresee what for many the term is quite likely to obscure, not only that any idealism must always have both a forward and a backward regard, but also that a true and vital idealism is always heroic and sacrificial: it is never shallowly sentimental. An idealism like Plato's is always a victory of the human spirit over a threatening and well-grounded pessimism. It is indeed a meditation, a successful meditation, on death. Did Plato himself mean the death of Socrates? Or, possibly, the approaching death of the Greek civilization? Doubtless both deaths, if they really count as two, influenced and inspired his thinking, and certainly both must help any understanding of Plato's victory over events and conditions that gave good cause for despair.

There is not space here for any long account of the grounds in Athenian or more generally in Greek life, or even in Plato's own direct personal experience, for a dark, despairing view of life; but, while many historians call the time one of great illumination, and while only a few years before there had been the Golden Age, the age of the famous Perikles, when civic pride and splendor and achievement of the highest sort had possession of the people, nevertheless life must always have its paradoxes, and that age of the illumination was really a dark, or at least a rapidly darkening, one.

Brilliant civilizations always spring from conquests; in part from conquests over men and in part, if the two can be separated, from conquests over nature, and certainly the rise of the Greeks' civilization was no exception to this simple rule. In Greek history,

before Plato's time, had come those battles, once if not still the wonder and delight of every school-boy, Thermopylae, Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea. But after battles and their successes, inevitable conceit; and the conceit, which expresses itself, of course, in self-consciousness and self-glorification, in works of art, in sensuously pleasing literature, in all the many ways of staging one's achievement, has the effect of making a naïve, genuine, simple, honest life sophisticated and artificial, rendering patriotism and religious piety and morality, and even the life of artistic production and intellectual inquiry, formal rather than real, cultivated—a very meaningful term—rather than direct and immediately genuine. In a single word, the conceit makes for culture; and culture, brilliant as it may become, must always betray tradition, transforming the once sacred institutions of all sorts from objects of positive devotion into mere instruments or utilities. For a cultivated life, by implication when not openly and confessedly, the traditional patriotism, piety, and morality already are, or are in process of becoming, things to use or wear or publicly to appear in rather than things to own and cherish deeply and heartily or to be essentially. Thus Plato's age, as both Socrates and he have told us in so many ways, was an age that was illuminated, talented, cultivated, but also that was given to an enthusiasm for manner and successful appearance in all things, ever exalting seeming above being.

Perhaps in human history it is the peculiar business of culture always to do just that; perhaps the established ways of a particular civilization, in the interests of a progressive history, need to be turned into mere forms without substance, conventions rather than vital interests; perhaps in history, as in personal experience, it is well that the things for a time supposed real should come to have the character of only passing dreams, however splendid; but, be this as it may, Athenian life in the time of Plato, bright focus that it was of Greek civilization, had become a grand show, a splendid dream; a life that was more ingenious than genuine, more subtle than substantial or responsible, more given to technique, fashion, and display than to righteousness.

And so we can feel the darkness in that age of Greek enlightenment; since betrayal of tradition can have no end save the

passing, the death, of the civilization into which it has come. That age of culture had its chiaroscuro effects. The cultured or cultivated patriotism was shadowed by a more or less treacherous cosmopolitanism; the cultured piety by a growing indifference to real belief; the cultured, sophisticated morality by a loosening of the customs and restraints of the time; the cultivated, professional art by playing to unreasoning passion; and the consciously technical science and philosophy by a fondness for sophistry and intellectual gymnastic. In short, successful battles; conceit and self-glorification; a golden, albeit a sunset-golden age, in which life was staged in wonderful works of art and thereupon robbed of its mystery; and an exaggerated culture, that turned life formal and artificial—such is the history of the Greeks down to Plato's time; and in this history who must not feel, with Socrates and Plato, a coming, if not even, in spite of the outward brilliancy, an already present, gloom?

Not least among the causes for a deep despair was the widespread selfishness. Thus, as but an incident of the artificiality that permeated the life of the time making the existing organization of society little better than an empty shell, the individual had come to stand for more than the class or the institution, or than any of the customs, ideas, or ideals that held the people in classes or gave foundation to the institutions. The life as actually formed or organized was treated as no longer intrinsically worthy, but as only so much personal opportunity, supplying the individual with the means, the definite instruments or conditions, with which, as he was subtle and ingenious, while all the time seeming loyal and respectable, he might work out his own selfish ends. The culture had truly brought a treachery to tradition, and behind the only outward loyalty which survived for a time the reigning motive was selfishness. Moreover, as needs especially to be kept in mind, at that time, as always when individualism has supplanted patriotism and loyalty to the established life, the individual, throwing off the old restraints (except of course as he found the appearance of compliance with them to serve his purposes), was feeling himself—there seems to be no better way of expressing his feeling—just big, nay, swollen, with the life of the whole world. Was he a Greek? Of course, but

consciously and boastfully, not a prudish one. In fact the Greek life was only the garb he wore so well or the brilliant part he was taking on life's much larger stage. Surely he was a citizen of the wide world, at least as wide as the reaches of the Mediterranean; and he was, too, nature's creature, not a bondsman of the codes of a merely local, however glorious, civilization. Yes, the selfishness, the individualism, of Plato's time, must always be associated with that cosmopolitanism which was mentioned above as the dark side of the patriotism in Plato's Athens. Yet perhaps—to digress a little—such a broad, free selfishness, always doing violence to custom, always secretly, if not openly, opposing the authority of the institutions, is also always only a jumping from one set of associations and restraints into another, which, although broader, may—or even must—prove more binding. The broadly natural life to which the selfish man so boastfully turns, after all is said, is truly a harder master, a closer and more inviolate association, than any positive civilization has ever been; and the destiny of the cosmopolitan individualism of Athens, when in the fulness of time that destiny had been accomplished, was a demonstration of this truth. But, returning, the selfishness in Plato's Athens, however affected with the conceit of cosmopolitanism, and because of the cosmopolitanism however promising of good or of ill for the future, could appear to Plato only as one more sign of a threatening doom.

Was Athens unhappy? Athens does not seem to have been unhappy. If the simple arithmetic of her joys and her sorrows could be worked out, the balance would probably be on the side of a good time. Certainly the people attended the performances of the comedies of Aristophanes quite as readily as those of the tragedies of Sophocles. The age, then, had its pleasure as well as its illumination; its gayety, especially at night, a modern who was also a bit of a poet might add, as well as its glaring electric light. Nor can one forget that selfishness, even at its worst, is always stimulating. Of course it prompts dissipation and lawlessness, but also—and with recognition of this the gloom of its time and generation must seem almost to lift a little—it prompts leadership, invention, originality; it assures to a people the birth of genius; it may betray tradition even as it flaunts its brilliant cul-

ture; but certainly it involves just the loosening of restraints that enables invention and progress.

Accordingly the good time of the Athenians could not have been without some sense of the deeper, hidden possibilities of the life which they were leading so carelessly. So often the real zest of gayety, the impulse to its brilliancy, springs from a seriousness that only lacks the courage of expression, or that for some other reason chooses to conceal itself; and, if Athens was as happy as she seemed, her happiness must have had some of this deeper zest. Her citizens certainly were selfish; but, if in Plato's age their selfishness produced the treacherous dissipated Alcibiades, it also produced Socrates. The chiaroscuro effects of that time of culture and treachery, of selfishness and enjoyment, were thus such as to make the light and the shade actually change places even as one looked.

As already said, and as is indeed very generally known, the influence of Socrates upon Plato was very great, and especially the reflection on Socrates's death was one of the determining factors of Plato's heroic idealism. But now what precisely was Socrates's relation to the culture of the time? In general the contemporary writers and thinkers and teachers, all the various exponents of the intellectual life, possessed only talent. They had the art, the skill or ingenuity, of successfully maintaining the conventional life of the day, even while they served their own or their clients' personal desires. Plato's master, however, was a genius, and genius occupies itself not with the conventional, but with the real, not with the selfishness that works through successful appearance, but with the selfishness that works through successful realization. So long as life must be in part always hidden behind its forms, so long as it cannot in its full meaning and intent be explicit, so long as besides the outward and conventional there must be also the inward and vital, genius and its searching originality, as well as talent and its subtle but superficial ingenuity, will have a place and a part in human history. So, again, Socrates was a genius, and it was his peculiar mission, meeting like with like, selfishness with selfishness, treachery with treachery, and above all cosmopolitanism with cosmopolitanism,

to disclose what was real in the life of the people at large but hidden from view, or what perhaps in a spirit of laughing bravado all others were bent on not seeing and truly appreciating. While that reality could be kept under, concealed behind the pretence of loyal Greek life, the irresponsible selfishness, which was already cosmopolitan but in a careless, unideal way, could go on; the Hellenic laughter and the brilliancy and the play could continue; but let the vital fact, the hidden reality, be revealed beyond possibility of concealment and indifference, and it would at once become, what Socrates made it, an object of duty, a recognized and measured responsibility; and with such a change the easy cosmopolitanism of the selfish, fashionable, brilliant Athenians would turn positive and serious. Their friendships could no longer follow convenience; nor their argument, desire; nor their piety, outward conformity; nor their patriotism, fine rhetoric and oratory and public display; but instead all these would be made, in the first place, real and vital, and, in the second place, as far-reaching in their commands and restraints as humanity itself, affecting and embracing the barbarians as well as the Greeks. Simply Socrates effectively revealed and idealized the universal life which so unmindfully his people were already living. There is always idealization, with an accompanying consciousness of duty, whenever something that is real and present is made manifest through somebody's personal achievement.

It is necessary to speak still further of Socrates, although the theme here is the philosophy of Plato. Grote in his *History of Greece* has described Socrates in three ways: an apostolic dialectician, a religious worker, and an intellectual genius. The term dialectician has reference to the very searching character of Socrates's inquiries, to his well-known method of dialogue and destructive cross-questioning, but the last two characterizations are of special interest in this place. As has been said, Socrates disclosed to his times the fact, already too real to withstand resistance, of a cosmopolitan or humanly universal life; and Grote very pertinently insists that Socrates's achievement was with the consciousness of one who felt himself a divinely

appointed messenger. Moreover, proving his religious devotion by his martyrdom, Socrates succeeded in making the people, however reluctantly, feel, no longer their license and selfishness, but their duty, their positive allegiance, to be humanly universal, to be larger and deeper than the idle culture, however brilliant, that was still keeping up the pretence of loyalty to a passing regime. In witness to such an awakening, the death of Socrates was followed by influential schools of ethics that, although immature in their doctrines, nevertheless under the inspiration of Socrates raised questions of life's goal, of its *summum bonum*, and suggested solutions that rested on universal elements in man's nature rather than on anything narrowly personal or racial.

But now with special regard to Plato's relation to Socrates, when Grote describes Socrates as an intellectual genius, and says in explanation that Socrates discovered the abstract, general idea, the conception, he may be calling attention to what is somewhat technical and difficult, but certainly he is touching upon what deeply and directly appealed to Plato. Plato's philosophy comprised chiefly—it had its focus in—a world, or heaven, of the ideas, of just those ideas which Socrates had discovered; so that only after a careful appraisal of those ideas can one understand either the connection between Socrates, the religious missionary of the universal life, and Socrates the intellectual genius, or the peculiar use that Plato made of what Socrates achieved.

The ideas which Socrates's genius discovered and out of which Plato constructed his philosopher's world were manifestly more than ordinary states of mind or consciousness. They had even the character of things, except that they were not such things as we see about us. Those ideas were of a matter, or substance, not seen with eyes nor felt with hands. Their substance, however, is really of much less moment than their character or meaning, just as one might say of souls that what they are really for is more important than what they are made of. The Socratic or Platonic idea, then, in value or meaning was, to use a homely metaphor, merely a nail on which to hang the fact of universality, as well as all the essential implications of it, which was so present and active in the cosmopolitanism of the time, and which Socrates made the great object of his mission. Only, being an

intellectual genius as well as a religious reformer, with the consequent thoroughness of an active, deeply searching mind, Socrates saw all things natural as well as all things human from the standpoint of universality, which is to say, from the standpoint of the "idea." The peculiar trees and stones, the peculiar natural objects of all sorts in any time, in any country, as well as the peculiar human customs and institutions, must be said to be local and temporal, to be provincial; and as these can hardly be conscious for themselves, a great thinker, broad enough and deep enough, sooner or later must become conscious for them, exactly as Socrates was conscious, not merely for the institutions of his people but for all things in their experience. Can you not imagine some olive-tree near Athens brought to the critical moment of asking what a tree truly is, just as the Greek in the city was asking what truly is a man, and with the inquiry made conscious of the opposition between itself—olives, branches, and all—and the universal nature that must embrace all trees, past present and future? Can you not imagine this at just the time when the Greek was feeling himself to be only a part, however important, in a universal humanity? Man has such a habit, as irresistible as it is effective, of reading his whole world, of seeing every thing and object in that world, in his own image, in the light of his own experience; and so at the time of Socrates, and particularly in the person of Socrates, we find man awakening to a cosmopolitanism, not merely for his own immediate human affairs, the various devices of his civilization, but also for every single object in the whole sphere of his life. As the leader, then, in that awakening, as one capable, so to speak, of thinking for the trees and the stones, for the things organic and the things inorganic, of his time, as well as for the things visibly and formally human and social, Socrates was indeed, in the simple but pregnant phrase of Grote, "an intellectual genius." Many men, overcoming a too easy provincialism, are capable of attaining to the feeling, if not to the insight, of a universal humanity; but most need a Socrates to convince them that such a feeling or such an insight pertains to the whole realm of nature. What, too, is intellectual genius, if not a human sympathy with what is not human?

Those who have read Plato's wonderful dialogues have found

him constantly representing Socrates as a seeker after the true definitions of things. What, for example, is justice? Or what is a table or a tree? And always Socrates concludes that no definition can ever be adequate to the real or full nature of anything whatsoever. It is a common saying that life is not definable; but Socrates goes farther, only carrying this notion to its legitimate outcome, insisting that not a single fact or incident of life is definable. All things are what they are. Justice is not in kindness to friends nor in care of the feeble in mind or body; it is larger and deeper than any specific relation; it is, then, really and fully, simply and comprehensively, justice. And man is not Greek nor barbarian, not friend nor foe; man is man; man, as he is to be found the whole world over and all history through. The tree is neither olive nor fir, but just nature's tree, as invisible and indefinable as it is universal and eternal. *The tree or the man or the justice* is just that invisible reality, call it what you will, force or principle or spirit or idea, in which the things visible and definite, the things provincial, live and move and have their being.

Great thoughts at first reading are likely to seem meaningless, if not positively absurd. Perhaps the reason for this is that greatness is always free from pretence. To have discovered a world, for example, in which things, being indefinable, are just what they are, are just deeply and fully themselves, to have said only that what is, is, may show a great faith, but also it seems decidedly simple-minded. Yet such simple-mindedness becomes glorified when with second thought one appreciates that the seemingly empty definitions are marks of the deepest possible reverence for reality. You are you and I am I, and no one of us would be satisfied with having his nature defined more narrowly than that. So defined, we feel in ourselves the possibilities of all things. So defined, our natures remain infinite. Any definition more specific, making you perhaps mere readers of a certain book and me only the author, would certainly compromise our true, full reality; and Socrates, an intellectual genius, widely and deeply sympathetic, revered reality with a religious reverence, and refused accordingly to compromise the reality of anything. In short, as if a great explorer, Socrates discovered a new world,

profoundly real, a world in which all things, just because invisible and indefinable, were their infinite selves—the world of the ideas. Truly, death would be gain as Socrates suggested, if it insured passage thither; and by its discovery Socrates proved himself, in the fullest sense, a missionary of the universal life.

But Plato, the poet-thinker, with his mind's senses perceived this world, the world of ideas, as probably Socrates never perceived it. Socrates believed in it; explorer that he was, he even reached its borders and led others thither; but Plato, while yet living, had the vision of it, and had the vision so clearly as to be able to portray it for all time. Doubtless Plato's training, so different from that of the humbly born Socrates, being the best that wealth and position and culture could provide, greatly supplemented his native ability for this work, making him equal to the imagination and artistic creation which such a portrayal exacted, but with Plato, as with us all, it was death that made that new world, the world of the ideas, so real, and for his mind's eye so clearly visible. In the to him peculiarly clear reality of that world to which Socrates finally passed, Plato had his answer to, his emotional as well as his intellectual consolation for, the loss of his master. Has death ever failed, after its first pain, to open men's eyes to what is not visible and to inspire their lips or their pens to what has been inexpressible?

The world of ideas, then, which Socrates discovered, was very real to Plato; it was as real or as "concrete" as a picture, or, better, as the world that you and I see when we look about us. We are accustomed to see, as we go on our way, only all sorts of particular objects and people, but Plato saw—what a vision was his!—the types or seeds, the universal realities, the infinite potentialities, of which the little things of our customary consciousness are only very uncertain reminders. Each one of those seeds or types, each one of those ideas, was as if a centre, or focus, for all the different members of its class throughout all time; and in the world of them all, in the world of those infinitely pregnant seeds, Plato walked seeing. Presumably any man might walk there, too, if he would; but walking there and seeing as Plato saw are not very common.

Today we have a name for Plato's world of the infinite seeds of all things. We call that world by no less a name than nature, although we are not commonly alive to the deepest meaning of the word. Nature, moreover, is very real and present. But Plato's real world was a world apart, a heavenly place, and it is quite pertinent to ask why? Too easy is the reply, so often accepted, that Plato was but foreshadowing a Christian view. Of course Christianity has long conceded to a few pagans such foresight, and Christian apologists have often relied on Plato as well as on other Socratic philosophers, for support of their various theses. This good old Christian reply, however, while not without point, is far from sufficient. To the question asked the direct answer must come from Plato's own experience or from the times determining that experience. Plato's doctrine was his own. His doctrine of a real world, the world of the real ideas, as a world apart, immaterial as well as sensuously invisible, was just his protest against the obstinate conventionalism of his time, the wholly degenerate conservatism, which by allowing selfish motives and jealousies to prevail, by subjecting justice to personal spite, had brought Socrates to his death. To Plato, as hinted already, the death of Socrates was but a focus, in an intimate personal relation, for conditions involving the whole fabric of the life of the time; and, to add to what has already been said of these conditions, the notorious failures of certain Athenian enterprises, notably the overwhelming disaster of the Sicilian expeditions, due to selfishness and corruption, and numerous acts, publicly scandalous, of political treachery, of impiety and of immorality, had their certain effect on Plato's mind. His own personal disappointment, too, when his hopes and efforts to establish on earth an ideal commonwealth came to naught, must have been very much like the proverbial last straw. In a word, the life of the time, both in many of its outward expressions and in its inner conditions, and Plato's own personal relations to this life, were such as to turn him, successor to Socrates as he was and genius in his own right as also he was, to a poet's idealism, to a vision of another world, to a life that, just because of its reality, could not be Athenian, or for that matter natural or earthly on any plan.

Socrates died, and almost at once Plato, his devoted pupil, also left Athens. Subsequently returning in body, not in spirit, he founded the Academy, and so effectively took philosophy and the world of philosophy out of the life of affairs, out of the streets and public places, where Socrates, the public nuisance, had for a time kept it. Then, writing those wonderful dialogues, he dramatized the master's life and teaching, presenting them, no longer in the market-place, but in a book or books, and in this manner making the way of philosophy a way of retirement from the world; and, as dialogue after dialogue appeared, as Plato's poet-thinker's genius grew into the fulness of its power, only expressing in theory what already he was practising for himself and others, he ideally constructed his real world, a world apart, the heaven of the ideas, to which Socrates had already journeyed, and in which Plato himself—such was the power of his poet's imagination—had come more and more truly and confidently to live.

Plato's vision of another world was thus more than an interesting pagan anticipation of the Christian belief in heaven. So to view it would be to make it only accidental or miraculous; a result that would neither bring credit to Plato nor deepen the truth of Christianity. It was indeed an anticipation, but also it was, as said already, Plato's own answer to, his very natural defence against, that blindly obstinate, brutally selfish, ingenious but not genuine, conservatism of his time. His other-world realism was relative to the persistent unrealism at Athens. It was, again, just his cry of victory, his triumph over the despair, deeply evident to him, of Greek civilization.

A heroic philosophy, then, a heroic, sacrificial, idealism; not shallowly sentimental, but deeply reflective; a triumphant "meditation on death"—such was the philosophy of Plato. In a separate world of ideas, of the eternal, infinitely teeming seeds or principles or spirits of all things, he found assurance when not only the death and the disaster, but also even the glitter and the brilliancy, about him suggested despair. And, more than this, as remains now to be observed, in a way not yet remarked the idealism of Plato was a triumphant reflection on death. With a meaning that will speedily appear it was triumphantly retrospective. It was

also triumphantly prophetic. The idea had been supreme once. It would be supreme again.

In the *Phaedrus* there is one of the most famous of Plato's so-called myths, and in this myth, where Plato (or Socrates) is describing the course of the souls in their chariots through the Heaven of What Verily Is, we read: "There follow . . . souls, which all do strive after that which is above, but are not able to reach unto it, and are carried around sunken beneath the face of heaven, trampling upon one another, and running against one another, and pressing on for to outstrip one another, with mighty great sound of tumult and sweat of the race; and here by reason of the unskilfulness of the charioteers, many souls are maimed, and many have their wings broken; and all, greatly travailing, depart uninitiated, not having seen That Which Is, and turn them to the food of opinion." So in effect has Plato given something very like to an account of the fall of man. The wreck of those chariots threw the souls of men from heaven to earth, from the realm of pure vision, of true knowledge, to the place of mere opinion; and, if the reader will recall how the history of a civilization is always a passing from the naïve, pure-minded life to a life of sophistication and intrigue, or say even from the spirituality of childhood to the complexity and artificiality, the sensuality and worldliness, of maturity, he will see, too, how the rise of a civilization, exactly like that of the Greeks, always must bring a fall of man. It brings a time when there is peculiar point in the thought, as expressed in at least one place, that except as men become as little children they may not enter the kingdom. Plato's ideas, then, being the direct evidence of That Which Is, were as if reminiscences from the time before the fall, from the childhood of his race. They were the pure, inarticulate spirits of all things, with which, to one looking back, the life of long ago must seem to have been informed, or by which, with the unconsciousness of a child, it must have been originally inspired and directed. Plato made much of reminiscence as a way to truth, his ideas were all native to men's minds, but lost or forgotten or obscured by the fall, and in many places he wrote of a Golden Age in the remote past; so that, in his world of ideas, as he set it out before him and made it an object of belief, one can see him

only taking as still real the high estate, the clear vision, the wise and simple life, of his people's long ago. Man ever seeks what man has lost. If only again he could be what once he was! If only he could return to that time in his past when, his vision being clear, all things were possible to him.

Accordingly memory had its share in Plato's victory. But the simple, purified, all-powerful spirit of the past, a spirit which, being informed with every one of the ideas of Plato's world, was very real, and was loaded with infinite possibilities for all things in man's experience, had another value besides its character as a comforting memory—a memory that seemed to Plato even to reach back into another world. Its very reality, when coupled with its separation or liberation from the formal life to which man had fallen and in whose subtle and alluring brilliancy man had been lost for a time, gave a peculiar confidence for the future. The long ago and the hereafter have ever been the same region and the same life. A true spirit of the past, a vital idea, any commanding ideal, is always both that which has heretofore given life its real worth—being, as upon its discovery men so often say, what really and truly they have been meaning all the time—and that which henceforth is to be lived up to. A vital idea, just like any idea in Plato's world, as it is truly freed from the restraints of form and tradition, as it is put where it can be real and not merely relative, universal and not particular, is always motive as well as memory, being a deeply appreciative projection of the broad spirit of the past into the future. Recall that Plato's ideas have already been described not only as the principles, or spirits, but also as the infinite potentials, of all things. As potentials, those ideas, being also unassailably real, were as truly earnest of the future as witnesses of the past. Recall, also, how in personal experience one's memories always both give freedom from the formal restraints of the present life and inform the life that lies before with its vital purpose. No motives are ever so impelling, so productive or creative, as life's old, old stories.

Moreover a realism, a realistic idealism, such as Plato's, though it find reality only in a separate world of ideas, cannot be wholly opposed, or negative, to what is present and manifest. In some

sense and measure the revealed hereafter must already actually move with some power in the present life. It may look askance at the form or structure of the life that is; but from the life itself, from the general spirit and intent to which the existing structure is simply become no longer adequate, it cannot hold itself wholly aloof. Indeed the more realistic, the more confident, an other-world realism such as Plato's becomes, the more it is bound to make some concessions of worth and reality to the world now and here. Similarly we have often been told that fully to believe in heaven is to believe that "now is the accepted time," that the present, not merely the long ago or the hereafter, and this world, not merely the other world, belong to it. A philosopher, too, must always regard reality as a theologian has to regard God. The real faith of the philosopher, like the faith of the theologian, is seriously compromised if its object cannot take all things, even the things that seem unreal or that seem quite unworthy, unto itself. Surely there is nothing quite so hospitable as faith, nothing so capable of compassing all things. And this need, so essential to perfect faith, of making its object hospitable to all things, gets peculiar force and worth, when the object, the reality, present to the vision, is felt to have, as Plato's ideas had, the value of a reminiscence. Though the believer's fall from reality may have been great, such a feeling gives not merely the assurance, already alluded to here, of still really and truly meaning well, but also a sense of still having something worthy to do, and—which is more—of still being able to do it. With regard, then, to that Greek life to which Plato was writing, civilizations are very like men: even at the moment of their darkest degradation they do acquire faith. Their faith, moreover, always born of memory, refuses to be merely in a separate, ideal world; for the very reality of the ideal brings it into the life of the world that here and now is, and makes it inspire this life with hope, and what is more, with a motive to renewed action and with a real power for action.

In Plato's heroic idealism, therefore, one may expect to find, what certainly one does find, that he triumphed over his pessimism; his belief dispelling despair, not by wholly excluding the conditions or causes of the latter, but by heroically taking the

latter up into the former. Perhaps Plato's triumph was not as complete as this would imply, but the ideas, although the realities of a world that stood apart, in a genuine sense were real also here and now; they were real and active at least in men's minds as always loving truth and in men's wills as always seeking reality. The souls of men "all do strive after that which is above," although "by reason of the unskilfulness of the charioteers many souls are maimed." Plato's idealism was thus at least sufficiently confident, his fiction was sufficiently superior to any visible fact, to save him from condemning this world, including Athens, to hopeless error and despair, and then setting over against it another world of sheer truth and perfection. His faith was deeper and stronger than is ever possible to any such crude dualism; and at least he went so far, besides recognizing the striving of all men, as also to teach that all the formally visible things of this world in some measure participated in the nature of the realities of the other, and that man accordingly, perceiving these things or acting with reference to them, however limited or "maimed" his vision, was still not wholly ignorant nor wholly evil. True, the things seen were but shadows of the real ideas, the eternal "principles"; but therein lay some ground of hope; and Plato firmly established the hope when he placed in earthly creatures, however fallen, that aspiration or striving to the "Heaven of What Verily Is."

That aspiration is the love, the "Platonic love," of which Plato wrote so often and so earnestly, and of which others since his day, more given to romance than to either history or philosophy, have often written so loosely. In their worldly, sensuous lives men truly are creatures of opinion and of quite superficial convention; but, very much as habit, even when judged bad, must still show devotion, though a misguided and misapplied devotion, to law and order, to uniformity and consistency, even so opinion, though false, must really love true knowledge, and convention, however hollow, must itself feel its inevitable ennui and yearn for what is real and substantial. "Love," said Plato in the *Symposium*, "is the name of our desire and pursuit for what is whole," and again, "Love is the desire of having the good always for one's own"; and while Plato summed all up with the doctrine that

philosophy is complete life, it is to be added that the love which inspired philosophy was alive, though not always well nurtured, in every man. All opinion, then, at least loves the truth; all artificiality at least craves reality; and such love or such craving saves even the life that is degenerate, giving it soul, imparting to it at least a good will, making even it real and active with the reality and activity of the ideal.

To an honest faith, evidently, to the faith of a realistic idealist like Plato, who could not but defy his own dualism, nothing here or anywhere can be so false or so bad that it is not at least potentially in touch with what is truest or what is best. A real ideal must always forgive the unideal, because in the unideal it must always detect a worship of, a striving after, itself. Even death—of Socrates or of Greek civilization, of any body or of any thing—cannot unsettle a real faith. Men may be prisoners in a cave, as the myth in the seventh book of the *Republic* would have them, but the bare fact that they can see the unsubstantial shadows of things is enough to insure them at some time their release and enlightenment.

Yet it must now be said, as has in fact been hinted already, that even Plato's faith was measured. Must we say that it was too true to the Greek spirit, and went only so far—not too far? Was it Greek moderation that held Plato to his dualism? That kept the ideal from being wholly cordial or hospitable to the real, or the real from resigning itself to the ideal? These are immoderately subtle questions perhaps; but certainly Plato was too near to the Athenian life, to the disasters and treacheries of that life, ever fully to overcome the repulsion with which it affected him. He could not forget the manner of the death of Socrates. For him the ideal world, therefore, had still to seem another world. Moreover also—although here to many may appear a hopeless paradox—in spite of that repulsion, he was too near to the almost blinding brilliancy of the Greek life about him; he was himself too good a Greek, too deeply an Athenian, not to paint his other world, the ideal of his poet's thinking, in Hellenic colors; and, painting it so, in just so far he betrayed or compromised both its reality and its presence. Nor could his doctrine of love or participation or shadows compensate for such betrayal. The real

ideal, actually present and alive even in Athens, could not have Hellenic form for the simple reason that Greek life itself, as has been shown here, was itself become Hellenic only outwardly. Inwardly it was already cosmopolitan; and the real ideal, accordingly, always bound for its reality to be hospitable without restraint, could be brought from the other world into this only as it fully identified itself with the cosmopolitan universal life.

Plato's idealism, then, was indeed realistic; but, being an aristocrat and an Athenian as well as an idealist, he never quite reached the supreme confidence. His realism fell short of the reality. Can any dualism, theological or philosophical, even while it speaks of love and aspiration, of good will and faith—always a waiting faith—ever quite compass reality? Can it ever escape being narrow, as even Plato's was Hellenic?

But Plato's idealism was said to be prophetic. It was prophetic because the ideas were not less motives than memories, and because, as real, they could not be wholly aloof from the life of this world or from actual conditions at Athens. A commanding sense of another world must always foretell the coming of some new dispensation in this world. Of what, then, in positive history was Plato a prophet? This question answered, the present study will have accomplished its purpose.

Plato was a Greek prophet—not accidental or providential, but inspired directly by the very life that had already set in among the Greeks—of the Roman Empire, of that in those days world-wide, cosmopolitan, humanly universal state, which did but make Plato's ideal materially present and real, and which undertook to carry out the compulsion that reality of an ideal always justifies. That universal life to which Athens had fallen—or risen?—which Socrates as an intellectual genius discovered and heroically revealed to his people, and which Plato portrayed with the confidence of an idealist, Rome achieved with the even more perfect faith, the supreme and spiritual realism of action.

Sometimes we are asked to take a blindly fatalistic view of history, as if nations rose and fell under the power of some force and destiny which they themselves have had no part in and can find no sanction for; but when we see a great genius like Socrates

or a great philosopher and poet like Plato so deepening his own Greek life as actually to translate it into an ideal which a conquering people subsequently fulfils, the fatalism loses its meaning. Socrates and Plato, even in the moment of death, by their acts and by their teaching quite belied fate, and made even death seem like opportunity and gain. Even the passing of Greek civilization was fulfilment, a liberation of the Greek spirit.

And, finally, in the *Republic* there is a doctrine to which special reference seems fitting, for it, too, in a way that must appeal strongly to any student of history, has the value of a prophecy of Rome. Thus Plato drew an analogy between the inner parts or phases of the individual self and the various classes of society. In the self he recognized three chief parts, appetite, will, and reason, and in society three corresponding classes, artisans, soldiers and law-makers. Similarly he might have said also that the self was a bundle of many impulses or instincts, such as the religious, the aesthetic, the intellectual, the political, and the industrial, and then have pointed out that in society there were just as many distinct classes to correspond, such as the religious class, the intellectual class, and so on. But the fact that such an analogy is drawn is more significant than the terms used to express it; for even while it made the two organizations, the individual and society, correspondent part to part, it also differentiated them in a momentous way. As belonging to the individual, the parts or instincts recognized were free and undefined, while as identified with the life of the various classes of society they were only such special developments, relative to place and time and nation, as the existing civilization had produced. In general, any distinct class in society always shows some phase or interest of our common human nature made the basis of a visible institution or profession and accordingly subjected to certain prescribed ways and laws, to a certain technique or ritual; and Plato's analogy can be appraised only with this general truth in mind. In that analogy we see man's untrammelled instincts set over against the confining institutions of a particular civilization, or man's universal nature opposed to only local and temporary embodiments of it. We see, for example, labor set over against established industries, political life against partisanship,

or religion against a reigning orthodoxy. While society was all things formally and narrowly and visibly, the individual was revealed as being all things invisibly and broadly or infinitely. But so to separate the individual from the established life of the time was to make him look beyond its local and temporal affairs to a new life, broader and deeper, in which all the old, old interests or impulses of his nature would find new embodiments, in which all the various edifices of civilization would rise, as it were, against the sky in some foreign land, on some new shore.

Of course Plato's ideas, native as these were to the mind of every man, were also terms in an analogy of the individual, not however merely to society, but to the whole complex sphere of life, to the natural as well as to the narrowly human environment. They implied such an analogy down to life's very minutest details, and they issued the same call for new life by bidding the local and particular, the visible and definite, to give way to the universal, the only passing shadows to the real and eternal. They gave to the personal individual the same superiority to whatever can pass away. But the simpler analogy of the individual's peculiarly human instincts to the various parts of a formally organized society has special interest here. In it, in its irresistible call for a new social organization that should be more imperial to human nature, one cannot fail to see, once more, the Platonic prophecy of Rome.

Did Plato himself foresee Rome? Yes and no. Plato saw the Holy City as a mirage in the sky. All in good time the freed Greek spirit, joining others on the same journey, would cross the seas to the new shore and, beholding even the great dome, enter into the life so miraculously—yet was there any miracle?—revealed to it.

An idealist, then, was Plato—a heroic idealist, confidently victorious over death; and in his idealism at once a liberator of the Greek spirit and a prophet, who, let it be specially remembered, in company with other prophets that have also meditated on death, has shown human history to be more than blind fate.

BISHOP BUTLER AND CARDINAL NEWMAN
ON RELIGIOUS CERTITUDE

GEORGE E. HERR

NEWTON THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION

Until within the memory of men little past middle life Butler's *Analogy* was a standard text-book in American Colleges, and up to 1850 it was among the books for the final examinations in the University of Oxford. Recently it has been brought into fresh prominence by the publication of Gladstone's *Subsidiary Studies*, and by the sumptuous edition of Butler's works issued by the Oxford University Press, to the preparation of which Mr. Gladstone devoted the last months of his illustrious career. Furthermore, within a short time two critical biographies of Butler have been published, one by W. Lucas Collins, Prebendary of Peterborough, and one by W. A. Spooner, Tutor of New College, Oxford, and Canon of Christ Church. The interest in Cardinal Newman is perennial, and fresh appreciations of his philosophy and of his unique personality are continually appearing.

Let us ask, What was the attitude of these representative men toward the question of religious certitude? What were the criteria which each would apply to ethical and religious data in order that they may be stamped with the mark of certitude? What tests, in their opinion, would justify the judgment that we are sure that this or that statement of religious or ethical truth is true?

An exhaustive discussion of these matters involves, of course, the fundamental problems of epistemology and metaphysics: How is knowledge possible? What is the true nature of reality? These, however, are not the realms in which either Butler or Newman moved.

Our course of thought may be conveniently outlined as follows:

- I. The doctrine of Butler's *Analogy*.
- II. The influence of this doctrine upon English theological

thought and upon the school in which Newman was trained.

III. Newman's own doctrine.

IV. The contributions of Newman and Butler toward a more comprehensive view.

I

Throughout the *Analogy* Butler concedes that the argument for the Christian revelation is one that leads to a greater or less degree of probability on its behalf: he nowhere claims that it is demonstrative or conclusive. Of course every one admits that there is a degree of probability which gives practical certitude. Butler maintains, however, with all his vigor, that, since the preponderance of evidence is on the side of the revelation, a rational man is justified in accepting it and in acting upon it as if it were conclusive. The maxim that probability is the guide of life he fearlessly applies to belief as well as to conduct. In his *Subsidiary Studies* Mr. Gladstone repeatedly calls attention to the wisdom of Butler's counsel that, on the one hand, the amount of belief which is yielded to any conclusion must be measured by the amount and character of the evidence which can be adduced in support of it; but that, on the other hand, in all practical matters, and in religion especially, we have to content ourselves with an amount of evidence which falls far short of demonstration. It is the part of wisdom, therefore, to ascertain on which side the balance of evidence lies; then to close the case, and to act with as much courage and directness as though the evidence had actually reached the point of demonstration. The action of which Butler makes so much is not simply the performance of the deeds inculcated by religion: in many passages Butler makes it plain that he is contemplating the acceptance on the part of men of the Biblical revelation itself. According to the *Analogy*, and according to Mr. Gladstone, the disposition to determine our beliefs and our behavior by the balance of evidence is the secret of life here and of life hereafter.

Mr. Gladstone is certainly right in extolling the philosophy of the *Analogy* as an excellent discipline for the business man

and the statesman. Whether or not it is a sound religious philosophy is open to some doubt.

There is something peculiarly robust and British in this doctrine. What could be more in accord with the practical, common-sense bent of English human nature than to weigh the evidence, make up your mind, and then act as if all the evidence had been on one side? That is what the English business man and statesman have always done. Why is not the principle equally applicable to religion? The Englishman who gave attention to such matters believed that it was. Mr. Gladstone says over and over again that it is. The evidence does not give you certitude; but you have a constructive certitude by striking a balance of the evidence, closing the case, and then acting as if the evidence had been conclusive. That is the way we act in every-day affairs; that is the principle upon which law is administered; that is a sound principle in religion.

It is singular that Butler stands almost alone among the greater English writers in his failure to exert any appreciable influence upon the Continent. A German translation of the *Analogy* appeared at Leipzig in 1756, and a second translation in 1787; a French translation had practically no circulation. Mr. Gladstone notes that Zart's enumeration of the forty-eight British authors who influenced German thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries does not include his name.¹ This is the more peculiar when we recall the influence of Locke upon the French Encyclopedists, and of Hume upon Kant. The truth is that the hard, mechanical, legal view of religious matters which Butler's doctrine of Probability involves is not congenial to the modern Latin mind, nor to the Germanic temperament with its instinct for inwardness. Locke and Hume are hard enough, but an attractive personality gleams through their discussions. They are frequently dry, but they are never gritty.

The fatal objection to the constructive certitude which Butler's argument establishes is that it is not real: it is constructive. The process which Butler recommends is too much like the act of an unskilful accountant, who, unable to detect the error in his reckonings, forces a balance. When not only action but belief is in-

¹ Einfluss der Englischen Philosophie. Berlin, 1881.

volved in the transaction, that is just the process that the mind repudiates as illicit. We can easily close the case in an affair of behavior, and treat the preponderance of evidence as conclusive. We cannot do that in a case of belief; for the mind cannot honestly yield its assent unless it is convinced, and it cannot be convinced so long as the evidence itself is not conclusive. In religion the conviction itself is the main matter. In religion the action which does not come from a convinced mind and a spirit at peace with itself is of a meagre, prudential type, and utterly destitute of that exultant confidence and self-abandon which are the springs of Christian devotion and heroism. It is utterly impossible to imagine an ideal Christian character built upon Pascal's wager, or upon any such basis as action upon the preponderance of the evidence.

Indeed, men have no right to treat their minds as Butler's principle would suggest. It is immoral to consider insufficient evidence as sufficient. Such a course involves a wrench to the normal operations of the intellect comparable to the injury done a fine watch by throwing a wheel out of its plane. The mind cannot be forced to a belief by an act of the will. That is not what the phrase "the will to believe" means. Strictly speaking, of course, no mind can believe what it does not believe. What actually takes place in the course we are describing is that the man tampers with his own processes. Henceforth his faculties do not function properly, and all of their products come under legitimate suspicion. Many of the unveracities and self-deceptions of truly religious minds have their origin in a pressure to believe.

II

Let us now glance at the relation of the *Analogy* to English theological thought and to the Evangelical School in which Newman was trained. The *Analogy* exercised a profound influence upon English thought. It did this in two ways. It substituted constructive for real certitude, and it restricted the so-called "evidences" to the external and formal accompaniments of Christianity.

No one can read the theological literature of England from

Hooper to Doddridge without being convinced of its pre-eminent spirituality. That is why Latimer and Baxter, Howe, Owen, Chillingworth, Jeremy Taylor, and even Laud himself, have survived. It is a great literature. The thinking is not fundamental, but within its limits it is sane, thorough, and robust. Now what was the doctrine of English theologians during this period as to the bases of Christian certitude? It found consummate expression in the article on the Bible in the Westminster Confession. Dean Stanley said² that this article and the chapters on Justification in the Decrees of Trent are the ablest creedal statements of the ages. Perhaps, however, as Professor Philip Schaff suggested,³ it may be more aptly compared with the Tridentine decree on Scripture and Tradition and the Vatican decree on the dogmatic constitution of the Catholic Faith. The Westminster article reads:

We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to a high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.

We may notice in passing that the source of this article is Calvin's *Institutes*.⁴ This doctrine of the Testimonium Spiritus Sancti is not only the doctrine of the Puritans, but it underlies the whole body of English religious thought from Latimer to Tillotson (1630-1694). It is not often elaborated, but it is there. In the second and third generations after the Continental reformations, theologians began to feel that the doctrine of the Testimonium afforded too much play for the subjectivity of the individual,

² Contemporary Review, 1874, p. 499.

³ Creeds of Christendom, I, 767.

⁴ Institutes, I, vii.

and they substituted for it the doctrine of the verbal inspiration of the Scripture, which came to mean the inspiration and authority of the dominant creed or theologian.

The doctrine of the Testimonium is undoubtedly a variety of mysticism; and the important thing to notice is that the early reformers, Continental and English, and the great body of English theologians down to the revolution (1688), reached certitude by the mystic path. They admitted that arguments about revelation would lead to a high persuasion as to the probability of its authority, but certitude—the full assurance beyond the shadow of a doubt—they believed came from the witness of the Holy Spirit. The theology of the eighteenth century is at a positive disadvantage compared with that of the seventeenth in its substitution of constructive for real certitude—a substitution which was in part due to the influence of Butler.

The influence of the *Analogy* was seen in another direction. A variety of forces was at work leading to an over-emphasis upon the external features of the Christian revelation. The old Arminianism of Holland, which entered England soon after the Synod of Dort and had been espoused by Archbishop Laud, placed the strongest reliance upon miracles and prophecy as the sufficient credentials of revelation. The influence of the great jurist and theologian Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) was almost wholly in this direction. The rapidly increasing vogue of the philosophy of Locke; the speculations of the English Deists; the answers elicited from such men as Leslie, Sherlock, and Conybeare; and the revolution itself which seated William and Mary on the throne, substituting for an inherent authority in the royal line the external force of the public will—all these tendencies were in the direction of making the Christian evidences purely external and formal, and the influence of the *Analogy* fell in with the popular drift and strengthened it.

In passing from Howe (1630–1705) and Doddridge (1702–1751) to Paley (1743–1805) and Blair (1718–1800), you are aware that you have entered into another latitude with another climate. The inward aspects of the Christian revelation are almost ignored. The reasoning moves in the domain of the mechanical and the outward. A comparison of that beautiful work of Doddridge on

the influence of the Spirit⁵ with Paley's *Evidences* illustrates the change that had taken place. In the former you are brought into the realm of the responsive, passionate, beautiful life of the soul; in the latter you move in the realm of dry precedents, of the arguments of opposing counsel, and of the balance of probability.

It would be wrong to disparage the vast service the *Analogy* rendered in answering the Deists out of their own mouths; but Butler's triumph over the Deists should not blind us to the formal and unspiritual aspects of Christianity which he emphasized in the *Analogy*.

In thus characterizing the theological drift in England during the eighteenth century we must not forget that there was a remnant of the High Churchmen who were still loyal to the older theology. They are represented by William Law (1686-1761), whose beautiful life and character made a strong impression upon Gibbon,⁶ and whose power of reasoning wins a cordial acknowledgment from Sir Leslie Stephen.⁷ But the school of Law was only a handful. He was little more than a voice crying in the wilderness.

It was John Wesley who brought back the popular religion of England to its mystic basis. He confesses that he could gain nothing from Law. Probably there was some temperamental barrier between the two men; but what he might have received from Law he gained from his visit to Herrnhut and from the Moravian theology. Wesley's doctrine of the Witness of the Spirit brought Arminian Methodism to the platform of the Article on the Bible in the Westminster Confession.

The Evangelicals in the Church of England represent the influence of the Wesleyan movement upon the English Church. A study of the Evangelical theology as represented by Romaine, Simeon, and Scott will be apt to leave the impression that the party had the zeal and the devotion of the Wesleyans, but that its theological position had not been thought through. We should never forget that the great philanthropic and missionary move-

⁵ Works, I, 472-590.

⁶ The Life of Edward Gibbon, Milman Ed. p. 17.

⁷ English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, II, 72.

ments of the nineteenth century arose within this party. It gave birth to the Anti-Slavery Society and to the Sunday School movement; to the Naval and Military (1780), and the British and Foreign Bible Societies (1804); to the London Missionary Society (1795) and the Church Missionary Societies (1799). But its good works did not save it. The fate of the Evangelical party is a conclusive demonstration of the necessity of a consistent theology if a Church would lay hold of the forces of human life. It shows that a Church has a mission to thought as well as to sentiment. It is useless to attempt to describe the theology of the Evangelical party in the English Church. It was neither Calvinist nor Arminian. It took something of Wesley's doctrine of the Witness of the Spirit, but fitfully and partially. Its attitude toward the question of certitude was that of Butler. The main reason for believing in the Christian revelation was that the balance of probability was in its favor.

This was the school in which the Tractarian leaders, Keble and Newman, were brought up. The mother of Newman was a member of the Huguenot family of Foudrinier. She herself was a moderate Calvinist, and taught her children to read the authors of the English Evangelical School such as Scott, Romaine, Newton, and Milner. Newman says: "The writer who made a deeper impression on my mind than any other, and to whom, humanly speaking, I almost owe my soul, was Thomas Scott of Astor Sanford. I so admired and delighted in his writings that when I was an undergraduate I thought of making a visit to his Parsonage, in order to see a man whom I so deeply revered."⁸

III

Let us now pass to Newman's own doctrine. The Tractarian Movement has been construed from many different points of view, but, so far as Newman was concerned, it was an endeavor to find a firm basis for religious certitude. Beneath all the discussions about the Real Presence, Baptismal Regeneration, Apostolic Succession, the note of the true Church in the English Establishment, and the like, that was the real question.

⁸ *Apologia*, p. 5.

The *Apologia* is the record of the processes of Newman's thought; the *Grammar of Assent* is his exposition of the logic of those processes. These works show that Newman reached certitude by the means of two principles, the self-evidencing power of divine truth and the action of the "illative sense."

A famous passage in the *Apologia* defines his position, and our interpretation of Newman will be largely influenced by our disposition to take this passage at its face value. He says:

Starting then with the being of God (which, as I have said, is as certain to me as the certainty of my own existence, though when I try to put the grounds of that certainty into logical shape I find a difficulty in doing so in mood and figure to my own satisfaction) I look out of myself into the world of men, and there I see a sight which fills me with unspeakable distress. The world seems to give the lie to that great truth of which my being is so full, and the effect upon me is, in consequence, as a matter of necessity, as confusing as if I denied that I am in existence myself. If I looked into a mirror and did not see my face, I should have the sort of feeling which actually comes upon me when I look into the living, busy world, and see no reflection of its Creator. . . . Were it not for this voice speaking so clearly in my conscience and in my heart, I should be an atheist or a pantheist or a polytheist when I look into the world.⁹

In Newman's inner life the truth of God is self-evidencing, but the external confirmations of that truth are not what he could desire. He would have the rational evidence match the intuitive persuasion. The a priori element in Newman's spiritual development was not the assumption that the Roman or the English Church was the custodian of an infallible external authority, but that somewhere there was an objective witness to God which matched his interior conviction.

There are many resemblances between Pascal and Newman, but there is one important difference. Pascal could write, "The heart has reasons which the reason knows not of." Newman could adopt the kindred motto, "Cor ad cor loquitur." But Pascal, if the fragments of his *Thoughts* reveal him correctly, could and did trust the interior conviction as Newman did not.

⁹ *Apologia*, p. 241 f.

It may have been due to the powerful influence of the school based on Butler's *Analogy* in which he was trained, or it may have been an effect of temperament, but Newman was not content, as Pascal was, to take what external evidence he could find and accept it gratefully as a corroboration of his interior conviction: he insistently demanded that the external evidence should match the interior conviction. This it was which led him to Rome.

In many respects the *Grammar of Assent*, though the least read, is the ablest of Newman's books. It is the most carefully reasoned; its tissue is closest. It was published in 1870, in the full maturity of his powers, after long processes of reflection had clarified his mind. In 1870, no more than in 1845, is he able to believe that the logical understanding can justify the interior conviction, but he holds that the "illative sense" can at least conclusively demonstrate that the Roman Church is the perpetual witness of God in the earth. It should be noted that this doctrine of the illative sense is not an afterthought of Newman. In the *University Sermons*, delivered in his Anglican days, the doctrine is adumbrated. There it appears as "the implicit reason." There is nothing especially recondite about this theory. In a word it is this: our judgments, whether we will or no, are not wholly the product of the logical understanding, but temperamental, sentimental, experiential, and many other considerations enter into them, and rightly so. Evidence addressed to the logical understanding is not so much a test of truth as a path by which we attain access to the truth. The responses and reactions of the human spirit are also pathways to truth.

A familiar illustration may make the point clearer. In an appreciation of an eminent financier the writer says in substance: For a number of years, up to his death, I sat on the board of directors of the X. Y. Co. with Mr. A. Many times I have observed his mental processes. He would listen with absorbed attention to the statement of the facts of a given situation, but I never knew a man more impatient of an argument about the facts. After he had the facts before him and had reviewed them, he reached a conclusion; and he used to amaze the other directors by the insight, sagacity, and adequacy of his judgments. Another thing surprised me. When Mr. A. was called upon to give his

reasons for his conclusion, his argumentation was exceedingly weak. We used to say that almost any member of the board could defend Mr. A.'s policy better than the author of it.

Now what elements entered into those sagacious judgments? Formal logic hardly at all. But first there was a natural business sagacity, akin to the endowment of the artist; then large experience in dealing with similar matters; then a capacity of looking at the whole situation in the large; and then a peculiar insight into human nature, so that he could readily forecast the practicability of his policy.

In what is probably his greatest sermon—that on “Implicit and Explicit Reason”—speaking of the nature of reasoning, Newman says:

One fact may suffice for a whole theory; one principle may create and sustain a system; one minute token is a clue to a large discovery. The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward with a quickness that has become a proverb, a subtilty and a versatility which baffle investigation. It passes on from point to point, gaining one by some indication; another on a probability; then availing itself of an association; then committing itself to some popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure memory: and thus it makes progress not unlike a clamberer on a steep cliff who, by quick eye, prompt hand, and a sure foot, ascends, how he knows not himself, by personal endowments and by practice rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him and unable to teach another. . . . And such mainly is the way in which all men, gifted or not gifted, commonly reason,—not by rule but by an inward faculty.¹⁰

Newman calls this power which enables us to arrive at our conclusions the “illative sense.” He likens it to the sense of beauty or to the capacity for dealing with affairs. He illustrates its nature and working in the various departments of human activity. By it the lawyer or the general or the business man or statesman reaches a certitude as to his own conclusions through the response of his whole personality to the situation.

It is a fair question, How far did Newman's reasoning satisfy

¹⁰ University Sermons, p. 256 f.

himself? Why did he restrict the operation of his "illative sense" to the claims of the Roman Church, and not apply it impartially to the whole round of doctrine? The truth probably is that he never really cut himself loose from the old evidential school in which he had been trained at home and in his early days at Oriel. It seems as if he could not have submitted to Rome, after all that he had written in the *Via Media*, except through the working of the views which created a parching thirst for an overwhelming objective authority.

IV

Let us now ask what contribution did these great thinkers make to a more comprehensive theory of certitude? Thus far, in referring to Butler, we have only considered the teaching of the *Analogy*. Butler wrote the *Analogy* against the Deists, and of course he had to meet them on their own ground, and he did not, in an apologetic directed to a certain phase of thought, expound his whole philosophy. In Butler's *Fifteen Sermons* he did work which abides. And no judgment of him is just which does not take into account the specific occasion of the *Analogy* and the doctrine of the *Sermons*. In the *Sermons* Butler regards the voice of conscience as incommensurable with the inferences from evidence. There is a trace of this doctrine in many nuances of the *Analogy*, especially in chapter viii, but in the *Sermons* it is thrown into the boldest relief. The certitude which parallels the certitude of our own existence is the sense of obligation to do right, the conviction of the authority of righteousness. Butler says, "Though a man should doubt of everything else, yet he would still remain under the nearest and most certain obligation to the practice of virtue."¹¹ The voice of conscience is like a royal invitation. Such an invitation becomes an imperial mandate; it supersedes every other engagement. The structure of human nature makes this sense of obligation its own witness. The vindication of the place and authority of conscience is Butler's superb service to theology. Principal Fairbairn holds that

¹¹ *Analogy*, II, 16, Gladstone's Edition.

Butler's doctrine of the supremacy of conscience is inconsistent with his doctrine of probability.¹² Perhaps Butler did not discriminate so sharply as would be well between conscience as a faculty, a function, and a product; or between conscience and the moral consciousness, or between the sense of obligation and moral law, but he laid a firm foundation for moral and religious certitude in his recognition of the nature and place of the authority of righteousness. The truth of the supremacy of conscience, or, to put it in another way, of the authority of righteousness, is at once a fact and a standard of judgment. To work out the legitimate sequences of the fact as vindicating the moral order of the cosmos, as witnessing to a supreme moral personality manifesting himself in that order, and as indicating the necessity of construing the universe in the terms of personality, is one of the most fascinating and rewardful tasks of the modern theologian. But the authority of righteousness is also a criterion of values, and we are sure of the truth of every insight that clarifies and ennobles the moral ideal.

Newman, also, made a contribution to a more comprehensive view in his doctrine of the interior conviction. Butler has hardly a word about the internal evidence of Christianity. He only refers to it to corroborate the external argument. Newman, on the contrary, makes the self-evidencing power of the truth primary, and his quest is to confirm it by external evidence. At bottom this position of Newman was a return to the doctrine of the Westminster Confession, to the doctrine of John Calvin, of John Wesley, and of Jonathan Edwards. Calvin said that "it was preposterous to attempt by discussion to rear up a full faith in Scripture." Our confidence "must be derived from a higher source than human conjectures, judgments, or reasons; namely the secret testimony of the Spirit."¹³ The Bible approves itself by its own clear illumination. No one could surpass Calvin in his emphasis upon the self-evidencing power of the Truth. In comparison with that the authority of the Church or of external miracles is secondary. Jonathan Edwards speaks to the same intent:

¹² *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 11.

¹³ *Institutes*, I, vii, 4.

The gospel of the blessed God does not go abroad abegging for its evidence so much as some think: it has its highest and most proper evidence in itself. . . . Unless men may come to a reasonable solid persuasion of the truth of the gospel . . . by a sight of its glory, it is impossible that those who are illiterate and unacquainted with history should have any thorough and effectual conviction of it at all. . . . After all that learned men have said to them there will remain innumerable doubts on their minds: they will be ready when pinched with some great trial of faith to say: "How do I know this or that? How do I know when these histories were written? Learned men . . . tell there is equal reason to believe these facts, as any whatsoever that are related at such a distance: but how do I know that other facts which are related at such a distance ever were?"

All this has a strangely modern sound. Edwards evidently was sympathetic with many of the questions now raised in our churches and lecture-rooms. His answer was just what we might expect:

He that sees the beauty of holiness or true moral good, sees the greatest and most important thing in the world. . . . Unless this is seen nothing is seen that is worth seeing: for there is no other true excellence or beauty. Unless this be understood nothing is understood worthy the exercise of the noble faculty of understanding. This is the beauty of the Godhead, the divinity of divinity (if I may so speak), the good of the infinite fountain of good.¹⁴

In a sense this answer of the soul to spiritual realities is one with the verifications of truth imparted by the sense of the authority of righteousness, but the inward response we are now contemplating is that of the whole personality.

All thoughts, all passions, all delights,
Whatever stirs this mortal frame,

are the agents and media of this verdict. The spirit of man becomes aware of the congruity between itself and truth, and witnesses to it. Whether this self-evidencing power of the truth is due to the structure of the soul, to the *Testimonium Spiritus*

¹⁴ Edwards's Works, V, 186, Dwight's Edition.

Sancti, to the mystic endowment, or to the quality of truth, is of secondary consequence to the fact itself.

These principles of certitude are to be supplemented by a third, which both Butler and Newman recognized, as all Christian thinkers in some measure have done. In the sermons of both it underlies the discussion like the granite ledges under a New England hillside. It may be called the pragmatic sanction—the witness of experience. In the act of “doing the truth” we unseal in our own hearts a fountain of assurance. The absolute self-surrender of the personal life to the moral conviction marks the beginning of a spiritual experience which, in normal lives, is not pathological like most of the instances described in Professor James’s *Varieties of Christian Experience*, but thoroughly physiological and balanced. The normal Christian experience does not introduce fantastic spirits into the soul: it drives evil spirits thence, and leaves the man clothed and in his right mind. This moral conviction may be as to a definite act of righteousness, or as to the duty of a generic choice, or as to the claims of Jesus Christ, for even these register themselves in consciousness as a moral conviction, and there is no essential difference between the choice to tell the truth against the strong temptation to lie and yielding one’s self to the claims of Christ. The inward harmony, the confidence, the divine peace—the peace that passes understanding—which follow self-surrender to a moral conviction, are among the most impressive aspects of the inner life as it has been recorded through the ages.

In regard to the relative importance of the internal and external evidences for religious truth, Butler and Newman represent two distinct types of thought. Butler seems to stake everything on the preponderance of the evidence. Newman starts out with an irrefragable interior conviction as to God. And yet, in the authority of conscience Butler recognized a certitude that is not given by argument, and Newman, who believed so thoroughly in the interior conviction, went to Rome for an external authority. And both recognized the subtle but convincing verification of experience.

When therefore Butler and Newman are asked, In view of what principles does the normal mind come to certitude as to religious

truth? though they differ widely in their philosophy and their outlook, they appear to agree in answering that we reach religious certitude in view of the sense of the authority of righteousness; in view of the mysterious responses of the human spirit to truth, corroborated by the conclusions of the reason; and in view of the verifications of experience.

THEOLOGY FROM THE FAR END AND THE NEAR

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Professor James tells us that pragmatism has suddenly precipitated itself out of the air. Of absolutism the opposite is true: while not losing its definite centres of influence, it has gradually diffused itself into the air. Everywhere the tendency has been to exalt the universal and to minimize the individual; to belittle the human and to ascribe all to the divine; to emphasize the far end and to ignore the near. This absolutist atmosphere and tendency is the theme of the present article.

The absolutist types of thought are largely, if not essentially, deductive and a priori: they are drawn from a conception of the universe, and reject what does not fit that conception. Such systems have an inherent attractiveness, for they are generally large and orderly and appeal to the intellectual imagination. They carry with them an air of assurance, especially when presented in the form of the dilemma. In the last resort we seem to be shut up to one of two conclusions, one apparently impossible, the other equally inevitable. But a deeper reason for the continued influence of a priori reasonings is found in the truth they contain. The dynamic unity of the mental life precedes its elements and the analysis of them. Experience and reflection upon it imply something anterior to experience. A human mind has certain native instincts, inherent ways of dealing with experience, apart from which experience as we know it would not be possible. Thus we inevitably act upon the principle of contradiction; we behave as if we believed it long before we are able to grasp the idea. This seems to be the simplest and most fundamental aspect of the great idea of unity—an idea corresponding with an ultimate fact that works unconsciously in our life long before we grasp it as an explicit idea. Deductive arguments derive their interest and force from their bold use of such constituents of thought and the frank appeal they make to them.

These presuppositions, however, are not to take the place of a careful examination of facts, but are to guide us in dealing with experience. The history of thought makes it clear that when men try to deduce truth from necessary principles they fall into error. Fruitful results are obtained only when we keep close to observation and experience, which we interpret by the light of reason. The more religious the theologian is, the greater his need of this warning. For religion is largely rooted in the fact that men can and do pass through and beyond the details of life and reach some conviction regarding the final purpose and significance of all. A chief function of theology is to see whether such an attitude can be formally stated and justified. A theology is valuable in proportion as it unites the religious disposition of the heart and will with the most uncompromising loyalty to fact. It is not difficult to work out harmonious and beautiful schemes of the universe, but the insistent question arises, Upon what facts do they rest? Theology must be very cautious in reasoning from the infinite, and give greater attention to the humbler but more serviceable task of thinking toward it. Though it is late in the day to say that the argument, "It must be so, therefore it is so," is discredited, absolutism gives many occasions for saying it. Deductions from general ideas of universal law, infinite intelligence, or perfect goodness, must be used very sparingly. Reasonings based upon definitions, such as the contention that since the term "universe" has a certain meaning the reality must accord with it, can be given little weight in a modern theology. An understanding of the world can be had only from an investigation of it. The conceptions of the nature of ultimate reality which we from time to time formulate are valuable, and doubtless give us some knowledge of the truth, but they are not so complete and accurate as to warrant us in setting aside as unreal any of the contradictory phases of life because they do not fit our ideas of the whole. To do so is to fall into the vice to which system-making is always prone, the tendency to tyrannize over the contents of the common consciousness.

These general remarks may close with a consideration of the most important presupposition of absolutism. A chief ground and fundamental justification of its method—sometimes avowed,

often used only implicitly—is an application of the maxim of parsimony which runs thus: All investigation proceeds upon the assumption that causes and explanations are not to be unnecessarily multiplied. Reason, then, naturally seeks simplicity and unity; and absolute reality must be in accord with this method, or all our study and reasoning are useless.

This contention cannot be allowed, nor is such use of the maxim of parsimony valid. In our speculative thinking we seek not the simplest and fewest principles, but the most correct. Our concern is not with the most convenient way to handle things, but with their final nature and meaning. We do not know beforehand whether the universe is fundamentally simple or complex, and to assume that it is either is to beg the question in dispute and to close the investigation in the act of opening it. If reality be not ultimately simple, it is an error to simplify it theoretically. The initial step of absolutistic logical method is thus seen to be the work of a presupposition that seeks to dictate the character of the universe rather than to discover it, and exploits nature in the interests of a theory instead of studying her ways.

The type of thought we are considering is generally set forth as peculiarly modern. In its religious form it claims to be the only theology that fits our civilization. In estimating the truth of this claim we will be empirical and begin at the near end. What is the most characteristic thing about the development of modern civilization? Probably no one thing would be so generally named as the increasing importance and worth of the individual. To make his liberty sure; to safeguard his civil, political, and religious rights; to afford him the largest possible room for personal life and development, is a chief aim of the movements of modern life. Along with this has gone—partly as effect, partly as cause—a deepening sense of the dignity and worth of men. Do we not regard a civilization as modern or otherwise in proportion as it gives or fails to give emphasis to the worth, the dignity, the rights, and the powers of individuals? This exaltation of the individual has reached its highest expression in our English-speaking race. From the earliest glimpses we have of that race to the present day it has been distinguished by an assertion of the worth and importance of the private citizen and a sturdy use of his rights and liberties.

Much speculative monism serenely ignores or directly contradicts this feature of modern life. If modern civilization has any suggestion to offer philosophy, surely it is this sense of the value and significance of the individual. If the tendencies and principles of historical development are to mean anything for us in our attempts to frame some scheme touching the final nature of reality and the ultimate significance of life, surely the first thing they mean is that the importance of the individual, his profound significance, and his supreme worth are to be made essential elements of such a scheme. The numberless variety of men, the endless diversity of personal life, the rights and powers of individuals, are to be taken, not as hindrances to be overcome nor as puzzles to be eliminated, but as a master-key to aid in the solution of the problem. Here is a great defect in the prevalent absolutism. Whereas a modern philosophy ought to be democratic, it is monarchical. Far from being modern, it is, in its essential idea—the absolute supremacy of One—characteristically ancient and mediaeval. Its fundamental conception is better fitted to Oriental habits of mind than to our modern, Western, American civilization.

Speculative thought is slow to grasp and use the suggestions of modern civilization. There is still to appear a thinker of the first rank who will take in earnest the democratic, individualistic impulses of the modern world, and use them in a final philosophy. Leibnitz did something of this sort, so far as his realm of monads differs fundamentally from the attempts to reduce all things to the manifestations of a single reality. Lotze also has some fruitful ideas in the same vein, but nothing very important. Professor Howison's book, *The Limits of Evolution*, is made seriously defective by the author's rejection of the idea of the evolution of the soul, and his advocacy of a metaphysical theory of its eternal pre-existence. Pragmatism will probably in time lead to some positive results, but as yet it has done little for constructive thought. Unity remains the dominant idea in our thinking. And it is assumed that unity must mean the absolute rule of one being or principle. Modern life suggests a very different conception. The world is to be thought of, not as an absolute monarchy or empire, but as a commonwealth of souls, wherein all

power and right are not derived from a supreme ruler, but are lodged in the individuals comprising the community. The supreme ruler derives his right to rule, not so much from the fact that in him all souls originated, as from his purpose to regard the rights, the powers, and the welfare of all the members, to restrain and punish those who refuse to recognize the rights of others and oppose themselves to the general welfare; and from his wisdom and power, by virtue of which he is able to enforce the laws of righteousness. If our theology is to be really modern, must it not follow some such suggestion as this rather than continue to build upon monarchical conceptions? Has philosophy nothing to learn from democracy and republicanism? To the advocates of absolutism who assert that any other than their way of thinking is a survival of outgrown "dualism" it is fitting to reply that their characteristic ideas are survivals of old-world influences, conceptions carried over from times when men were unable to conceive of order and stability except under the rule of an absolute monarch before whom individuals were nothing. The real choice for us lies not between a dualism of God and devil, on the one hand, and absolutism, on the other: it is between the conception of God as an absolute ruler of individuals, devoid of any real initiative of their own, and the thought of the universe as a commonwealth or family of souls, each of whom has his rights and powers which God himself cannot ignore or override. Herein is the very heart of the problem for the modern mind.

Recently it has become evident that many absolutists see the defect of their thought touching personality, for they endeavor to amend it. The intention is clear, but its success is not. Assurances that unqualified monism is not inconsistent with personality or careless of its interests are not sufficient. Indeed their very explicitness reveals a fundamental weakness. The principle of personality must be an integral part of the whole. Mere protests and amendments do not do it justice.

Coming to a more specific theological realm, it is important to notice that the progress of theology in America, especially in New England, has been vitally connected with an increasing sense of the value of man, personality, and freedom. Among the oddities of theological nomenclature is the inappropriate though common

use of the phrase "The New England Theology." It is generally applied to a system of belief which, thought out by Calvin in Geneva, was imported into New England, and was in no way peculiar to it. The title would much more fittingly be applied to the liberal thought which, beginning in a reaction and protest against the Calvinistic doctrines of God's unlimited sovereignty and man's moral inability, found its first great exponent in Channing. This theology is a native growth; and is the natural expression in religion of the New Englander's faith in democracy and assertion of liberty. Herein is one explanation of the way in which its principles have permeated and influenced the religious life of New England. This liberal theology has, in its great representatives from Channing to Everett, taught the moral freedom and ability of men, the dignity and worth of the individual. This factor has rightly been as prominent as its doctrine of God; and Hedge thought that it should have been called "humanitarian Christianity." Likewise with a similar theology in England: Martineau, who thankfully acknowledged his indebtedness to the inspiration of Channing, made the freedom and value of the individual a central conception of his theology, and in his final exposition of his thought gave the world his *Types of Ethical Theory* in advance of the *Study of Religion*. Of late, however, there has come into liberalism a strong current of determinism and absolutism, the force of which is derived mainly from the tendencies of scientific speculation. It directly contradicts some of the most characteristic conceptions for which liberalism has stood, and its assertions of the absoluteness of God and the inability of the individual are not logically congruous with the principles of liberalism nor lineally descended from them.

Modern life, and the distinctively modern interpretation of life, have something further to tell us about the significance of the individual. By a characteristically modern interpretation of life is meant one not explicitly given by older schools, and different in essential respects from those of past ages. The really modern man regards life as an opportunity for personal achievement, a chance for him to do something with himself and his environment. Life is taken, not as a gift to be passively received nor as a problem to be solved by reflection, but as something to be acquired

by working and waiting. This emphasis upon the active, practical aspect of life constitutes an attitude different from that of the Middle Ages. With the dawn of the modern era, not independent thinking only, but active energy began to have a larger place in men's lives. Ideals of understanding the world were not merely supplemented by ideals of mastery over it: they became subordinate to them. Instead of speculating about the shape and size of the earth, men explored it to see what it might be and how to use it. This change received expression in philosophy in Kant's subordination of the pure or theoretical reason to the practical or active reason—an expression the full significance of which was not seen by Kant himself. Fichte took it up and enunciated it in some of the most inspiring teaching the world knows. Carlyle (chiefly in his earlier writings) and Emerson gave it more complete expression. These men and their utterances roused others to gird themselves, to stand up and deal with life in the power and dignity of manhood. Under such inspiration life is taken as a challenge, and men are led to be masters and creators as well as thinkers. "Trust thyself; trust the world; get something good done"—such is the teaching.

This individualism of will is one of the causes of the supremacy of the English-speaking race. It is a Frenchman who has recently called attention to it.¹ Anglo-Saxon superiority is due mainly to the individual energy and self-reliance of the Englishman. He does not wish society to care for him; he asks only for a fair chance. He wishes to earn his living and to make his own way. He is not afraid to face the world and to take risks. So he gets on. Spain and France each started with a better chance in America than did England. But the Frenchman, depending too much upon a central government, and the Spaniard, dreaming of gold and a fountain of youth, failed. The Englishman, self-reliant and enterprising, saw in America not a paradise of ease, but an opportunity for liberty and work. He set to work. His individual enterprise and energy made America.

Protestantism is largely rooted in this individualism of will, and we are slowly finding it out. Whereas with the Roman

¹Edmond Demolins, *Anglo-Saxon Superiority*. Translated by L. B. Lavigne, 1898.

Catholic salvation is a gift to be received from the Church in return for obedience and submission, Protestantism more and more sees in salvation a fuller, higher life, to be attained by the coöperation of a man himself with God. The Church is not to provide a sure entrance into heaven after death, but to help men to a nobler character and a richer life here and now.

A specific instance of the practical result of this modern attitude may be given. After the steamship "Deutschland" made her first trip across the Atlantic, a technical journal published the tabulated statements of the working of her engines and boilers. From the fact that the engines developed, for each pound and a half of coal burned, one horse-power exerted for one hour, a calculation was made as to the increase of the world's available energy. It was shown that to develop power equal to that produced by the annual yield of coal in the United States, if used with similar results, twenty million workers would have to labor one hundred and eight years. This increase of available power has been brought about by the practical wisdom and enterprise of individual men. Yet in the name of modern thought it is gravely argued that to suppose that our human wills have any power of initiative is childish conceit! Fortunately discoverers, inventors, and leaders of enterprise do not think so. This tremendous energy lay useless, even unknown, until men who supposed they did count for something and could initiate something grappled with the apparently unpromising elements of the earth. Our wills, we are frequently told, are only tiny, meagre, and feeble manifestations of the one universal will, vain and helpless without God, and can originate nothing. That wholly apart from God we could do nothing, and would be nothing, is not here questioned. But if facts of history give any indication of the truth, many of them indicate that in important ways God is helpless apart from men. By means of irrigation men cause deserts to blossom as the rose. In modern market-gardening the farmer makes any climate and soil he desires, and gets five crops a year from one piece of ground. Mr. Burbank has in a few years outdistanced the work of thousands of years of nature—the universal life which some assure us is the absolute master of men. Electricity as a natural force is perhaps the oldest of all forms of power, but only recently has it by the

skill and toil of men been made subservient to our welfare. In this progressive subjection of nature to human welfare an eminent American economist finds a new economic basis of civilization, and tells us that we have passed out of the "pain or deficit economy," in which men had to fight a deficit, and have entered upon a "pleasure or surplus economy," in which our problem is how to distribute equitably a surplus of resources.² In substantial harmony with this is the view of a great English naturalist who sees in man "nature's insurgent son," whose appearance made a new departure in cosmic evolution, whose will has become a new ruler that has profoundly modified not only his own history but that of the whole living world and even the face of the planet³ on which he lives. Are these characteristics of human life in general and modern life in particular to count for nothing in our thought? Is it reasonable to suppose that they have no ontological significance? Should we ignore the conceptions of our own civilization, and allow other ideas to direct our thinking? And if we continue to follow such a course, would it not be well to see the true character of our principles, and not confuse ourselves by calling them modern and civilized?

But, it is confidently asserted by theological absolutism, our whole conception of an orderly, systematic world makes it impossible for us to believe in individual freedom and initiative; for in a universe "there cannot be any room for independent and creative wills actually thwarting the Good Will."⁴ If there were such, there would no longer be a universe, but only a "multiverse," and this choice between chaos and cosmos is held to be ultimate and decisive. But is our knowledge of the universe so full and exact as to warrant such confident assertions as to the possible and the impossible? No reason based upon observation and experience is given for the statement just quoted. It is offered as a self-evident truth, belief in which is compelled by the law of contradiction. Two conceptions are compared, and, being found incompatible, one is taken and the other left. For modern thought, however, the question is, What kind of a world is given in expe-

² Simon N. Patten, *The New Basis of Civilization*, 1907.

³ E. Ray Lankester, *The Kingdom of Man*, 1907.

⁴ Charles F. Dole, *The Theology of Civilization*, 1899, p. 61.

rience? The only satisfactory manner of getting light upon the great problem of the relation between human wills and the divine will is by observation of experience and reasoning from it. We must see what there is in life that throws light upon the relation of the one and the many. The neglect of absolutism to approach the problem in this way is another instance of the dominance of deductive method in its thought. Instead of careful observation and reasoning therefrom we are often given statements that have made a strong impression upon the minds of those making them. Now on every hand actual affairs furnish instances that help to a solution of the problem. A modern business establishment is planned and created mainly by the wisdom and ability of one man, without whom it would never have come into existence. Yet he alone could not have accomplished the result. He furnishes the main outlines of the business, but it is carried into execution by a small army of subordinates. To each of these is given a certain amount of discretion and power of action. Within limits each decides what is to be done, and has the decision carried out. A mistake, carelessness, or dishonesty, on the part of an assistant, injures the business, while continual care and attention, and a wise, timely move, help it. The freedom and independence of the subordinates are real though limited. The head of the house does not attempt to do everything himself, nor does he even closely direct his assistants. A university, a federal union of states or provinces, are other examples of the same thing. More interesting and instructive, because more ancient and familiar, is the family. The parents guide in a general way the family life. The children as they grow are given larger individual liberty, more and more they plan their own lives, until at last the relation between children and parents ceases to be that of governors and governed and becomes a human companionship of affection and interest. A family shows how an indwelling, overruling providence of wisdom and goodness is compatible with great liberty, independence, and initiative on the part of individuals.

These instances help us to understand both the actual and the ideal relation between the One and the Many. They show how baseless is the theory that, if there is one God, there cannot be

creative wills, capable of working with or against the supreme will. If facts of observation are to count for anything, if we are to get light upon the problem of the universe from the conduct of affairs upon earth, there can easily be independent wills capable of originating action in or out of harmony with the purposes of the supreme will.

Into the many considerations that lead us to believe that there are wills with a real though limited independence this article cannot enter. One point only will be mentioned. If men are wholly without power of initiative, if they are mere helpless, passive manifestations of one absolute will, then all the evil and sin of the world is the act of God. A Japanese woman sold her step-daughter to a man for ten yen (five dollars). If there is no human independence and initiative, then God sold the girl—and God bought her. Common sense and moral reverence forbid the thought. No vigor and rigor of logic can make such a conclusion other than odious and blasphemous. Nor can the matter be mended by using the idea of development and saying that this outrage is only a step in a process which is, on the whole, good. For either there is something of supreme worth which gives a standard of value or there is not. If there is not, the process has no moral significance. If there is, then for us it must consist in the dignity of human souls. Any degradation of souls then becomes an evil as long as it lasts. Such evil is not made better by being viewed as a stage in a development. For again, what is the final purpose and meaning of the process? It consists in the promotion of the dignity and nobleness of souls. But here is an insult put upon a soul. While it continues it is evil—evil which cannot rationally be made anything else, and ought not morally to be called anything else. A course of development that needs such wrong, or inevitably produces it, cannot be wholly divine. It is impossible to regard as the unmodified work of a righteous God a process that repeatedly destroys the highest moral values known to us. This conclusion cannot be set aside by an attempt to force a hasty and complete answer to the question, 'Then what is it that is not divine?' The point that calls for emphasis here is that, if God is to be to us a moral being, worthy of reverence and worship, we must believe that, whatever may be the ultimate

explanation of the Japanese woman's act, it is not to be attributed to God. We are sure that truth is not to be found by flat contradictions of plain moral sense and ordinary spiritual insight. Some distinctions we must hold, even though they do not readily fit into our preconceived schemes of the universe.

If now, passing over many intermediate steps of thought, we conclude that men can and do commit wickedness, are we consequently compelled to surrender faith in divine providence? Or what is the relation between the misdeeds of men and the providence of God? It is vain to seek light here simply by working with intellectual conceptions. We must bring our ideas into contact with the realities of observation, and from the interworking of the two we may gain some truth. Instances already given show how an indwelling, overruling purpose may exist along with the freedom, the mistakes, even the wickedness of men. The manager of a department of a great business may blunder, or sell his employer's secrets to a competitor, or steal his employer's money. An injury, trivial or serious, results. The head of the establishment must be ready to repair such injuries. Probably he has at the start so limited the power of his subordinates that none of them can fatally injure the business. Evidently, then, considerable liberty may be given to individuals, and there may be much misuse of it, along with the carrying out of a supreme purpose. It is, then, sheer assumption to say that for theology to recognize the power of initiative in men is to destroy our conception of a universe and leave us with a chaos.

This, however, only establishes the possibility of a universal providence; experience alone can tell us whether there is such a providence. What then do we experience in connection with our mistakes and wrong-doing? We find offered to us opportunities of amendment and recuperation. A man sins carelessly or wilfully. He generally finds at hand some remedy for his degradation. He makes a mistake, and discovers that he can learn the lesson of it and avoid it in the future. Frequently he can do much to repair the damage wrought by his error or misdeed. We can destroy, but we can also build. We hurt and degrade ourselves by evil, but we can receive a cure. No sin seems to be final: recovery is always possible, newness of life is always to be had,

and unexpected currents of vitality continually appear: there are no signs of exhaustion. These helps and remedies, this restoration of our souls, is offered to us. We do not make them: we only receive and apply them. Our life and experience, small as they are, are in close vital connection with the whole of existence, and its inexhaustible life environs and supports us. This is the manifestation in intimate, personal experience of the moral providence of God. It has been working in the past, and it works now. Revealed close at hand for our good, it is yet so vast and deep that we cannot comprehend it. We do apprehend it and are aided by it, because it first apprehends us. This revelation of greatness as well as nearness leads the soul to make the leap of faith and to believe that there is in God a remedy for every possible mistake and misdeed of men. The field of his wisdom and goodness is larger than that of human activity, and includes all its possibilities. We may help or hinder, but we cannot destroy, the purposes of God. A victorious army is none the less triumphant because there have been shirkers and cowards in its ranks; and they are none the less blameworthy and contemptible because the army has triumphed. A man chooses whether he will have his place with the true men who fight well or among the skulkers who only hinder the victory.

When, then, the absolutist asks incredulously if a man can by the exercise of his little will interfere with the working of divine providence, the reply must be, Surely he can. The best conception we can form of such providence is that it is an attempt to gain the voluntary coöperation of individuals in the welfare of a great family. The free assent of men to a divine purpose, their consent to its laws, their willing dedication of themselves to a divine life, are the very heart of the matter. But if men can consent to such a purpose and work with it, they can also refrain from doing so either by mere neglect or deliberate refusal. Probably the vast mass of wrong-doing is at bottom heedlessness rather than intentional choice of evil. Christian theology has greatly exaggerated the element of deliberate wilfulness in sin. Men seldom intentionally choose evil as their good; they are simply careless of their diviner possibilities. But this heedlessness is sinful, and hinders the realization of God's purpose in human life. For the

best cannot be forced upon us even by God; it comes to us only when we voluntarily appropriate it. Paradoxical as it may be, it is true that it is possible for a man to have an excess of faith in God. This is undeniable on the prosaic level of common affairs, for there, if a man merely commits himself to providence and does not proceed to earn a living, providence lets him starve. It is equally true in the highest concerns of our nature. There God is hindered until and unless we work with him.

The absolutist types of thought have done a great work for theology. By going directly to the centre, dealing with the whole of existence at once, and explaining everything finite by relating it to the infinite, they have reached truth of the highest value, that will surely stand. The conception of a world-unity is so firmly established by many concurrent lines of observation and reasoning that assaults upon it are vain. Constructive thought not only may use it but must incorporate it as an essential part of its schemes. But this alone is not enough. The manifold parts and aspects of the world must be studied, and proper attention given to the interests and objects of actual life. The ultimate unity is doubtless more than these, but it certainly is not without them. It is only a dialectic prejudice that leads the absolutist system-makers to insist that we must choose between all-monism and all-pluralism. They are wholly right when they contend that the universe is a rational system, but wrong in concluding that only one kind of system is possible. The systems well known by us in experience are not so closely fitted and minutely dovetailed that variation, contingency, and free play of the parts are impossible. The facts are just the opposite; and there is a multitude of reasons for thinking that it is the same with the universal order. Philosophical theology must regard these things, and use a case method of investigation as well as the dialectical. The revelations of the telescope do not annul those of the microscope, and the latter have the greater value in the practical conduct of life. To find the truth, the short view is as necessary as the long. In a drama the characters are at least as important as the plot. Monism with its conception of the absolute and pluralism with its emphasis upon individuality are equally valuable and significant. In the clash of schools and opinions now one may be uppermost, now the

other; but neither is supreme lord of intelligence. The principle of the plurality of souls must rank with that of unity of origins. The highest unity is an ideal one, and consists not in singleness of substance or power, but in harmony of aim and endeavor. This, so far from being an eternal reality existing independently of men, is constituted by the loyalty and endeavor of individuals, apart from which it exists only as a possibility. This is at least the case with that phase of the world-unity with which we as moral beings are most concerned. A valid theology, working from the far end *and* the near, must make the pluralism of souls, the moral independence of the individual, as central and significant as the thought of God. Its scheme of thought will not be a circle drawn from one centre, but an ellipse with two foci. It will find the most important unity, not in the dominance of one will, but in the coöperation of many in a rich, varied life. Each man will be seen as a centre of activity capable of using the divine energy; God will be thought of as a Father, respecting the individuality of his children, seeking to win them to a nobler, higher life.

SURVEY OF RECENT LITERATURE

*The Old Testament.*I. *General.*

Old Testament and Semitic Studies in Memory of William Rainey Harper. 2 vols. 1908.

Gilbert, G. H., Interpretation of the Bible; a Short History. 309 pp. 1908.

The Programme of Modernism. 1907.

Knight, Theodore, Criticism and the Old Testament. 1907.

Roman Catholic and Protestant Bibles Compared. (Gould Prize Essays.) 2 ed. 1908.

Cornill, C. H., Introduction to the Canonical Books of the Old Testament. 1907.

Taylor, R. Bruce, Ancient Hebrew Literature. 4 vols. 1907.

Cheyne, T. K., Traditions and Beliefs of Ancient Israel. 1907.

Gordon, A. R., Early Traditions of Genesis. 1908.

The two volumes in memory of President Harper contain twenty-six papers contributed by American scholars and covering a considerable part of the Old Testament field—a fitting tribute to President Harper's activity as a teacher of the Old Testament.

Gilbert's popular sketch of the history of interpretation contains some good observations on the limitations which an uncritical treatment of the Old Testament puts upon exegesis itself.—The Italian reply to the Encyclical of Pius X, translated into English by Father Tyrrell, and published under the title, *The Programme of Modernism*, has a short but lucid sketch of the recent results of Old Testament criticism.—A calm and well-considered view of the critical situation is given in *Knight's* "Criticism and the Old Testament."—The three *Gould Prize Essays* furnish facts about Roman Catholic translation work not generally known to Protestant readers. The comparison made between the versions is intelligent and fair. The arrangement of the material is not so clear as it might be, and the attitude toward the Apocrypha is to be regretted. An excellent bibliography is appended.

The fifth edition of Professor *Cornill's* "Einleitung" has been translated into English in part and published thus under the title

"Introduction to the Canonical Books of the Old Testament." The English edition, as the title indicates, omits the part of the German work relating to the Apocrypha; this was done at the author's request—the Apocrypha is to be treated in a separate (German) volume by Professor Gunkel. Cornill's work agrees in general in method and results with Driver's well-known Introduction, differing from it partly in being less statistical in form, and partly in taking a more advanced position in regard to the date and origin of certain portions of the Old Testament. It may be recommended as an excellent guide in the study of the Old Hebrew literary history.

Canon *Cheyne*, in his "Traditions and Beliefs," cites a large mass of suggestive material from Babylonian and other records and from folk-lore; but the value of his construction of this material is diminished by the nature of the theories to which he has lately committed himself.—Alongside of this work may be mentioned *Gordon's* "Early Traditions of Genesis," a conservative survey of the field.

A convenient edition of the Bible is *Taylor's* "Ancient Hebrew Literature," which in four volumes gives the Old Testament, the Apocrypha, and the New Testament, the matter being arranged by topics.

II. *Interpretation.*

Briggs, C. A., The Book of Psalms. (International Critical Commentary.) Vol. II. 572 pp. 1907.

Barton, G. A., The Book of Ecclesiastes. (International Critical Commentary.) xiv + 212 pp. 1908.

Streane, A. W., Esther. (Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.) 1907.

The second volume of Professor *Briggs's* "Psalms" completes his work on the Psalter. This volume, like the first (which has been widely noticed in critical journals), contains a wealth of exegetical and critical material with much helpful reflection. Dr. Briggs here reaffirms his position respecting the dates of the psalms, the methods of the editors, and the nature of the metrical forms; the subject is a difficult one, and there is room for difference of opinion on many of the points involved.

In the Introduction to his "Ecclesiastes" Professor *Barton* gives a thoughtful criticism of the various views of this somewhat enigmatical book that have lately been expressed. In general he has avoided the extreme positions of some recent scholars; his own position may be described as liberal conservative. In agreement with Nöldeke and McNeile he assigns the book to about the year 200 B.C., on the ground that it is quoted in Ben Sira (*Ecclesiasticus*), the date of which is about 180 B.C. He recognizes interpolations by only two editors, the one orthodox, who corrects the author's heresies, the other a sage who is devoted to wisdom. He rejects the view that the book is affected by Greek thought and that it is metrical in form; the alleged Epicureanism of 9 7-9 he finds in a Babylonian fragment of about 2000 B.C. These positions, all of them debatable, are defended with marked ability. The commentary is clear and helpful. It is satisfactory to see that he retains the Masoretic text of the first clause of chap. 12 ("Remember thy creator in the days of thy youth"), which, however, he properly regards as an editorial interpolation.

Dr. A. W. *Streane's* "Esther" has useful annotations; its critical position is unduly conservative.

III. *History.*

- Grant, Elihu, *Peasantry of Palestine*. 1907.
Montgomery, J. A., *The Samaritans*. 1907.
Meyer, M. A., *Gaza*. 1907.
Gregg, David, *Between the Testaments*. 1907.
Toffteen, O. A., *Ancient Chronology*, I. 1907.

In *Anthropological Essays*, a collection of papers presented to Dr. E. B. Tylor in honor of his seventy-fifth birthday, Dr. J. G. Frazer, in a paper entitled "Folk-lore in the Old Testament," discusses a number of passages with great learning and freshness, though his conclusions are not in all cases satisfactory.—Customs and ideas in the Orient are persistent, and the description of manners given by *Grant* in his "Peasantry of Palestine" helps to reconstruct the old Hebrew life.

Professor *Montgomery's* "Samaritans" gives the best account of the history and religious opinions of this people that has yet

been published. The part of the book relating to Old Testament times deals with the facts in accordance with sound methods of historical investigation. The Samaritans are said to have been substantially a Jewish sect; Sanballat is regarded (against Josephus) as a contemporary of Nehemiah; and Isaiah 66 is not interpreted as a reference to the Samaritan temple.

Dr. M. A. Meyer's "Gaza" is a valuable contribution to our historical material. It substantially reproduces Stark, and adds the results of recent investigations.—Rev. David Gregg's popular sketch of the interbiblical history is useful, though critically vague.

It cannot be said that Professor Toffteen has advanced our knowledge of the early Hebrew history by the discussions in his "Chronology"; his bold conjectures are without historical support. The treatment of Old Testament chronology, however, occupies only a small part of the volume.

IV. *Religion.*

- Bousset, W., *What is Religion?* 1907.
 Marti, K., *The Religion of the Old Testament.* 1907.
 Workman, G. L., *The Servant of Jehovah.* 1907.
 Kent, C. F., *Israel's Laws and Legal Precedents.* 1907.
 Terry, M. S., *Biblical Dogmatics.* 1907.

An instructive comparison of the Old Testament religion with other religions is given in Professor Bousset's "What is Religion?" an attractively written book.—"The Religion of the Old Testament" is the translation of Professor K. Marti's well-known work on the subject; he is sometimes over-conservative, but always full and suggestive.—Professor Workman's "Servant of Jehovah" is a scholarly and helpful study of a question that has perpetual interest for students of the Old Testament.—An admirable guide in the study of Hebrew law is Kent's "Israel's Laws and Legal Precedents." The material is arranged in general chronological order, with foot-notes and a critical introduction.

In his "Biblical Dogmatics" Professor Terry treats the Old Testament as an independent book and lets it speak for itself, not attempting to import into it New Testament ideas. He dis-

cards the terms "inerrancy" and "infallibility" (for the Bible teaching) as contrary to fact, but maintains the "sufficiency" of the Scriptures as a guide to the knowledge of God. The Old Testament he regards as standing in general on a lower ethical and religious plane than that of the New Testament; it is to be regarded, he holds, as an incomplete revelation, a preparation for the full truth of the Christian Scriptures. He frankly adopts modern critical principles and results in the treatment of the Old Testament. The volume is characterized by a clear arrangement of the material and a refreshing directness in the statement and interpretation of the Biblical texts.

C. H. TOY.

The New Testament.

I. *General.*

Hastings, James, *A Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels.* 2 vols. 1906-1908.

Sanders, H. A., "Four Newly Discovered Biblical Manuscripts," *Biblical World*, February, 1908, pp. 138-142; E. J. Goodspeed, "The Detroit Manuscripts of the Septuagint and New Testament," *Biblical World*, March, 1908, pp. 218-226.

Grenfell, B. P., and A. S. Hunt, *Fragment of an Uncanonical Gospel from Oxyrhynchus.* 22 pp. 1908.

Buchanan, E. S., *The Four Gospels from the Codex Corbeiensis ($\bar{\bar{f}}$ [\bar{f}_2]); together with Fragments of the Catholic Epistles, of the Acts, and of the Apocalypse from the Fleury Palimpsest (h).* (Old Latin Biblical Texts.)

Deissmann, Adolf, *New Light on the New Testament, from Records of the Graeco-Roman Period.* x + 128 pp. 1907.

Gregory, C. R., *Canon and Text of the New Testament.* (International Theological Library.) 539 pp. 1907.

Ferris, G. H., *The Formation of the New Testament.* 281 pp. Philadelphia. 1907.

Abbott, E. A., *Notes on New Testament Criticism.* (Diatessarica, Part vii.) xxx + 313 pp. 1907.

Hastings's Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels is intended as an aid to preachers, and besides the usual archaeological, critical, and theological articles on subjects connected with the Gospels, "every aspect of modern life, in so far as it touches or is touched by Christ, is described under its proper title," in an enormous number of brief articles, such as "Abiding," "Above and Below," "Accommodation," "Poet," "Fact and Theory." Many of the articles are good and suggestive, and such short discussions of fragmentary topics may prove valuable to many persons. Some of the longer articles also are excellent, but for purposes of serious

study a complete Bible Dictionary and good handbooks to the several departments of New Testament learning are better guides.

The Biblical manuscripts of Mr. *Freer* of Detroit are a valuable addition to the materials of textual criticism. The ms. of the Gospels (uncial and very ancient) contains after Mark 16 14 the Greek of an interesting additional passage already partly known in Latin from a reference by St. Jerome. The text of Matthew is not of the type of \aleph B.

From the Oxyrhynchus excavations comes a parchment fragment of the fourth century, containing two hundred words from an *apocryphal gospel*, and giving part of a controversial conversation between "the Saviour" and "a certain Pharisee, a chief priest, named Levi," on the subject of outward and inner purification. The matter can have no claim to historical trustworthiness. To what apocryphal gospel it belongs cannot be determined.

English scholars continue their punctiliously accurate publication of texts with the Old Latin version of parts of the New Testament found in *Codex Corbeiensis* and the Fleury Palimpsest.

Deissmann's book is a popular and very interesting account of the gain to an understanding of the New Testament from the increasing knowledge of the contemporary language and prevalent ideas of the Greek World. He describes and illustrates how philological and literary interpretation, and also the comprehension of the religion of the New Testament, are all aided by the study of the newly discovered inscriptions, papyri, and inscribed potsherds. The profounder theological and historical lessons of his discussion will not be overlooked by the thoughtful reader.

Gregory's thick and instructive book on the Canon and Text of the New Testament is intended for continuous reading rather than merely for reference. It contains an exposition of the history of the use and collection of the New Testament writings, with the evidence from ancient writers translated in full, and will give a good idea of the innumerable problems, as well as of the now well-established conclusions, relating to the general progress

of the history. The latter half of the volume presents a clear and even entertaining statement from a great textual scholar of the facts of textual criticism, and gives the best account available of Westcott and Hort's epoch-making theory of the history of the New Testament text.—*Ferris's* small but vigorous book is admirably adapted to give the general reader a trustworthy idea of the history of the Canon.—*Abbott's* "Notes" are on many topics, and mainly a collection of material for the technical scholar.

II. *Gospels and Acts.*

Allen, W. C., *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to S. Matthew.* (International Critical Commentary.) xevi + 338 pp. 1907.

Harnack, Adolf, *Luke the Physician.* (Crown Theological Library.) xii + 231 pp. 1907.

Harnack, Adolf, *The Sayings of Jesus; the Second Source of St. Matthew and St. Luke.* (Crown Theological Library.) xvi + 316 pp. 1908.

Salmon, George, *The Human Element in the Gospels; a Commentary on the Synoptic Narrative.* xxiv + 550 pp. 1907.

Wernle, Paul, *The Sources of our Knowledge of the Life of Jesus.* xii + 163 pp. 1907.

Forbes, H. P., *The Johannine Literature and the Acts of the Apostles.* (International Handbooks to the New Testament.) viii + 375 pp. 1907.

Important are the books by Allen and Harnack. *Allen*, in his *Commentary on Matthew*, has limited himself to the attempt to make clear what is characteristic of and peculiar to that Gospel, and to show how the author used his sources, and what meaning the sayings of Jesus "had in the mind of the Evangelist when he placed them in their present position in his Gospel." This has produced a work of great value to every serious student of the Gospels, but not such a general reference-book on the life and teaching of Christ and on historical criticism as commentaries on Matthew have usually been. This division of the field is a gain both for the quality of the book and for its influence on the reader's point of view. For broader discussion one must go elsewhere; to know the Gospel of Matthew this is one of the best aids in existence.

Allen holds that the sources of the first Gospel were Mark, the "Logia" of Matthew, and other materials; he strongly controverts the view that the common material of the first and third

Gospels came from one common source, and argues that the early documents must have been much more complicated than is often assumed. His introduction is a noteworthy contribution to Synoptic criticism.

Harnack's two important monographs are characteristically illuminating, effective, and stimulative to reflection. In "Luke" he urges that the author of the third Gospel and the Acts was Paul's "beloved physician," a view which is rejected by many critical scholars, but seems likely to make gratifying progress through Harnack's new advocacy and skilful presentation of the evidence. If it is adopted, it is, in Harnack's judgment, necessary to admit that Luke, although a contemporary, was sometimes not a perfectly well-informed historian, and sometimes worked up meagre materials into an elaborate narrative, and that, although a physician, he did not stand on the level of modern science. Some critics of Harnack's view would find a study of the great Greek physician Galen instructive.

"The Sayings of Jesus" is an investigation of the "Logia" or "second source" of Matthew and Luke. Harnack believes that there was such a source, originally written perhaps by Matthew in Aramaic, in Palestine, before the destruction of Jerusalem, and somewhat more ancient than Mark. Its contents and form can be approximately determined. "The influence of 'Paulinism,' which is so strong in St. Mark, is entirely wanting." That the conception of the personality of Jesus furnished by this source is homogeneous and characteristic is one of the chief proofs that the analysis is correct. Harnack's book is sure to lead to further inquiry by the same method. If an assured result could be attained here, the foundations of confidence in our knowledge of the life and teachings of Jesus would be distinctly increased; for that confidence must mainly rest on our attitude to the Gospel of Mark and to the body of Sayings discussed by Harnack. Any contribution to our knowledge of either is of vital significance.

Salmon's posthumous volume is a detailed commentary on the parallels of the Synoptic Gospels. Its greatest interest lies in the revelation here made of how Salmon's later thought had travelled

from the strongly argued views of his "Introduction" (1885) to an acceptance of current critical views of the Synoptic problem, and even to the tentative belief that the Fourth Gospel is the work only of a disciple of the Apostle John.

In *Wernle's* little book the general reader will find a well executed presentation of the differences between the Synoptics and John, and a simple form of the modern theory of the two sources of the Synoptic Gospels.

Forbes's commentary on the Johannine Literature and the Acts completes the "International Handbooks to the New Testament." The English text is the basis of brief, but careful, open-minded, and well-informed notes, from the point of view of thorough-going, but not unsympathetic, criticism.

III. *Life of Christ.*

Sanday, William, *The Life of Christ in Recent Research.* viii + 328 pp. 1907.

Bennett, W. H., *The Life of Christ according to St. Mark.* xii + 295 pp. 1907.

Robertson, A. T., *Epochs in the Life of Jesus; a Study of Development and Struggle in the Messiah's Work.* xii + 192 pp. 1908.

Garvie, A. E., *Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus.* xii + 545 pp. 1907.

Schmiedel, Paul, *Jesus in Modern Criticism.* 91 pp. 1907.

Orr, James, *The Virgin Birth of Christ.* xiv + 301 pp. 1907.

Swete, H. B., *The Appearances of our Lord after the Passion; a Study in the Earliest Christian Tradition.* xviii + 151 pp. 1907.

Lake, Kirsopp, *The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ.* (Crown Theological Library.) viii + 291 pp. 1907.

Sanday has collected a number of lectures and essays into a highly suggestive and delightful volume. It is the best source in English for information about recent German study of the apocalyptic element in Jesus' teaching. The book has significance also in showing the tendencies of Dr. Sanday's own later thought.

Bennett's and *Robertson's* books on the life of Christ are reverent and thoughtful studies, each with its own method; but are of popular usefulness rather than scientific contributions.—*Garvie's* is a far more substantial piece of work, being an elaborate study of the life, and especially of the thought and character—and so

of the person—of Jesus Christ, from the point of view of a theologian. Garvie has made a significant addition to the literature of the life of Jesus.

Schmiedel's address, although from a wholly unorthodox point of view, is positive and constructive, and exhibits in use the rules of criticism which he laid down in his much-discussed article in the *Encyclopaedia Biblica*. He "maintains the truth of much that others reject."

In a series of apologetic lectures written from strong conservative conviction, *Orr* discusses methodically the narratives of the virgin birth, the evidence from the other writings of the New Testament and from the early Church, and the Old Testament prophecies, and treats of its doctrinal bearing on the sinlessness and uniqueness of Jesus and on the incarnation.

Swete follows carefully and reverently the various narratives of the resurrection appearances, and considers their relation without formal discussion of objections.—*Lake* examines elaborately the several texts, and has chapters on "the reconstruction of the earliest tradition" and "the facts behind the earliest tradition." His view is that Paul must be the starting-point, and that the appearances were "objective visions."

IV. *Epistles and Apostolic Age.*

Milligan, George, *St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians; the Greek Text with Introduction and Notes.* cx + 195 pp. 1908.

Mayor, J. B., *The Epistle of St. Jude and the Second Epistle of St. Peter; Greek Text with Introduction, Notes, and Comments.* ccii + 239 pp. 1907.

Du Bose, W. P., *The Gospel according to St. Paul.* viii + 303 pp. 1907.

The Fifth Gospel, being the Pauline Interpretation of the Christ. By the author of "The Faith of a Christian." xii + 223 pp. 1907.

Wrede, W., *Paul.* xvi + 183 pp. 1907.

Scott, E. F., *The Apologetic of the New Testament.* (Crown Theological Library.) viii + 258 pp. 1907.

Milligan's admirable, scholarly, and well-proportioned commentary on Thessalonians worthily fills the empty place in Lightfoot's projected series. The author has used the most recent sources, such as the papyri, to illustrate Paul's language and ideas, and one of his long notes is devoted to "St. Paul as a letter-writer,"

with striking parallels from contemporary Greek private correspondence found in Egypt.

Mayor has written a full and important commentary on Jude and 2 Peter, similar in method and scale to his exhaustive commentary on James. He holds to the now generally adopted view that 2 Peter is partly drawn from Jude and is not genuine. Jude he thinks to be genuine.

Du Bose and the author of *The Fifth Gospel* have both given compact and readable presentations of the Pauline system of Christian thought. The former writes as a theologian, using modern language and aiming to depict Paul's main ideas as theological truth. The latter author tries rather by a sympathetic psychology to understand the working of Paul's mind, to "follow him into his soul's laboratory, and see him at work on his own experiments."

Wrede's rapid and effective sketch of the life and ideas of Paul is from a different point of view from either of the two just mentioned. His original and pointed utterances are full of suggestion and stimulus, whether they call out agreement or dissent. He emphasizes the conception that Paul was not the theological expounder and successor of Jesus, but as a second founder of Christianity remoulded the new religion and established it as a religion of redemption.

Scott traces in seven lectures the apologetic element in the various books of the New Testament and shows its influence on the forms and development of nascent Christian theology.

J. H. ROPES.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- THE AGE OF REVOLUTION (1648-1815). *By W. H. Hutton.* 8vo, pp. 301. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. \$1.50 net.
- THE ATONING LIFE. *By H. S. Nash.* 12mo, pp. 148. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. \$1.00 net.
- THE NEARER AND FARTHER EAST. *By Samuel M. Zwemer and Arthur J. Brown.* 8vo, pp. 325. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. .50 net.
- THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY. *By Josiah Royce.* 8vo, pp. 12+409. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. \$1.50 net.
- FAITH IN MAN. *By Gustav Spiller.* 8vo, pp. 190. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. \$1.75 net.
- ANGLICAN LIBERALISM. *By Hubert Handley.* 8vo, pp. 312. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1908. \$1.50 net.
- HINTS ON OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY. *By Archibald Duff.* 8vo, pp. 187. London: Adam and Charles Black. 1908.
- WESTERN ASIA IN THE DAYS OF SARGON OF ASSYRIA, 722-705 B.C. *By A. T. Olmstead.* 8vo, pp. 6+192. New York: Henry Holt & Company. 1908.
- BIBLICAL DOGMATICS; AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPAL DOCTRINES OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES. *By Milton S. Terry.* 8vo, pp. 18+608. New York: Eaton & Mains. 1908. \$3.50 net.
- TALKS ON RELIGION. *By Henry Bedinger Mitchell.* 8vo, pp. 8+325. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1908. \$3.00 net.
- THE JAPANESE NATION IN EVOLUTION. *By William E. Griffis.* 8vo, pp. 8+408.¹ New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1907.
- THE CHRISTIAN FAITH AND THE OLD TESTAMENT. *By John M. Thomas.* 8vo, pp. 10+133. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1908. \$1.00 net.
- THE CHURCH OF TO-DAY. *By Joseph Henry Crooker.* 8vo, pp. 177. Boston: American Unitarian Association. 1908. .75 net.

THE DOCTRINE OF MODERNISM AND ITS REFUTATION. *By J. Godrycz.* 12mo, pp. 132. Philadelphia: John Joseph McVey. 1908. .75 net.

THE INFINITE AFFECTION. *By Charles S. Macfarland.* 12mo, pp. 174. Boston: The Pilgrim Press. 1907.

THE STORY OF THE REVISED NEW TESTAMENT, *By Matthew Brown Riddle.* 12mo, pp. 89. Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times Company. 1908. .75 net.

PAUL THE MYSTIC; A STUDY IN APOSTOLIC EXPERIENCE. *By James M. Campbell.* 12mo, pp. 6+285. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1908. \$1.50 net.

